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ABSTRACT
Freedom, Equality, and Markets in Eighteenth Century Philosophy
by
Nicole Whalen
Advisor: Omar Dahbour

This dissertation examines how eighteenth century thinkers Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Adam
Smith, and Immanuel Kant defended the value of free markets. It reconstructs their defense of
liberal economic reforms, including free trade (domestic and foreign) and the deregulation of
markets in labor and land. Through this reconstruction, I demonstrate how the normative
foundations of early free market thought were contested throughout the period. Pro-market
thinkers (e.g. Turgot, Smith, and Kant) viewed economic liberalization as a mechanism that
increased the economic freedoms of individuals, whereas critics of the market, including Richard
Price and other “agrarian republican” thinkers, concluded that liberal reform diminished
opportunities for material self-sufficiency and independence. Contemporary scholars, who often
emphasize the egalitarian commitments of eighteenth century pro-market thinkers, have largely
downplayed the significance of this latter group of thinkers and their egalitarian proposals for
agrarian reform (which Turgot, Smith and Kant did not support). In contrast, this dissertation
contends that although the agrarian republican outlook constituted a path not taken in the history
of economic thought, the conceptualization of economic freedom as a form of nondomination
and material self-sufficiency remains an important idea for contemporary discussions of
economic justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Rethinking Market Economies: What Can We Learn from the Past?

Recent events, including the 2008 financial crisis and the resurgence in left social
democratic and environmentalist movements, have put markets at the center of contemporary
political debate. These events signify a growing discontent with the ideological predominance of
neoliberalism—a theory that extolls free markets for their efficiency and alleged ability to
maximize wealth and freedom. Critics claim that neoliberal policies have worsened economic
inequality, exacerbated the environmental crisis, and placed political power into the hands of a
corporate elite. In response to these concerns, there has been a noticeable shift in debate. New
theories are now being put forward, and old ones revived, that seek to mitigate environmental
destruction and decrease economic inequality and disempowerment. What many of these theories
hold in common is their support for greater economic regulation and, in some cases, the radical
reconstruction of economic institutions and free market practices.
It is within this context that some contemporary political philosophers have developed an
interest in historical ideas about markets. Scholars believe that in studying the past we can gain
normative insight into how to reshape current free market practices. While I believe political
philosophy can contribute to these normative projects, this dissertation will delineate economic
and philosophical approaches to markets that I view as part of the problem, not the solution, to
our current economic impasse.
The focus of this dissertation will be on the free market thought of Anne Robert Jacques
Turgot, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant. As will be discussed, contemporary scholarship on
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this period is largely revisionist, insofar as it disassociates eighteenth century economic thought
from the nineteenth century doctrine of laissez-faire and contemporary neoliberalism. Scholars
tend to emphasize, for instance, how early proponents of liberal economic policies permitted
state intervention, economic regulation, and wealth redistribution to a far greater extent than
many contemporary advocates of free markets would now support. They conclude that, for these
reasons, early pro-market thinkers were far more egalitarian than contemporary free market
proponents. This revisionist project seeks, moreover, to destabilize some of the fundamental
assumptions underlying contemporary free market ideology by showing how disparate the views
were of its avowed predecessors.
While it is accurate to claim that early proponents of free markets addressed the welfare
needs of the laboring poor, the suggestion that their economic views radically depart from the
traditional tenants of economic liberalism seems a less credible one. As will be discussed below,
support for government intervention is not necessarily inconsistent with support for a capitalist
free market economy. This is the standard contemporary liberal view.1 Like libertarians, liberals
do not question the ability of free markets to enhance economic growth and freedom. Unlike
libertarians, however, liberals believe that the state has a greater role to play in correcting for
market failures and growing wealth inequality. This is generally expressed in their support for
welfare state capitalism. On this model, unequal market outcomes are corrected by the state
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In this dissertation my use of the term “liberal” or “free” (as in “free market”) refers to policies
or economic theories that favor a market economy, i.e. an economy where the distribution and
production of goods and services are coordinated through the market as opposed to the state. In
my use of the term here, however, it designates a particular political-economic outlook. As I will
go on to explain, market economies come in a variety of institutional forms. In market
economies, the function of the state can be minimal or robust in terms of its ability to regulate
markets or redistribute wealth. I designate views that favor the former approach as libertarian or
neoliberal, and views that favor the latter as liberal. On both outlooks, however, markets play a
primary role in supplying goods and services.
2

through income redistribution. To the extent that these thinkers do share some perspectives in
common with the liberal outlook, it is questionable what more we might learn, given that, as will
be seen, their discussions of distributive justice remain underdeveloped.
While on the liberal outlook, moreover, the role of markets in organizing economic life is
limited, it is not limited to the extent that the economy is fully subordinated to the governance of
non-market institutions or actors (i.e. the state or civil society). This latter outlook is represented
in various traditions of socialist thought and in theories of economic democracy (more on these
distinctions below). From the perspective of these traditions, welfare state capitalism fails to
correct for other harmful forms of inequality that can occur even in the context of greater income
equality. For these reasons, proponents of these theories suggest that economic equality and
freedom require structural and institutional changes that go beyond wealth redistribution. Some
interpretations of Smith also suggest that his economic thought is amendable to certain of these
more overtly anti-capitalist views.
Against this more recent academic trend, this dissertation demonstrates that once the
views of Turgot, Smith, and Kant are located in the wider eighteenth century debate about the
merits of economic liberalization, these contemporary interpretations encounter several
problems. While from a contemporary standpoint the admission of some forms of regulation and
wealth redistribution may be identified with liberal views of the economy, in the eighteenth
century there existed a very different and more robust understanding of what was required of
society if the aims of freedom and welfare were to be met for the laboring poor.
As one example of this, a common view that circulated during the period was the
republican idea that freedom, as a form of nondomination, required economic self-sufficiency.
This view was advanced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by republican thinkers
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including James Harrington and Richard Price. Likening wage labor to a form of slavery, these
thinkers supported reforms that increased opportunities for land ownership (by opposing the
unequal distribution of property) and self-employment. In contrast, Turgot, Smith, and Kant did
not follow in identifying wage labor as a form of domination. Nor did they adopt agrarian
reforms that would allow for a more equal distribution of land. Alternatively, in adopting a
contractarian view of labor relations, they understood commercial employment and wage labor
to be compatible with republican freedom. From this perspective, as long as a person is in
possession of their labor power (not property), they are held to be economically independent.
Pro-market and anti-market thinkers, then, characterized emerging free market relations in
dramatically different ways.
This dissertation examines these conflicting eighteenth century assessments of the ethical
basis of a market economy. While the primary focus is on the pro-market thought of Turgot,
Smith, and Kant, I also pay close attention to the views of their opponents. What becomes clear
in this reconstruction, is that pro-market and anti-market thinkers alike employed the values of
freedom and welfare but used them to defend very different economic policies and reforms. As
just suggested, the diversity of their views may be rooted in their conceptual disagreement about
the meaning of economic freedom. Where agrarian republicans, including Price, identify
economic freedom with ownership of property or productive assets, Smith, Kant, and Turgot
identify economic freedom with ownership of property in the person, which can be alienated in
the form of labor. Depending on which definition is adopted, one is led to support a different
position on a variety of economic issues, including property distribution and ownership, free
markets, and labor regulation.

4

In highlighting these differences, this dissertation challenges recent scholarship that
identifies early pro-market thought with the development of a “free society of equals.”2 For, once
the arguments of Turgot, Smith, and Kant are compared to the views of their opponents, they
look markedly less committed to egalitarian aims. As will be discussed, critics had good reason
to believe that liberal reform posed a new set of problems for securing the liberties of the poor.
They articulated these concerns in their criticisms of the monopolization of grain by merchants
and suppliers, the proletarianization of the laboring poor, and the consolidation of property
produced by the enclosures. In short, they associated liberal reform with the loss of economic
control over their livelihood and subsistence. In this way too, they anticipated theories of
economic democracy, which seek to place the economy under greater public and social control.
Conversely, while pro-market thinkers addressed the abuse of power by the mercantile
state, they were less concerned with the monopolization of power in the economic realm. They
overlooked or refuted the growing concern, expressed by their opponents, that free markets allow
power to amass to the owners of property and capital—i.e. grain merchants and suppliers,
employers, and landlords. Much like market fundamentalists today, in upholding the property
rights of the owners of property and capital, they overlooked the freedoms of those who
possessed only “human” capital. If contemporary political philosophers are interested in looking
to the past for alternative ways of theorizing market economies, then it is to the critics, not the
early proponents, that they should turn. To further clarify and elaborate on the distinctions
introduced in this section, I now turn to the work of Karl Polanyi to discuss the idea of a “market
economy.”

2

Elizabeth Anderson, Private Government: How Employers Rule Our Lives (and Why We Don’t
Talk about It) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
5

Market Economies
The concept of a market economy was developed by Karl Polanyi in his classical text,
The Great Transformation (1944). In this book, Polanyi traces the social dislocation and
upheaval that surrounded the development of capitalism in the period of the British industrial
revolution. He characterizes this development in terms of a monumental shift that occurred in the
societal organization of economic life. As Polanyi details, in the transition to capitalism,
economies that were once embedded in society became dis-embedded and subject to the rule and
organization of markets. The term “embedded” is employed by Polanyi to designate economies
that are enmeshed in social institutions and norms.3 When economies are dis-embedded, they are,
alternatively, subject to the “self-regulating” mechanisms of the market—namely, the forces of
supply and demand mediated through market prices. A dis-embedded economy is, moreover,
synonymous with a “market economy,” which Polanyi defines as an “economic system
controlled, regulated, and directed by markets alone;” where “order in the production and
distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism.”4
Polanyi argues that the development of the market economy in the nineteenth century
was historically unprecedented. While markets have always existed, they were “incidental” to
economic life and played a “subordinate” role in the production and distribution of goods for
consumption.5 To demonstrate this, Polanyi discusses several anthropological examples of nonmarket economies that pre-date the development of capitalism. In these societies, economies
were organized through systems of reciprocity, redistribution, or householding. What is evident
in each of these economic systems, moreover, is not only their lack of dependency on markets
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Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 57.
Ibid., 68.
5
Ibid., 43; 56.
4
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for the distribution of goods, but also the absence of a strictly economic motive (i.e. the motive
of gain) underlying economic behavior.
Polanyi describes, for example, a tribal custom where food is supplied to families through
matrilineal relatives. In this instance, a brother delivers “the finest specimens of his crop” to his
sister and does not gain, in turn, an “immediate material benefit.”6 Polanyi claims that the
brother’s aim in this particular act is to secure his social status and reputation. His act will
ultimately ensure that his family’s needs are met (given the principle of reciprocity), but his
motivation is oriented first toward securing his social role or status. Polanyi concludes from this
(and other examples), “man’s economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships.”7 He
continues, that man “does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of
material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets.
He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.”8 Because markets played a
marginal role in economic life in pre-capitalist societies, Polanyi concludes that the market
motivation of gain was equally as peripheral to social life.9
Where markets did exist, moreover, they were subject to social constraints and norms, so
as, suggests Polanyi, to not overrun or replace existing methods of production and distribution
within society.10 In the periods preceding the development of capitalism, these constraints
operated through the regulation of feudal institutions and (with the development of mercantilism)
the state. In feudalism, for example, property was under the control of “legal and customary
6

Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 46.
8
Ibid.
9
Polanyi develops the distinction made by Aristotle between wealth acquisition and
householding. As Aristotle notes, these two forms of production differ insofar as the former is
organized around production for exchange, and the latter, production for use. Aristotle, Politics,
trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 15.
10
Ibid., 61-62.
7
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rules,” which determined the use, ownership, and transfer of land.11 Labor was also subject to the
governance of the guilds, which set the wages of workers, requirements for apprenticeship terms,
and other regulations related to the production of specific crafts.12 Mercantilism, in its attempt to
unify disparate local economies, nationalized these practices through legal measures, including
the Statute of Artificers, and the Poor Laws (which will be discussed later on). The Tudor and
early Stuart period also inhibited the marketization of land through its interventions in the
enclosure movement. In sum, Polanyi writes: “Mercantilism, with all its tendency towards
commercialization, never attacked the safeguards which protected these two basic elements of
production—labor and land—from becoming the objects of commerce.”13
The development of capitalism in the industrial period overturned these relations. Instead
of being peripheral to economic life, markets became the main mechanism through which needs
were met. In this transformation, economic activity was subordinated to the motives and
principles of market exchange, i.e. the mechanism of price and the motive of gain. As Polanyi
defines it, in a market economy all goods are produced to be sold in markets with the aim of
deriving an income through sales (whether it is the sale of goods, labor, land, or money).14 This,
then, was a dramatic shift from producing on the basis of need within the household or for
distribution within the tribal community. The motivations for production, moreover, became
detached from the social motivations underlying economic activity in pre-capitalist societies.
The relationship between social institutions and markets, moreover, was also dramatically
altered. As Polanyi describes it, in market economies the state is prohibited from introducing any
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Ibid., 69-70.
Ibid., 70.
13
Ibid., 60.
14
Ibid., 68-69.
12
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measure “that would influence the action of these markets.”15 The state cannot regulate “price,
nor supply, nor demand,” and the only policies permitted are those that “help to ensure the selfregulation of the market by creating conditions which make the market the only organizing
power in the economic sphere.”16 Polanyi is careful, then, to note the distinction between support
for self-regulating markets (i.e. economic liberalism) and non-intervention (i.e. laissez-faire). He
claims that the introduction of economic liberalism required significant intervention on part of
the state, i.e. that “laissez-faire was planned.”17 As he explains:
Strictly, economic liberalism is the organizing principle of a society in which industry is
based on the institution of a self-regulating market. True, once such a system is
approximately achieved, less intervention of one type is needed. However, this is far from
saying that market system and intervention are mutually exclusive terms. For as long as
that system is not established, economic liberals must and will unhesitatingly call for the
intervention of the state in order to establish it, and once established, in order to maintain
it.18
For these reasons, Polanyi views economic liberalism as distinct from the doctrine of laissezfaire, although notes, “in common parlance there is no harm in using them interchangeably.”19
The important point here is that support for intervention is perfectly consistent with support for a
market economy, insofar as intervention promotes the self-regulating market or the interests of
private market actors.20
The reversal of the relationship between markets and society is ultimately identified by
Polanyi as the cause of the social upheavals of the nineteenth century and the rise of fascism in
the early twentieth century. Polanyi reaches this conclusion through his analysis of the
destructive tendencies of a market economy as it attempts to subsume all of social life under its
15

Ibid., 69.
Ibid., 69.
17
Ibid., 141.
18
Ibid., 149.
19
Ibid.
20
I will return to this point in more detail below.
16
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rule. Polanyi claims, thus, that the idea of a self-regulating market economy was both utopian
and destructive.21 He writes that such a society “could not exist for any length of time without
annihilating the human and natural substance of society.”22
Polanyi’s reasoning here relates to his discussion of “fictitious” commodities. While land,
labor, and money all operate as commodities in market economies, i.e. as “objects produced for
sale on the market,” they do so in a “fictitious” way.23 This is because land, labor, and money are
not objects “produced” to be bought and sold in the sphere of exchange; they are produced “for
entirely different reasons.”24 Nature or humanity, in other words, cannot be said to exist for the
purposes of economic exchange alone. To subject humans and nature to this logic, moreover, is
to subject them to abuse and neglect. As Polanyi describes it:
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their
natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would
result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity “labor power” cannot be
shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the
human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing
of a man’s labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical,
psychological, and moral entity “man” attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective
covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social
exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice,
perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements,
neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the
power to produce food and raw material destroyed.25

21

It is important to emphasize that Polanyi did not think there ever existed an entirely
disembedded economy, thus why the idea was “utopian.”
22
Ibid., 3.
23
Ibid., 72.
24
Specifically, labor refers to “human activity,” which does not exist for the sake of being sold;
land is nature, “which is not produced by man;” and money is “a token of purchasing power,”
something that is not “produced,” but brought “into being through the mechanism of banking or
state finance.” Ibid., 72. Polanyi notes that his discussion of fictitious commodities “has nothing
in common” with Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism. Ibid., 72 n.3.
25
Ibid., 72.
10

The destructive tendency of a market economy relates to the process whereby objects of
production—land, labor, and money—are brought under the foreign control of economic laws.
For Polanyi, this amounts to a type of anarchy, where people are no longer in direct control of
their own economic activity and are therefore made vulnerable to market failure. In being subject
to market mechanisms, moreover, the particular use values embodied in these objects are
overlooked or harmed. To commodify persons and nature is to treat them as means to the ends of
gaining wealth. This comes at the cost of ignoring the intrinsic (i.e. non-economic) value or ends
that the objects possess outside the sphere of market exchange. It is, moreover, this effect of
market economies that produces what Polanyi calls a “double movement,” i.e. the historical
development of counter-movements that resist self-regulating markets and seek to protect
fictitious commodities from their destructive tendencies.26
Polanyi’s critical assessment of market economies parallels contemporary criticisms of
neoliberalism— a theory that also supports the self-regulating market thesis. His work was also
prophetic in its warnings about the existential threat that market economies impose on the natural
world. But for present purposes, it is important to highlight how Polanyi’s analysis offers a way
forward for thinking through what a socially embedded economy might look like in the
contemporary world.
In the closing chapter of The Great Transformation, Polanyi states that economic and
social improvement depends on our ability to (re)create non-market economies. What this means,
on his view, is not the removal of markets altogether (“the end of market society means in no
way the absence of markets”) but rather the removal of markets in labor, land, and money (i.e. in

26

Ibid. 76. Polanyi uses this framework to analyze the political and economic crises that
eventually led up to the rise of fascism and World War II.
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fictitious commodities).27 Polanyi offers only a few brief remarks on what this would look like.
However, he states that wage contracts, the conditions of work, and even the pricing of certain
“staple foods” would all be “determined outside the market.”28 He also mentions that the
removal of land from markets would lead to the “incorporation of land with definite institutions
such as the homestead, the co-operative, the factory, the township, the school, the church, parks,
wild life preserves, and so on.”29 In short, an embedded economy would require the
decommodification of labor, land, and money.30 Importantly, what Polanyi suggests, then, is not
the regulation of a market economy but the eradication of markets in specific goods altogether.
Like in pre-capitalist societies, our economies should remain subordinate to society and markets
(where they do exist) subject to regulation and control. While the implications of this view will
be explored below, it is clear, as Polanyi himself recognizes, that such changes would be
“radical” in comparison to the organization of production and distribution in market
economies.31

Economic Democracy
In the common usage of the term, a market economy is an economy in which goods and
services are primarily allocated through market exchanges. According to this definition, a
capitalist economy is an example of a market economy, given that, in theory, the market, not the
state, is responsible for the provisioning of goods and services. More specifically, in capitalist
societies, private individuals or corporations, i.e. the “private sector,” supply the majority of
27

Ibid., 251-52.
Ibid., 251.
29
Ibid.
30
Other examples of the historical attempt to embed markets in labor, land, and money, are
discussed in chapters fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen in The Great Transformation.
31
Ibid.
28
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goods and services. The means of production used to produce these goods and services are
privately owned, as is the surplus generated in production. People who do not independently own
the means of production (or capital) are reliant on the owners for receiving a wage, which, in
turn, enables them to purchase the goods and services needed for their subsistence.
Capitalism is also an example of a market economy in Polanyi’s definition of the term.
To recall, a market economy does not describe an economy in which the market is fully
autonomous from the state or social institutions (although the term dis-embedded may appear to
suggest this). State intervention, as Polanyi notes, was necessary for the establishment and
continuance of the market economy. For these reasons, the concept of a “free market” is a
misnomer, insofar as it suggests the complete separation of the market (or markets) from the
state or society.
When delineating market economies, the important distinction relates, then, not to the
existence of intervention, but rather to forms of governance and ownership in the market. This is
clear in Polanyi’s analysis of “fictitious commodities.” The concern is, if the production and
distribution of land, labor, and money are left to the “self-regulating mechanisms” of the market,
they are left to the governance of private market actors (i.e. the owners of capital), who are
motivated to produce on the basis of gain. Polanyi’s suggestion to decommodify land and labor
can be interpreted to mean that their distribution and production should come under greater
public or social governance and ownership. In other words, the price of labor, conditions of
work, and use of land and resources should be subject to democratic decision-making procedures
and not be left to the private decisions of owners (i.e. the owners of the firms or capital).32 As

32

This could be interpreted to mean undemocratic state control—but in contemporary theories of
economic democracy, ownership should be decentralized and not concentrated in the hands of
the state.
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Malleson puts it, “the fundamental question…is not ‘free market’ or ‘intervention,’ but rather
intervention ‘for whom’ and ‘for what.’”33
Herein lies the idea of economic democracy, a broad term that describes the incorporation
of democratic principles, including freedom, collective deliberation, and shared authority, into
various economic arenas and practices (i.e. the workplace, markets, investment, and finance).34
In short, economic democracy gives workers, consumers, and communities greater decisionmaking power over economic activities that affect their livelihood and freedom. While a fuller
account of the theory of economic democracy lies beyond the scope of this dissertation, I’ll
briefly highlight some of its basic principles by comparing it to welfare state capitalism (or social
democracy) and state socialism.
Capitalist economies are not the only economies that make use of markets. Social
democratic societies and societies with robust welfare states are also market economies. The
difference between these two types of economies (capitalist vs. social democratic/welfare state
capitalism) is that in the latter the public sector plays a greater role in the regulation of the
market and in the provision of goods and services. In general, welfare states are committed to
establishing a large safety net for those who are negatively affected by unequal market outcomes.
This can be accomplished through a variety of means, including taxation, social spending, or
greater support for labor unionization. Welfare state capitalism stops short of socialism, insofar
as it does not call for collective or state ownership of the means of production or for the
replacement of markets with central planning. While it is possible for worker cooperatives to
exist in social democracies (as it is possible in capitalist economies), social democracies may
33

Tom Malleson, After Occupy: Economic Democracy for the 21st Century (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 104.
34
For an overview of the concept of economic democracy, see Michael Menser, We Decide!
Theories and Cases in Participatory Democracy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2018).
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also encourage the practice of codetermination.35 Codetermination allows workers to participate
on the board of large firms and therefore directly influence decisions within it.
From an economic democracy perspective, existing social democracies and welfare states
fall short of fully democratizing the economy.36 Malleson, for example, notes how although the
Nordic countries have lower levels of economic inequality in comparison to the United States,
they still have not eliminated inequality. In Norway, for example, “the richest 10% control
50.5% of the wealth.”37 Malleson views this as a problem that is inherent to the structure of the
social democratic model. On this model, while higher taxes (or greater fiscal spending) and
union strength leads to a robust welfare state and higher wages, the private control of firms,
investment, and finance limits the possibility for an even greater reduction in inequality.
Malleson’s reasoning (which he develops on the basis of empirical examples) is that further
attempts to redistribute wealth or authority pose a direct threat to the profits and governance of
private owners.38 On his view, for greater equality to be achieved—and to more fully “alleviate
substantial poverty, wealth inequality, or worker powerlessness,”— countries must “replace
private control of investment by public and cooperative control.”39 Malleson also promotes
worker cooperatives, which would grant workers, as owners, greater decision-making power in
their place of work.
Malleson is not alone in raising criticisms of the social democratic or welfare state model.
In political philosophy similar concerns have been voiced against theories of distributive justice
35

Ibid., 119-20.
Malleson distinguishes between liberal/neoliberal market economies (United States, Canada,
United Kingdom, to name a few), and social democratic market economies (Norway, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark). Ibid., 112.
37
Ibid., 102.
38
In short, if the loss in profits becomes too great, the capitalist class will go on the offensive
against workers. Ibid., 123.
39
Ibid., 123-124.
36
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that favor welfare state capitalism. The central worry is that distributive justice focuses on
correcting for (ex post) material inequalities without seeking to change institutional or structural
arrangements that may be the source of such inequalities. As Iris Marion Young puts it, “such a
focus ignores and tends to obscure the institutional context within which those distributions take
place, and which is often at least partly the cause of patterns of distribution.”40 Young concludes
from this, borrowing Nozick’s terms (without adopting his libertarian solution), that distributive
justice erroneously “conceptualize[s] all issues of justice in terms of patterns,” when the object
of justice should focus on the underlying “processes” that cause such unequal distributions in the
first place.41
In another example, Rawls, although often associated with the welfare state model,
explicitly rejected this view later in life. He claimed that a capitalist welfare state could not
“[realize] all the main political values expressed by the two principles of justice,” because “it
permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets and natural
resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life rests in few hands.”42
Rawls promoted as possible alternatives, property-owning democracy or a liberal democratic
socialist regime (which he distinguishes from state socialism). The former model would
“disperse the ownership of wealth and capital” and therefore prevent the “near monopoly of the
means of production” that was permitted under welfare state capitalism (as well as in laissezfaire capitalism).43 Some contemporary theorists have further developed the idea of a property-
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owning democracy, also referred to as a theory of “predistribution.” Alan Thomson, for example,
draws from the recent work of Thomas Piketty to argue that inequalities in wealth or capital, as
opposed to income, generate a different set of problems for equality, including political
influence, educational access, and class status—problems that welfare states are not capable of
amending.44 In short, on these outlooks, welfare state capitalism fails to address problems related
to hierarchy and domination in the workplace, inequalities in property, wealth or productive
assets, and the lack of decision-making power within economic (and political) institutions.
Economic democracy also differs from orthodox Marxism. From this latter perspective,
socialism is associated with state ownership of the means of production and a centrally planned
economy. Traditional socialist accounts significantly limit (if not eliminate) the role of markets,
leaving the state in charge of production and distribution. As Malleson details, on this view, as
Kautsky and Lenin espoused it, worker collectives were ruled out.45 The state, not the workers,
was held to be the owner of the means of production. Malleson notes certain commonalities
between economic democracy and socialism, but ultimately finds several faults with the
orthodox Marxist view, an important one being that nationalization (i.e. state ownership of the
means of production) supports the hierarchical structure of the workplace, and therefore severely
limits the idea of workplace democracy. Many Marxists have also come to reject the idea of
central planning and argue for the superior efficiency of markets and the price mechanism.46

and human capital (that is, education and trained skills) at the beginning of each period, all this
against a background of fair equality of opportunity. The intent is not simply to assist those who
lose out through accident or misfortune (although that must be done), but rather to put all citizens
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Thus, even within Marxist thought there exists (and have existed) a variety of economic
positions, some of which fall closer in line with theories of economic democracy.47
In the conclusion of the dissertation, I address contemporary interpretations of Smith that
claim he favored a socially “embedded” market model. As my comments above aim to show, all
market economies are embedded in social institutions. Even neoliberal capitalist societies depend
on the state and legislative system for ensuring its basic functioning. It is better thus to think of
market economies as existing in a variety of institutional forms that can vary in their ability to
promote egalitarian or freedom-enhancing aims. For example, market economies can exist in
non-capitalist societies (societies with collective or communal forms of property) or in societies
with a more equal distribution of property and resources. Moreover, in some societies, markets
operate on a significantly smaller scale, where people are able to meet a range of subsistence
needs outside the market altogether.48 To get a clearer idea of what institutional arrangements
Smith and other pro-market thinkers favored, a closer historical look at the particular debates
they were engaged in will be the focus of the remaining chapters. But first, a note on another
important theme discussed throughout the dissertation.

Republicanism and the Market Economy
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Although the term “economic liberalism” suggests the idea that the early pro-market
outlook aligned with liberal political tenets, the dominant political framework in the eighteenth
century was republicanism. In a general sense, republicanism is a body of political thought that is
opposed to absolutism and favors the ideas of a mixed constitution, civic virtue, and political
participation. Like liberalism, however, republicanism is also a contested term. Mainly, there are
two competing interpretations of the history of republican thought. One interpretation, referred to
as the “civic humanist” view, characterizes republicanism as a political theory committed to
democratic self-rule. The writings of Hannah Arendt and J.G.A Pocock are commonly associated
with this view.49 The other, more recent interpretation, referred to as the neo-republican (or civic
republican/ neo-Roman) view, interprets republicanism as a political theory that values
democratic participation only as an instrumental good. Alternatively, the ultimate ideal in
republican thought, according to the neo-republican interpretation, is a specific conception of
freedom as a form of nondomination.50 This conception has its roots in Roman Jurisprudence,
whereas civic humanists locate republican ideals in the tradition of the Greek polis.
While each pro-market thinker’s engagement with republican ideas varies, the idea of
freedom as a form of nondomination plays a central role in economic debates throughout the
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eighteenth century.51 The concept has its origins in the legal category of sui juris in Roman law.
Sui juris denotes the status of a free, independent person—a person who is not under the power
(potestas) of another—i.e. a person who is not a slave.52 As will be discussed later on, unlike a
liberal (negative) conception of freedom, republican freedom emphasizes the importance of
securing a subject’s legal status so as to protect them from interpersonal forms of arbitrary power
and domination.53 It emphasizes, moreover, the importance of self-sufficiency, construed in both
economic and political terms. The reasoning here is that if a person is self-reliant, they are
protected from domination in interpersonal relations of dependency.
Originally, in the ancient republics of Roman society, this term was applied only
descriptively. During this period, it was also believed that free republics required an unfree class
of laborers (i.e. slaves) to support a class of independent and politically active citizens. On the
classical republican view, then, the commitment to freedom as a form of nondomination was not
yet universal. As one commentator writes, “the sheer conceptual opposition of freedom to
slavery did not, on its own, generate a criticism of slavery.”54 For classical republicans,
moreover, any involvement in trade or labor was associated with unfreedom. Cicero, for
example, describes wage labor as “a contract to servitude” and trade as a “demeaning” activity,
where profit is earned through the “dishonorable” act of telling “lies.”55 It was believed, then,
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that if someone worked for another or was employed in a trade they were unfit for citizenship
and involvement in the political sphere. Only those who owned land and earned a living through
the employment of workers or slaves were sui juris and therefore permitted to participate in the
affairs of the republic.
In the seventeenth century, republicanism underwent a change. Due, in part, to the
influence of natural law theory, which asserted the equality of all persons, some thinkers asserted
that civil and political freedoms ought to be extended to all members in society (albeit not, on
some accounts, to women).56 Elizabeth Anderson refers to this new development in republican
thought as “radical republicanism.” She identifies it with the political outlook and constitutional
reforms advanced in the seventeenth century by the Levellers and John Locke. These thinkers, on
her account, sought to expand the franchise and advocated greater “equality under the law” on
the basis of their commitment to republican freedom and anti-absolutism.57
Like the classical republican thinkers, radical republicans also viewed economic
independence as a necessary requirement for political participation. Given, however, that radical
republicans sought to extend political freedoms, they used this as a justification for equalizing
property ownership.58 This outlook is especially clear in republican thinkers like James
Harrington (in the seventeenth century) and Richard Price (in the eighteenth century), who
shared a vision of an agrarian society consisting of small, independent landowners (these
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thinkers are also referred to as “agrarian republicans”).59 Price, for instance, employed
republican arguments to criticize parliamentary enclosures, which consolidated small landholdings in favor of large-scale agricultural development.60 I will suggest later on that Price’s
outlook can be characterized as an early republican critique of agrarian capitalism.
Radical (or agrarian) republicans, then, were less hostile to the activity of labor in
comparison to their classical predecessors. The important caveat here is that labor was
considered free only when it was self-governed.61 Articulating this outlook, Abraham Lincoln,
one of the many Americans influenced by the British commonwealthmen, writes: “The prudent,
penniless beginner in the world, labors for wages awhile, saves surplus with which to buy tools
or land, for himself; then labors on his own account another while…[this] is free labor.”62
Lincoln makes it clear that “free labor” is distinct from “hired labor,” claiming that those who
remain hired laborers do so on account of the fact that their “dependent nature” prefers it.63 For
the agrarian republicans (like the classical republicans), wage labor was viewed as the antithesis
of economic independence. As Alex Gourevitch describes it, on the agrarian view, “economic
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independence” entailed the “control over one’s labor and property—a lack of subjection to the
commands of others in how one performs one’s daily activity.”64
As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, Turgot, Smith, and Kant depart from the
agrarian republican outlook. While it is evident that republican values informed their political
and economic views, they were markedly less hostile to wage labor and did not support
republican agrarian reforms to equalize property ownership. Alternatively, Turgot, Smith, and
Kant characterized wage labor as a form of free labor. In doing so, self-employment and the
equalization of property did not feature as strongly, if at all, in their political and economic
outlooks.65
In the concluding chapter, I will demonstrate how the interpretation presented in this
dissertation departs from contemporary scholarship on the period. While some scholars note the
difference between anti-market and pro-market republican outlooks, and label the latter as
“commercial republicanism,” I argue that they overlook the important distinguishing features
within this typology of eighteenth century republicanism. I suggest that the commercial
republican thinkers (e.g. Smith, and Kant) understood republican values, including freedom, to
be compatible with the development of agrarian capitalism, whereas the agrarian republicans
(e.g. Rousseau and Price) did not. If my interpretation is correct, this poses some problems, as
well, for contemporary theorists who look to these thinkers for insight into the development of an
alternative (i.e. anti-capitalist) market arrangement.
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The Significance of the Eighteenth Century
Before getting into the details of this contemporary debate, it is necessary to locate the
eighteenth century pro-market outlook in the economic debates of its own time. This is what the
following chapters set out to do. I should first clarify, however, why this period is of historical
interest. The study of political economy did not begin in the eighteenth century, but it did receive
widespread treatment by a large number of enlightenment thinkers throughout the period. Their
discussion of the economy was a philosophical one. As such, it was sensitive to the normative
dimensions of economic debate. The economic outlook of Turgot, Smith, and Kant was also
forward-looking. That is, although they criticized existing economic policies tied to feudal and
mercantile regimes, they were also concerned with theorizing an alternative economic system
that could take its place. For Smith, this was his model of “natural liberty,” where liberty refers
not only to liberal economic policies, but also to a system of natural rights.
As will be seen, these new economic proposals were intended for a future economic and
political regime that was realized at the start of the nineteenth century. As Thomas Piketty
details, the eighteenth century marked the transition from “ternary” to “ownership” societies.66
According to Piketty, both types of societies were “regimes of inequality” with unique
justificatory ideologies. He refers to the ideology of the former as “trifunctional” and the latter as
“proprietarian.” A ternary society consists of three distinct classes: the clergy, the nobility, and
the third estate (commoners and workers). In these societies, the former two classes owned the
majority of property and therefore held all the political and economic power.67 In ownership
societies, the status-based distinctions and privileges found in ternary societies were abolished
66
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and replaced by a regime of equal rights and private property (secured by the state). The
Physiocrats, Smith, and Kant, as will be seen, all articulate criticisms of ternary societies, and the
seeds of proprietarian ideologies lie within their political and economic frameworks.
Importantly, moreover, Piketty claims that ownership societies consistent of various types
of property schemes.68 In Western Europe, the scheme that ownership societies adopted
remained inegalitarian.69 Piketty suggests that such an outcome was not inevitable, and that
historical proposals for egalitarian distribution schemes had been vocalized during this
transitional period.70 Piketty’s description here maps well onto the discussion that follows in the
remaining chapters. As I suggest above, Turgot, Smith, and Kant, although critical of the
privileges of ternary societies, failed to fully address new forms of domination and economic
inequality that characterized developing ownership societies. Their strong defense of property
rights prevented them from proposing the types of egalitarian (i.e. anti-capitalist) property
schemes advocated by thinkers like Price. Therefore, Price was far more egalitarian and sensitive
to the harms of what Piketty refers to as the “quasi-sacralization of property” in proprietarian
ideologies.71
In sum, the eighteenth century was an important period for studying the ideological
defense of modern inequality. The debates of this period are also of more than just historical
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interest. Piketty notes that although ownership societies entered into a more egalitarian phase
following World War II, economies throughout the world have witnessed growing inequality
since the 1980s.72 According to Piketty, we are now living in an ideological period of neoproprietarianism.73 Studying the emergence of proprietarianism in the eighteenth century can
therefore help provide insight into contemporary justifications of inequality. It can also assist in
the normative project of constructing a new egalitarian ideal. As Piketty writes:
All human societies need to make sense of their inequalities, and the justifications given
in the past turn out, if studied carefully, to be no more incoherent than those of the
present. By examining them all in their concrete historical contexts, paying close
attention to the multiplicity of possible trajectories and forks in the road, we can shed
light on the present inequality regime and begin to see how it might be transformed.74
This quote speaks well to the historical approach of this dissertation. In considering the
justifications provided in defense of the new ownership society (which was also an emerging
capitalist society)—and the objections of their critics— I hope to shed light, not only on the
internal inconsistencies of eighteenth century economic thought, but also our own. I suggest thus
that contemporary views on wage labor, property ownership, and free markets still remain deeply
indebted to the original theorists of the modern ownership model.
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CHAPTER ONE
Dis-embedding the Market: The Grain Debate in Eighteenth Century France

In mid-eighteenth century France, there occurred an important debate that addressed the ethical
basis of a market economy. The debate was over the introduction of liberal reform in the grain
trade. As will be discussed, from the perspective of the critics of reform, liberalization threatened
to upend the customary policy of provision, which ensured that grain was available and
affordable for the laboring poor. While proponents of reform asserted that a deregulated grain
market would better meet the subsistence needs of the poor, subsistence crises put these
assertions into doubt, causing political and economic turmoil throughout the period. This chapter
provides a historical description of these events and examines the defense of liberal reform
advanced by the Physiocratic thinker, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781).
The economic thought of the Physiocrats is a helpful place to begin an investigation of
the philosophical underpinnings of economic liberalism. Political economy did not begin with
the Physiocrats, but they are commonly attributed with introducing the first scientific and
systematic approach to economics.1 They also approached the study of economics from the
perspective of justice and morality. Like Smith, they defended liberal reform on the basis of its
rootedness in natural law. Smith, moreover, was in contact with various Physiocratic thinkers.
Judging by his intention to dedicate the Wealth of Nations to Quesnay, Smith felt indebted (albeit

1

David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A Reinterpretation (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), 85.
27

was not entirely faithful) to their economic contributions.2 Surprisingly, however, in revisionist
accounts of Smith, the influence of the Physiocrats is sometimes overlooked. In elucidating some
of the key arguments that the Physiocrats put forward, I hope to provide a broader historical
context for examining Smith’s economic model. This debate is important too, not only for better
understanding the pro-free market position of the eighteenth century, but also for elucidating the
anti-market position of its critics. This chapter begins to challenge thus the extent to which the
pro-market position was successful in defending its ethical claims about liberalization, especially
in the face of its empirical shortcomings.

The Grain Debate
Throughout the eighteenth century the French government was largely responsible for
overseeing the availability, quality, and price of grain. Although exceptions were sometimes
granted, especially when the price of grain was low, government regulations addressed all
aspects of the grain trade and were enforced by local officials known as the police. These
restrictive policies included the prohibition or restriction of trade both abroad and internally, the
banning of any purchases or sales outside the public market place, a mandatory registering of
traders with the police, and a prohibition on engrossing, forestalling, and regrating.3 In a general
sense, the policies common to the old regime restricted who was permitted to deal in grain as
well as the location of sale. The idea was that in keeping trade exclusive to public markets, it
2
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would keep all grain related activities visible and better guarded from fraudulent practices. Of
utmost concern throughout the period was the possibility of collusion between producers and
sellers and the formation of monopolies, both of which could artificially drive up the price of
grain at the expense of the consumers. Other aspects of the trade, including the price,
measurement, storage, and transport of grain, also remained under the surveillance of the police.
From the perspective of the government, paternalism was justified on account of the
threat to social stability that subsistence crises posed. Food crises occurred periodically
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France.4 One scholar attributes this to the
outcome of absolutist policies beginning in the fifteenth century, when the king, in an attempt to
end the peasant uprisings of the feudal era, increased taxes on the peasantry and eradicated
existing feudal controls to consolidate state power.5 The increase in taxation was exponential. As
one scholar notes, “Total taxation quadrupled in the decade after 1630…By 1628, in fact,
Normandy alone was providing Louis XIII with revenues equal to all those raised by Charles I in
England.”6 As a result of these measures, the peasantry was prevented from accumulating
enough wealth to expand their agricultural production—the surest form of protection from
famine and scarcity.7 Correspondingly, the state experienced a financial crisis that continued into
the eighteenth century, where, by 1789, “the annual deficit equaled one-fifth of the state budget
while interest payments on the national debt rose to more than half of annual government
expenditures.”8
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It was within the context of economic stagnation and excessive taxation that the first calls
for liberal reform were advanced. In particular, during the period of Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s rule
as Controller-General (minister of finance) under Louis XIV (1661-1683), there emerged a
growing-body of anti-mercantilist literature.9 Colbert implemented policies that were emblematic
of the French mercantilist outlook. He identified money (or bullion) with wealth, and located the
source of wealth in gains made through foreign trade and commerce. Under the influence of the
mercantilist “balance of trade” theory, he also encouraged the exportation of manufactured
goods, while placing restrictions and tariffs on imports.10
The calls for early reform advanced by a number of thinkers, including Claude Fleury,
Archbishop Fénelon, and Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert, were based on a rejection of Colbert’s
conception of wealth.11 According to the anti-mercantilist outlook, wealth was measured not by
the amount of money a nation possessed, but instead by its domestic goods, especially, in the
case of France, its agricultural output. From this position, reformers argued that in hindering
agricultural production the current system of taxation and protectionism prevented the nation
from becoming more prosperous. In place of mercantile controls they advocated a single income
tax and a system of free export to increase the demand of domestic products.12
Although the early calls for liberal reform went unheeded, support continued to grow
throughout the eighteenth century. McNally comments that the period was marked by
“agromania and anglomania.”13 During this time, French intellectuals were introduced to English
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political economy through the writings of Locke, Petty, Tucker, and Hume.14 Attributing
England’s prosperity to its agricultural methods, they also became interested in new methods of
agricultural production and science.15 The most important advocates of liberty to emerge in this
context were the Physiocrats, a “sect” or “school” of thought that formed around the figure of
François Quesnay (1694-1774).16 The Physiocrats further developed the criticisms raised against
mercantile policies. Like the early reformers, they viewed the current system of taxation as a
hindrance to economic progress and supported the liberalization of grain.
Originally trained in medicine, Quesnay served as a court physician to King Louis XV
and Madame de Pompadour, the King’s mistress and patroness of the philosophes (French
Enlightenment thinkers). As a consulting physician to the King, Quesnay lived in an entresol
(mezzanine) in the Palace of Versailles. It was here, moreover, that a meeting in July 1757
between Quesnay and Victor de Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau (1715-1789), author of L’Ami des
Hommes (Friend of Mankind, 1756), is said to have marked the “birth” of the Physiocratic
School.17 Quesnay began writing on the topic of economics only later in life, with his first
writings on the topic dating from the period of this initial meeting. They include two articles
published in the Encyclopédie: “Fermiers” (Farmers) in 1756, and “Grains” (Grains) in 1757.
Both texts discussed important themes of what would eventually be identified with the
Physiocratic doctrine. This doctrine received its full exposition in Quesnay’s Tableau
Économique (Economic Table), originally published in 1758 and followed shortly thereafter by
three subsequent versions.
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In addition to its two founders, other members and associates of the school included
Dupot de Nemours, Mercier de la Rivière, several intendants, and Encyclopédistes, including
Denis Diderot.18 Jacques Turgot, the protégé of Marquis de Gournay (another well-known free
trade advocate) was included among the latter. Turgot held a number of important administrative
positions, moving from a magistrate, to intendant (tax collector) of Limoges, and lastly to the
position of Controller-General. Turgot also wrote on several intellectual topics, including
philology, the natural sciences, and history. His best-known written work in economics was a
text entitled Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth, written in 1766.
Despite its growing popularity during the era leading to reform (the school even had its
own Journal, Ephémérides), Physiocracy only thrived for a short decade. As will be discussed,
even Turgot’s attempt as Controller-General to re-institute liberal reform fell short of reviving
liberal momentum after the rescinding of reform in 1770. While the details of Turgot’s defense
of liberal reform will be explored below, it is important to make note of the foundational
principles that the Physiocrats developed.
Physiocracy, which translates as the rule or government of nature, was based on the
premise that there existed economic rules that were analogous to natural laws. In their scientific
attempt to uncover these laws, the Physiocrats developed a systematic model of economics. The
central economic idea they uncovered, which led them to support liberalization, was the concept
of the “net product,” i.e. the surplus that remains after a producer earns back a value equivalent
to the costs of production. Importantly, the Physiocrats claimed that only agriculture was capable
of producing a net product, and that industrial forms of production were “sterile” and
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unproductive. This surplus, created by the cultivators (who employed wage laborers to work for
them), was then given to proprietors in the form of rent. Importantly, from the Physiocrats’
perspective, the net product was the sole source of wealth that could legitimately be taxed by the
state. To tax the cultivator, as was practiced, would cut into the funds available for the cost of
production, which was necessary for agricultural expansion, whereas the net product was not. It
was important, moreover, to allow free exports so that cultivators could accumulate more wealth,
expand production, and, as a result, increase state revenue.
While attempts were made to introduce liberal reform throughout the period, it was not
until 1763 that legislation finally came to pass with the May declaration under ControllerGeneral Henri Léonard Jean Baptiste Bertin.19 The early draft of Bertin’s proposal reiterated
arguments in line with the outlook of liberal reformers. It was critical of the police, blamed
regulation for dearth, and supported free trade on the grounds that it would improve agricultural
development.20 In response, the declaration liberalized trade in the interior. Registration
requirements were removed (opening up the trade to newcomers), as were bans on off-market
exchanges and other barriers including road tolls.21 Police regulations in Paris remained,
however, and export abroad was still prohibited. It was not until 1764, when Clément Charles
François de Laverdy replaced Bertin as the new Controller-General, that this final step was
taken. Under Laverdy’s July 1764 edict, exports abroad were finally permitted with the caveat
that they would be cut off as soon as prices rose above 30 livres.22
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The initial reaction to reform was mixed. Not all of the thirteen courts (Parlements), for
instance, were in full support of the May declaration and July edict.23 Many expressed the
concern that social unrest would inevitable result from undoing the traditional policy of
provision.24 The Parisian municipality was especially hesitant to pass Laverdy’s reforms. Joly de
Fleury, the advocate general of the Paris Parlement, voiced many criticisms about the new
measures, including the possibility that wages would not, at least initially, match the rise in price
caused by increased exportation.25 Fleury, moreover, commented about the reformers: “They
want to subject the commerce of a good so necessary to life to the same principles to which is
subjected that of things less useful and even superfluous.”26 As will be seen, this was a concern
that would reemerge in response to the subsistence crisis that followed reform. While for the
most part good harvests and low grain prices kept resistance to a minimum in the initial phase of
reform, things quickly changed as France entered into a period that experienced less favorable
conditions.
As predicted, riots against grain exportation soon followed reform, beginning as early as
1764 in the north and spreading to the south throughout the 1770s.27 The grain riots typically
entailed a process whereby grain was requisitioned from dealers, merchants, or cultivators,
brought to the market for the local populace, and then given a new price (“taxation
Populaire”).28 This process, moreover, was sometimes carried out with the assistance of the
police. As Kaplan notes:
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The riot involved certain risks, but they were not entirely unpredictable and if they
frequently seemed worth taking it was because more often than not they resulted in an
improvement in the collective lot of the village or town. In the most favorable
circumstances, the police would preempt or dissipate the riot by requisitioning supplies
and/or readjusting the price of grain as a measure of general interest and social control
founded on the vague but widely shared premise that private property had public
obligations.29
As the passage details, it was common for the police to partake in price-fixing and to help bring
the grain to market when it was available. Kaplan attributes to the police a “crisis of conscience”
in trying to implement reform that went against the traditional practice of provision.30 He writes:
“it seemed perilous and wrong-headed to undermine the public order and well-being by
abandoning the grain trade to a concourse of self-interest.”31
Liberals and their opponents disputed the underlying cause of the crisis.32 Those in favor
of liberal reform attributed it to natural causes and the failure of officials to fully implement the
new liberal controls. Alternatively, from the perspective of the critics, liberal reform and dearth
were invariably linked. Critics claimed that by removing the ban on off market exchanges, the
reforms empowered merchants and traders to engage in monopolistic practices, allowing them to
control the supply and drive up the cost of grain. Prices, moreover, were on the rise. For
example, in Paris between 1763 and 1768, the cost of grain rose from 13 to 27.90 livres.33 The
freedom to export, moreover, allowed merchants to seek out other markets at the expense of
local needs.
Kaplan notes that most historians of this period tend to favor the liberal interpretation of
the subsistence crisis in France. He concedes that, given the available information, “it can be
29
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plausibly argued that harvest lapses and disasters were sufficiently pronounced and widespread
to occasion a conventional scarcity and chérte.”34 He goes on to add, however, that such a reality
should not lead us to conclude, “liberalization played no role.”35 He states:
The harvest of 1765 does not seem to have been unusually short in most places, while
opinion on the severity of the deficits between 1766 and 1768 differs from source to
source and place to place…For different purposes, économistes and their critics often
pointed to the paradox which suffered (allegedly) abundant supplies to coexist with
exorbitantly high prices. A critical reading of administrative evidence and impressionistic
testimonies strongly suggests that the freeing of the grain trade, if it did not itself provoke
chérte, exacerbated the short-term oscillations and quickened the cyclical and long-run
movement by overturning market habits, modifying the customary flow-patterns of grain,
multiplying the number of intermediaries, reducing the local visible supply, encouraging
forestalling and rerating, and introducing a whole new dimension of adventure and
uncertainty which influenced supply and demand.36
Kaplan also provides details about a variety of complaints submitted by officials, including
reports on the disappearance of local markets, rising prices, falling wages, unemployment, and
the buying up of grain by merchants.37 A noteworthy report also cited by Kaplan is the
occurrence of a riot sparked by the “discovery of a huge pit of charred grain covered with fresh
sand containing between 25 and 50 muid [a unit of measurement] on the road.”38 He comments,
“The incident struck the people as an example of the sort of terrible maneuvers that merchants
engineered in order to keep the markets empty and the prices exorbitant.”39 All of this points to
empirical evidence that the claims of the critics were grounded in worsening economic
conditions.
The government was not initially responsive to growing resistance and criticism against
reform. Laverdy accused the public of “prejudice” and sought to discipline the police to conform
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to the new legislative measures.40 The outlook changed, however, in 1769 under the new
Controller-General, Joseph-Marie Terray. At this time, several Parlements were already
implementing measures that were in violation of liberal practices, including prohibiting exports,
banning off-market exchanges, and subjecting private granaries and inventories to search.41 An
arrêt was then issued in July 1770, which prohibited exports on the grounds that the price
surpassed that which was permitted under the July 1764 edict.42 This was followed by another
arrêt in December of 1770 that went much further in rescinding liberal policies. The new
legislation required all traders to register with the local police, prohibited the practice of
“enarrhement” (the purchasing of future harvests, which caused an increase in prices),
criminalized the purchasing of grain outside the public market, and forced all exchanges to occur
within the public marketplace.43 Kaplan considers this last legislative move as its most
important, commenting “the concentration of supplies on the market would assure a regular,
predictable, visible supply, facilitate exchanges between buyers and sellers, and expose them to
constant scrutiny.”44 He adds, “without a fixed market system, the police could not possible
wage a successful war again monopoly.”45

The Liberal Defense: Turgot on Welfare, Property, and Liberty
In 1770, Turgot, one of the leading proponents of liberal reform, exchanged a series of
letters with the Controller-General Terray. At the time, Turgot was an intendant on tour of
Limoges, which was especially hard hit by the grain crisis. Several of the letters were lost, but
40
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the remaining four offer insight into his justification for reform. As Turgot puts it, the letters
address Terray’s concerns that: “the policy of freedom was favorable only to a very small
number of subjects; that it is immaterial to the cultivators, and that it is most harmful by far to
the greatest number of the King’s subjects.”46 In response to these concerns, Turgot sets out to
show how all classes of society benefit from the liberalization of grain. He agrees that proprietors
benefit significantly from the profits that accrue under liberal policies, and he also shows
(against Terray) that the profits earned by cultivators are not cut short by the limited term of their
leases.47 What is more difficult to explain, and what he spends more time demonstrating, is how
the laboring poor equally benefit from the liberalization of the grain trade.
Turgot’s central claim in response to Terray’s comment about the laboring poor, i.e. “the
greatest number of the King’s subjects,” is that their interests align with the interests of the
cultivators and proprietors. In his fifth letter, Turgot attributes this to the fact that the wealth of
the latter two groups (as they spend money on cultivation or purchase goods) is the source of the
former group’s income and that any increase in wealth for proprietors and cultivators is therefore
an increase in the wealth for laborers. His outlook here is consistent with the Physiocratic
understanding of the economy as a circular process; he says that the circulation of wealth is as
“essential to the life of the body politics,” as “the circulation of blood is essential to the life of
the animal body.”48 This point is also reiterated in his final letter. Here Turgot claims that the
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“consumer” depends on agriculture (and presumably, its expansion), both because they rely on it
for their “livelihood” and in regard to the sale of their labor.49 He writes of the consumer:
He has an interest in selling his labor at a price high enough to enable him to pay for the
commodities he needs with the price he receives for it, and he must pay for these
commodities at a price high enough for those who sell them to draw from this price the
means to generate an equal quantity of produce in the following year, as well as the
means to continue to buy his labor. Without this exact proportion, either the cultivator
would cease to make the earth produce commodities and revenue, or the wage earner
would cease to labor, or rather, these two things would occur at the same time, because
cultivator and wage-earner, wages and labor, being necessarily correlated, and equally
dependent on one another, must either exist, or be destroyed together. 50
Turgot concludes by noting that if this “proportion” failed and society declined, it would be
“wage-earners” who would be the most negatively impacted by it.51 For, it is this group that will
first starve, not the cultivator who owns the harvest and land. Turgot concludes that the wage
earner is therefore the most interested in “the extension of cultivation”—even more so than the
cultivator and proprietor.52 Where, “For the latter two, the question is only that of being more or
less wealthy, of living more or less comfortably; but for the wage-earning consumer, existence is
at stake; it is a matter of life or death.53
Turgot assumes that because wage earners are dependent on the wealth of cultivators and
proprietors for their livelihood, they have an interest in the ability of both classes to secure
wealth. Because, moreover, liberalization is said to generate greater wealth (since free export
would increase demand and profit), he concludes that free trade is also in the interest of the
laboring class. This is true not only for agricultural laborers, but also those employed in industry,
since industrial wages, on the Physiocratic outlook, are equally dependent on the purchases made
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by proprietors and cultivators alike.54 Turgot, of course, overlooks how the relationship of
dependency between worker and employer depends on the existence of a landless group of
laborers. If people were relatively self-sufficient, such a dependency would not exist.
The question that follows from Turgot’s commentary, is how exactly did he account for
the process whereby an increase in wealth for the proprietors and cultivators would necessarily
lead to an increase in wealth for the laboring poor? Turgot, after all, recognizes in the former
group a predisposition to resist raising the wages of workers. In his discussion on taxation, for
instance, he discusses how an increase in taxes for workers would threaten their livelihood and
lead to a demand for higher wages. In such a situation, Turgot comments that “the less well off
the laborer, the less domineering he can be, and the proprietor will at first not give in easily to
the increase in wages.”55 This tendency is also discussed in Reflections on the Formation and the
Distribution of Wealth. Here Turgot comments how the “simple workman” is paid “as little” as
the employer is able; he says of the employer:
since he has a choice between a great number of workmen, he prefers the one who works
most cheaply. Thus the workmen are obliged to vie with one another and lower their
price. In every kind of work it is bound to be the case, and in actual fact is the case, that
the wage of the workman is limited to what is necessary in order to enable him to procure
his subsistence.56
In this passage, Turgot recognizes that workers have less bargaining power compared to their
employers. However, in his letters, Turgot departs from this earlier view. For instance, Turgot
comments on the necessity of some excess above a subsistence wage for workers. He recognizes
that competition between laborers results in “simple unskilled workers” being paid a subsistence
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wage, but claims it is not the case that wages are so low that workers cannot support themselves
in times of sickness, unemployment, or high prices.57 He writes of this excess fund:
But it is of this type of luxury especially, that it can be said that it is a most necessary
thing; it is essential that there is a little of it, just as it is necessary that there is some play
in every machine. A watch of which all the wheels would work into each other with
mathematical precision and without the smallest gap, would soon cease to go. If by an
unexpected decrease in wages or increase in expenses, the worker can put up with being
reduced to strict essentials, the same causes which had forced wages to rise a little above
the necessary of yesterday, continue to operate and cause them to rise once more until
they attain a higher level, in the same proportion with the necessary of today. 58
Turgot suggests, then, that there is a natural tendency for wages to rise above subsistence alone.
He goes on to claim, moreover, that proprietors may sometimes resist increasing wages due to a
decrease in revenue. In this event, however, he argues that the market would undermine their
efforts. If employers were to deny a wage increase, it would compel workers to seek employment
elsewhere and create a tight labor market. Workers thus, “by curtailing their competition,” could
“lay down the law” and “force the proprietors to raise wages.”59
Turgot brings this point up again in the final letter. Here he discusses how an expansion
of the grain trade (a result of liberal legislation) would lead to an increase in the production of
agricultural goods. This is ultimately good for workers, he contends, not only because it
increases the amount of jobs available, but also because it increases the demand for labor, which
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leads to an increase in wages.60 He points, moreover, to the example of the rise of wages for
masons in Paris due to an increase in the building trade.61 In sum, he concludes:
Here then, the increase in values brought about by the policy of free trade, is an obvious
advantage for the class of wage-earning consumers, since it causes a greater wages fund
to be available for distribution, which produces: firstly, a greater certainty of finding
work, and, for each laborer, a greater number of useful working days; secondly, an actual
increase in the price of wages, through the competition of cultivators and proprietors,
who will raise it in emulation of one another to attract workmen; thirdly, an increase in
population, consequence of the greater affluence of the people.62
In showing how free trade would potentially increase the wages of workers and thus benefit a
group other than the property-owning class, Turgot adhered to the Physiocratic outlook.
Quesnay, for instance, on the topic of the grain (i.e. corn) trade, asserts: “The ordinary proper
price of corn, which procures such a large revenue for the state, does no harm at all to the lower
orders.”63 In the case, moreover, that the price of grain increases under free trade, he asserts that
“wages would also rise proportionately” and that such a rise would be “a matter of little concern
to those who paid it, in comparison with the wealth which would result from the establishment of
the proper price of corn.”64
Turgot also dismissed fears about a rise in the price of grain, or the unaffordability of
grain for consumers. During this period, the liberal view was associated with an encouragement
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of high grain prices. The idea was that the opening up of trade to new markets would lead to an
increase in demand and therefore a rise in price. Historically, a rise in the price of grain was
something to be discouraged. From the (Physiocratic) liberal perspective, however, high grain
prices were viewed as beneficial, insofar as it increased the cultivator’s revenue, which permitted
an expansion of production and economic growth. Quesnay, who advocated such an outlook,
claimed thus, “Valuelessness plus abundance does not at all equal wealth. Dearness plus dearth
equal poverty. Abundance plus dearness equals opulence.”65 Quesnay argued, moreover, that it
was low prices that were harmful for the country and synonymous with poverty and low
population.66
Turgot offers a few related responses to this concern. In general, he often assumes that
wages and prices will reach a state of equilibrium with one another. For instance, he claims that
before the laboring class was burdened by taxes, “wages were on a level with the customary
price of commodities, and this level, which is the result of a multitude of causes combined and
balanced with each other, must tend to re-establish itself.”67 In his final letter, he reiterates this
point, claiming that while it is “necessary” for some “proportion” to exist between wages and
prices, a just “equilibrium” may be difficult to obtain.68 He continues:
The proportion can be disturbed for shorter or longer intervals in such a way that a great
number of men experience all the excess of misery, and that societies are in a state either
of crisis and convulsion or weariness and decline. What ought to be desired? Two things:
firstly, that this proportion between the price of wages and the price of commodities is the
fairest, the closest to equilibrium, the most advantageous possible for the cultivators and
the proprietor on the one hand, and the wage-earner on the other; the most suitable, in
short, to procure for the whole of society the greatest amount of production, of
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enjoyment, of wealth and of strength; secondly, that the disturbances occasioned by
natural causes are as rare, as short-lived, and as light as possible.69
Turgot then states that this “is the true end of legislation on the matter of subsistence,” but that it
is through freedom, not regulations, that such ends are met.70 He remarks, moreover, that he will
not be able to show how exactly free trade accomplishes this in his letter.71 Turgot’s assurance
that wages and prices tend toward equilibrium is therefore never fully explained. What is clear to
him, however, is that such equilibrium exists, and it does so, not on account of the efforts of
regulation, but rather through the mechanisms of the free market.
Turgot also claims, somewhat at odds with Quesnay’s outlook, that the belief that
liberalization would lead to “dearer grain” is “not necessarily true, as the statistics of average
grain prices show.”72 He claims that it is not the case that a significant amount of grain would
even be exported (as feared), using as an example England, where, “in spite of their
encouragement of exports,” they “do not export a great deal of grain.”73 He even suggests that
free trade would lead to a fall in prices, in the case that production increases faster than demand.
His reasoning here is that it will take time for a demand (i.e. population) to catch up to increases
in production, and so there will be an initial decrease in the price of the commodity.74 In this
response, Turgot points to a more specific mechanism to explain how prices would remain low
(albeit, only as an initial phase of agricultural expansion). In line with other liberal claims, he
69
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also states that the freedom of trade would help reduce prices by permitting the free transport of
grain from areas that are abundant to those where grain is scarce.75 In general, moreover, free
trade helps avoid the high prices that result from dearth and famine, because it encourages
consumption (through exports) which leads to greater production: “The stimulus to production
and capital formation given by the policy of free trade will increase the sum of produce in the
nation and therefore the fund from which everyone can consume.”76
To summarize thus far, Turgot offered several lines of defense against Terray’s claim that
liberal reform only benefited the class of proprietors. Specifically, in regard to the effects on the
laboring poor, Turgot claims three things. First, he demonstrates that because the wealth of the
proprietors is the source of income for cultivators and consumers (i.e. wage laborers), an increase
in their wealth is beneficial to the poor. The second and third arguments contend that free trade
can stimulate higher wages for workers and also cause a decrease in the price of grain. Turgot
rests his claims thus on the positive economic effects that reform would have on the welfare of
the laboring poor.
Turgot’s defense of liberal reform, however, did not rely on economic arguments alone.
He also appealed to the value of justice. This appears in his final letter to Terray, where he offers
political advice on how to handle the subsistence crisis. Turgot cautions Terray against blaming
the dearth on “scheming,” as opposed to natural causes.77 In doing so, Turgot adhered to the
liberal position that the dearth was the outcome of a bad harvest—a fact of nature that the
government could not control. For this reason, he also advises against the government promising
to provide for the provision of the poor:

75

Ibid., 240.
Ibid., 241.
77
Ibid., 245.
76

45

The people are well aware of the fact that the Government cannot command the seasons,
and they must understand that it has no right to violate the property of the husbandmen
and the grain merchants. It is a sign of strength, even in the eyes of the people, when they
can be told: What you ask of me is an injustice. Those who are not satisfied with this
reasoning, will never be satisfied with any, and will always slander the government, no
matter what measures it takes to please them; for it will not gratify them seeing that it is
impossible for the government to procure cheap grain for the people when the harvests
have failed, and that there is no possible means of obtaining it at a lower price than that
which would result from complete freedom, that is, from the observance of rigorous
justice.78
It is evident from this passage that Turgot associates the economic model of free trade (in grain)
with the laws of justice, primarily because it protected the property rights of the husbandmen and
merchants. As another example of this view, Turgot states in his letter to Richard Price (1778):
The right to control commerce is everywhere taken for granted; exclusive bodies, or the
governors, are even authorized to prohibit the exportation of certain commodities in
certain circumstances. So far are people yet from realizing that the law of complete
freedom of all commerce is a corollary of the right of property—so deep are they still
immersed in the fog of European illusions.79
While no systematic treatment of justice is provided in the letters, it is evident from Turgot’s
other writings and correspondences that, like Quesnay, he grounded his economic outlook in a
theory of natural law.80 Specifically, the Physiocrats, including Turgot, understood the right of
free commerce to be grounded in the natural right of property.81
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Turgot also claimed that property rights pertain to the ownership of one’s own labor.82
This view is voiced in his Six Edicts to the King (1776), where he calls for the suppression of the
Parisian guilds. Turgot claims that the suppression is necessary in order to ensure “the full and
complete enjoyment” of a laborer’s right to employ “their sole resources for subsistence,” (i.e.
their labor).83 On his view, with its requirements of apprenticeship terms and other various
exactions, the guilds hindered free labor markets and this fundamental right. Likening guilds to
monopolies, he claims that they result in a “loss of wages and means of subsistence” for the
laboring class by limiting the number of people employed in particular trades. In place of the
view that “the right of labor is a royal right, one that the Prince could sell and that the subjects
ought to purchase,” Turgot claims:
God, by giving to men needs and making them dependent upon the resource of labor, has
made the right of labor the property of all men, and that property is primary, the most
sacred and most imprescriptible of all. We regard it as one of the first obligations of our
justice, and as an act in every way worthy of our beneficence, to emancipate our subjects
from all the restraints which have been laid upon that inalienable right of humanity.84
Turgot suggests, then, that guild regulations hinder the natural right to alienate one’s labor. For,
according to Turgot, enterprise only requires two classes: “entrepreneurs” who advance the
means of production, and “simple laborers” who work for wages.”85 He says this relation is one,
moreover, that “is based in the nature of things and does not depend on the arbitrary institution of
corporations.”86 In addition to viewing guilds as institutions that inhibit the natural liberties of
workers, Turgot also suggests that the institution of the guild enforced an arbitrary power over its
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members and the community. He concludes thus that the suppression of the “arbitrary and
injurious regime” of the guilds would increase people’s “independence.”87
Turgot’s concern for the welfare of the poor is also revealed in his efforts as an intendant
of Limoges during the subsistence crisis of 1770-71. The policies Turgot adopted to combat
famine throughout the region suggest his amenability to state intervention as a means of
accomplishing these aims. On these points, some scholars challenge the association of Turgot
with the doctrine of laissez-faire. As Emma Rothschild claims, Turgot’s theoretical emphasis on
economic equilibrium did not preclude him from being concerned with empirical cases of
economic disequilibrium.
As evidence of this, Rothschild examines the policies that Turgot implemented in
response to the subsistence crisis in Limoges. Believing that unemployment worsened the
subsistence crisis, Turgot’s central policy was the creation of state-financed charity offices and
workshops that employed people in public works projects, including building new roads.88 On
Turgot’s economic outlook, the state was permitted to intervene and assist people with finding
employment, albeit while leaving the grain market untouched. Turgot viewed the policy,
moreover, as an alternative to public charity, to which he was opposed.89
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Rothschild mentions three other state-led efforts Turgot introduced to deal with the
subsistence crisis in Limoges. The first related to the availability of grain. Turgot was concerned
that merchants were not traveling to certain areas because of the high costs of transport. To fix
this, he used loans and bounties to encourage imports into struggling areas.90 Secondly, Turgot
also implemented a new system of taxation that decreased taxes for the poor and raised them for
the rich. It was from this revenue, moreover, that the charity workshops were to be funded.91 It
should be noted, that in general, taxation was not at odds with the Physiocratic outlook. To
recall, the Physiocrats supported a single tax on the land-owning class, which was to be the basis
for all state expenditure. Turgot’s amenability to taxation is also evident in his suggestion that
public works be financed by the land-owning class, and not the unpaid (forced) labor of the
Corvée.92 Lastly, Turgot also imposed restrictions on landowners, prohibiting them from
dismissing tenant farmers in difficult periods and restricting rents paid in kind.93
Rothschild concludes from these efforts that Turgot’s “commitment to free commerce in
corn was consistent…with support for government intervention in other markets.”94 That for
Turgot, as well as Condorcet and Smith, while “government intervention in commerce is always
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to be regretted,” it remained “necessary to ensure minimal welfare for all citizens” and therefore
was sometimes permitted.95 Rothschild also claims that Turgot’s efforts paid off:
The effect of Turgot’s policies, by the end of 1770, was that the Limousin had been saved
from widespread famine. The 1769 harvest had been the worst of the century in the
region, and the 1770 harvest was again bad, at a time of European scarcity. But by early
1771, the scarcity was only partial, despite continuing high prices. Mortality rates
increased little in 1770 and 1771 (although more in 1772).96
Assuming Rothschild’s commentary is accurate, Turgot’s efforts demonstrate how institutional
support was required to support “free” markets in grain. While these regulations did not attempt
to alter the price of grain or have the state become a supplier of grain, they did establish the
importance of the state’s assistance in other areas for the functioning of a free market. It would
require, however, a deeper investigation to determine the details of Turgot’s taxation
recommendations. In comparison, an anti-Physiocratic thinker, Louis Graslin, proposed a
progressive tax policy that would tax the lowest earners at 5 percent, and the highest earners at
75 percent. 97 As will be discussed below, it seems unlikely that Turgot would be in favor of a
taxation scheme that would radically reduce the consolidation of wealth of the proprietor class.
Based on the discussion thus far, one might wonder whether or not Turgot should be
classified as a laissez-faire thinker—a term commonly associated with Physiocratic thinkers.
However, as discussed in the introduction, support for intervention is not inconsistent with
support for a market economy. Perhaps a more important concern, then, in assessing Turgot’s
economic model, is not the extent to which he was amenable to intervention, but rather whether
or not he was attentive to new forms of inequality and domination generated by liberal reforms.
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For, although Turgot associated free markets with welfare and freedom, critics claimed that
liberal reform threatened these very same values. In order to get clear on these distinctive
outlooks, a closer examination of the oppositional view is required.

Turgot and the Critics of Reform
The above reconstruction of Turgot’s defense of liberal reform elucidates how the values
of welfare and freedom were central to his economic outlook. Rothschild’s interpretation of
Turgot as a supporter of intervention also casts Turgot in a favorable light. From the
contemporary perspective of a welfare state proponent, support for wealth redistribution and
intervention is generally held in opposition to a more extreme free market outlook (i.e. a
neoliberal or libertarian model). A problem with this interpretation, however, is that it overlooks
some of the strongest criticisms voiced by opponents of reform throughout the period. These
criticisms were not concerned about the right to employment or the redistributive efforts of the
state. Alternatively, they addressed the power that accrued to the owners and suppliers of grain,
as well as employers and landowners. This section addresses these concerns in light of Turgot’s
economic outlook.

Grain Owners and Merchants
For many critics, a problem with liberalization was that the deregulation of the grain
market empowered certain economic agents, mainly grain suppliers, to pursue profits at the
expense of consumers and the poor. Kaplan’s historical account of the grain debate offers
numerous examples of how this concern was expressed. His description of Terray’s reaction to
reform and justification for issuing the arrêt in 1770 is particular illuminating. While Terray was
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equally distrustful of the paternalist model—agreeing with liberals that too low a cost of grain
would hinder agricultural development—he ultimately sided with the view that liberalization, by
encouraging hoarding and monopoly, was at fault for high prices.98 Terray summarized the grain
debate as follows:
[One party] proposed to abolish all the laws and to leave everything to the free will of the
proprietors of grain. Grain, they say, is their possession, they must be masters to sell it
when, where, how and at the price they wish. The other demands the rigorous execution
of the hindrances established by the old laws, because, they retort, grain cannot be
compared to any other good or merchandise. Man needs bread every day. Thenceforth,
the grain owner, if he holds it hoarded away, becomes too much the master of the price,
he can and he is tempted to abuse it.99
Kaplan notes that Terray, although viewing the problem as one of conflicting interests,
ultimately sided with the consumers, “given their inherent disadvantages in the struggle with
producers and owners.”100 Kaplan emphasizes, moreover, Terray’s concern that deregulation
disproportionately favored dealers at the expense of the majority:
The grain trade, in Terray’s estimation, inevitably generated abuses. It was fatuous to
imagine that it could or would police itself. Given their control over subsistence, dealers
exercised an extraordinary sort of authority over society, which had no means to call
them to account. Left to themselves, Terray felt, they would press their advantage to
disastrous extremes. Even as the liberals argued that police by its nature was incapable of
moderation, so the Controller-General maintained that grain dealers, unless checked,
ineluctably damaged the public interest. ‘Only surveillance can stop Monopoly,’ the
gravest abuse, he contended. Grain could not be allowed to become ‘an object of
speculation for the rich’—precisely the liberal goal, from Boisguilbert to Turgot. The
problem with the reforms of 1763-64, in Terray’s view, was that they ‘opened up an
excessively great cupidity, they stirred the desire to get rich on the traffic of a commodity
of indispensable necessity,’ an enterprise which he regarded as morally wrong and
politically untenable. Since it had lost ‘the spirit of purity’ the grain trade could not post
its own guarantees of good conduct.101
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Opponents of reform argued thus that without government oversight there was nothing to prevent
dealers from misrepresenting the stock of grain and artificially raising its price (or, to take a
different example, causing a price inflation through speculation in the market).102 In this case,
price was determined not by supply and demand, but instead by the private interest of the sellers.
This was particularly disconcerting because grain was an important source of subsistence for the
poor, and any fluctuation in price could have potentially disastrous effects on their livelihood.
In defending the property rights of the grain owners and merchants, Turgot sided with the
liberal position.103 His assurance, moreover, that prices tend toward a state of equilibrium, failed
to fully explain how, without government oversight, the private owners of grain would be
prevented from committing these forms of abuse. While Turgot offers several explanations for
why the price of grain will not rise, his arguments do not directly address the possibility of abuse
by the owners and merchants. As Rothschild and Kaplan note, prices continued to rise
throughout the period, suggesting his predictions were not on target. Kaplan’s historical account
also dismisses the possibility that the collusion of grain owners was apocryphal. As will be
discussed in the next chapter, Smith, perhaps recognizing this oversight, went to greater lengths
to assure his readers that dealers abstained from the practice of monopoly, viewing it to be
against their economic interests. The important point here is that although Turgot was concerned
about the freedom and welfare of the laboring poor, he did not take seriously the claims that
these values were undermined by economic agents abusing their power as owners of an essential
commodity. In short, he did not apply his criticisms against the “monopoly” power of the guilds
to the monopolization of power in the economic realm.
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Equality in Property
The concern that absolute property rights empowered producers and sellers of grain was
representative of a broader concern about inequalities in property ownership throughout the
period. As discussed in the introduction, this view was largely informed by a republican outlook
that tied independence and freedom to the ownership of land. The Genevan Enlightenment
thinker, Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), articulates this outlook in his encyclopedia entry on
“Economy” (1755) (later republished as Discourse on Political Economy). In line with the
classical republican view, he argues that commerce acts as a corrupting force on civic virtue (a
point I will return to in chapter four), and, in line with the Physiocratic outlook, claims that
commerce, i.e. “the arts of pleasure,” and industry are wrongly favored over agriculture and
“useful and demanding crafts.”104 In contrast to the Physiocrats, however, he notes that a duty of
government is “to give some thought to their [the citizens] subsistence.”105 Adding that this
should not be done by “fill[ing] the granaries of private individuals,” but instead “to maintain
abundance so within their reach that to acquire it, labor is always necessary and never
useless.”106
Rousseau also hints at the idea of an agrarian reform as a possible solution to inequality.
He writes that one of the most “difficult” functions of government is “protecting the poor against
the tyranny of the rich.”107 He continues, that it is the “most important” priority of government
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“to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes, not by appropriating treasures from their owners, but
by denying everyone the means of acquiring them…not by building hospitals for the poor but by
protecting citizens from becoming poor.”108 While Rousseau’s solution to economic inequality is
not entirely developed, it is evident that he prefers a preemptive approach, perhaps through
limitations on the accumulation of property, to an ex post redistribution of wealth.
The proposal to equalize property is also found in another (French) Enlightenment
philosopher, Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771). Helvétius, like Rousseau, also interacted
with the Physiocrats and encyclopédistes, and was best known for his controversial text De
l’Esprit (1758), which was publicly burned and condemned by the Parlement of Paris, the
Sorbonne, and the Pope. The major claims associated with his philosophical outlook relate to his
view that all human actions are motivated by the desire to maximize pleasure and reduce pain,
and the utilitarian identification of the common good with the greatest happiness for the greatest
number. In his correspondence with Condorcet, Turgot argues against Helvétius’ view that “selfinterest is the only principle that actuates men.”109 However, although Helvétius defended a
moral theory that is commonly associated with other laissez-faire outlooks, he was otherwise
critical of the so-called advances of commercial society.110
Helvétius claims in De l’Esprit that nations “most celebrated for their luxury and police”
(i.e. commercial societies) are those “countries where the majority of the inhabitants are more
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unhappy than the savage nations.”111 Raising a point that, as will be seen, Smith contradicts, he
adds, “It is a question, whether the condition of a savage be not preferable to that of a peasant?112
Helvétius states that the unhappiness associated with wealthy nations is the outcome of an
unequal distribution of wealth: “luxury, and the wealth it produces in a state, will render the
subjects happier only in proportion as this wealth is equally divided.”113 Helvétius attributes this
inequality to the following:
The rich man will have purchased extensive lordships; and being able to take advantage
of the necessities of his neighbors, he will, in a short time, have annexed an infinite
number of small farms to his estate. A diminution of the number of proprietors increases
the number of laborers. When these are multiplied, so that there are more laborers than
work, it will be with the workmen as with all kinds of merchandize, which becomes of
less value in proportion as it becomes more common. Besides, the rich man, whose
luxury even exceeds his wealth, is under a necessity of lowering the price of labor, and
giving the workman no more than is absolutely necessary for a bare subsistence. The
latter is obliged, through necessity, to accept of it; but in case of sickness, or an increase
of his family, for want of sufficiency of wholesome food, he dies, and incumbers the state
with an indigent and destitute family.114
The contrast with Turgot is quite clear. Unlike Turgot, Helvétius is skeptical about the ability of
the price of labor to remain above a livable subsistence level. He attributes this to the
consolidation of land, which devalues labor, since its supply exceeds its demand. He also
attributes it to the interests of employers to lower the price of labor for their own profit. In
contrast to Turgot, he offers reasons for why unequal land ownership creates a structural
tendency for wages to remain at subsistence levels, leaving workers powerless to demand more.
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Helvétius hints at an interesting solution to this dilemma. In a footnote where he argues
against the claim that a decrease in taxes would increase the happiness of the workers, he writes
the following:
What then must be done to render his condition happy? Make a considerable addition to
the price of a day’s labor. In order to [do] this, the proprietors must constantly reside on
their estates: then, like their ancestors, they would reward the services of their domestic,
by bestowing on them some acres of land. The number of proprietors would insensibly
multiply; that of day-laborers decrease; and the latter, by becoming more scarce, would
set a higher value upon their work.115
On his view, an increase in wages is possible by equalizing the ownership of property. This is
very different from Turgot’s view that market mechanisms will produce a fair, livable wage for
the laboring poor. In De l’Homme, which was not published until after his death, he offers a
similar solution:
What can hinder a people from declaring themselves the heirs of the whole nation; and in
that case, on the decease of a very rich individual, dividing among several a property that
would be too considerable for a single person? Why may not a people, after the example
of those of Lucca, so proportion the taxes to the wealth of each individual, that when his
land exceeds a certain number of acres, the tax on the supernumerary acres may exceed
the rent? In such a country, there can certainly be no very great acquisitions. A hundred
laws of this kind might be invented. There are, therefore, a multitude of ways of
preventing a too speedy accumulation of wealth in a small number of hands, and of
checking the too rapid progress of luxury.116
In recommending the breaking up of large land holdings, Helvétius’ outlook aligns with a
republican approach. As discussed in the introduction, given the republican commitment to
freedom as non-domination, classical republican thinkers often identified freedom with
economic independence and property ownership. One scholar notes the possible influence of
Helvétius on Thomas Paine, who, equally troubled by the injustice of unequal land distribution in
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America, suggested that landowners be taxed in order to compensate those who did not possess
property.117
Turgot, however, does not appear to be committed to such a program. This is not to
overlook aspects of his political outlook that were amenable to some republican views. Turgot,
importantly, departed from the “legal despotism” associated with the Physiocratic outlook.118 In
Vie de M. Turgot, for instance, Condorcet suggests that Turgot supported a republican
constitution, defining it as a constitution where property owners possessed the right “to concur in
the formation of laws, to regulate the constitution of the assemblies which digest and promulgate
these laws, to give a sanction to them by their suffrage, and to alter by a regular deliberation the
form of every public institution.”119 This outlook is evident in Turgot’s Mémoire to the king
(1775), which, while never published, argued for the establishment of local and regional forms of
assembly (i.e. assemblies within the municipalities, the cantons, and the provinces) to
accomplish these republican aims.120 On Turgot’s account, the institutions would be responsible
for making decisions related to the distribution of taxes, the creation of public works projects,
and regulation of poverty relief. Turgot’s model was not fully democratic, however, as only
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those who owned property, i.e. not wage earners, could participate in the assemblies, and larger
landholders were allotted more votes.121
Richard Whatmore suggests that Turgot’s interest in constitutional reform was the
outcome of his failed attempts to reinstitute liberal reforms as Controller General in 1774.122 He
claims that Turgot, attributing this failure to the disunion of the nation, proposed constitutional
reforms in hopes of creating “a patriotic and egalitarian culture in France.”123 In addition to his
proposal for new representative bodies, Turgot also proposed the creation of a Council of
National Education. He describes the aims of the council as follows:
It would be the duty of one of the Councils to get composed a series of classic books,
according to a regular plan, so that one would lead on to another, and that the study of the
duties of the citizen, member of a family and of the State, might be the foundation of all
other studies, which would be graduated in the order of utility they have for the State…A
new system of education which can only be established by the authority of your Majesty,
seconded by a well-chosen council, would conduce to form in all the classes of society
men virtuous and useful, just souls, pure hearts, zealous citizens.124
Like Turgot’s recommendation for the assemblies, the reasoning behind his education proposal
was to instill in subjects a greater sense of public duty and virtue.125 These commitments are in
line with a republican outlook, which views a just order as one where subjects submit their
private interests to the public good (i.e. Rousseau’s conception of the “general will”).126
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Turgot’s support for greater inclusion and representation of landowners in government
did not lead him, however, to adopt the republican outlook that set limitations on property
ownership. This is likely due to Turgot’s (Physiocratic) economic outlook, which supported an
agrarian capitalist organization of production.127 On this model, large land holdings were favored
over small ones due to economies of scale. Quesnay, in his general Maxims, written as a followup to the Tableau Economique, summarizes this Physiocratic outlook:
That the land employed in the cultivation of corn should be brought together, as far as
possible, into large farms worked by rich husbandmen; for in large agricultural
enterprises there is less expenditure required for the upkeep and repair of building, and
proportionately much less cost and much more net product, than in small ones. A
multiplicity of small farmers is detrimental to the population.128
That Turgot adopts this view is evident in his claim that tenant farming is the most advantageous
form of farming:
This method of putting out land to lease is the most advantageous of all to the proprietors
and to the cultivators; it becomes established in all places where there are wealthy
cultivators in a position to make the advances involved in cultivation; and as wealthy
cultivators are in a position to provide the land with much more labor and manure, there
results from it a huge increase in the product and the revenue of landed property. In
Picardy, Normandy, the environs of Paris, and in the majority of the Provinces of the
North of France, the land is cultivated by farmers. In the Provinces of the South they are
cultivated by Metayers; therefore the Provinces and the North of France are incomparably
more wealthy and better cultivated than those of the South.129
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Turgot does not appear to suggest the benefits of a “multiplicity of small farmers.” Elsewhere he
also assumes that wage laborers make up most of the population, referring to “agricultural wage
earners” as those who “make up the greatest part of the population” and also as “poor wageearners who carry out the most laborious and most useful work.”130 It is evident, then, that
Turgot’s economic model supports an agrarian capitalist model, where land is rented out to
wealthy farmers who then employ wage earners to cultivate the land. Smith, as will be discussed
in a later chapter, also defended this outlook. In sum, to recall the discussion in the introduction
of the dissertation, Turgot did not favor an ownership society that was radically egalitarian.
Alternatively, the political and economic arrangement that he assumes favors large landowners
(and grants them greater political power) and a system of wage labor.

Wage Labor
The republican claim about equality in property was also tied to the identification of
wage labor with servitude and domination. Helvétius approaches this view in his seemingly
prescriptive claim that a redistribution of land would cause the number of laborers to decrease
and therefore the price of labor to rise.131 Rousseau also expresses this view when he claims, in
On the Social Contract (1762), that, in an ideal polity, no one ought to be “so rich as to be
capable of buying another citizen,” nor anyone “so poor that he is forced to sell himself.”132
Equality in property thus was advocated as the means to the end of economic independence and
self-sufficiency.
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Turgot’s discussion of wage labor is certainly favorable to the view that the price of labor
should not be too low. As discussed above, Turgot admits that employers are pressured into
keeping wages at a subsistence level. He claims, however, that wages tend to, and ought to,
remain above this minimal level and even rise well above it. Turgot’s assurances that wages will
remain above a subsistence wage still present some problems. Part of Turgot’s argument that
wages will rise rests on the assumption of a tight labor market, which, on his account, would
occur during a period of economic expansion (a point Smith also notes) and therefore would be
limited to a temporary phenomenon.133
Turgot also acknowledges the possibility for disequilibrium between wages and prices.
To recall, he comments that equilibrium “can be disturbed for shorter or longer intervals in such
a way that a great number of men experience all the excess of misery, and that societies are in a
state either of crisis and convulsion or weariness and decline.”134 Turgot’s recognition of this
tension, however, does not lead him to propose intervention as a solution. In fact elsewhere in a
passage that reiterates his claims about economic equilibrium, Turgot explicitly seems to suggest
the contrary. Here he claims: “employers must be completely free to use such men as they deem
proper, in order that the local workers may not, by taking advantage of their small number, force
them to increase wages above the natural proportion.”135 Alternatively, he reiterates (in both
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texts) his belief that a system of free trade is more conducive for achieving fair wages and prices.
Turgot’s support for job creation programs is distinct, then, from advocating for intervention in
the form of an agrarian reform, which would decrease the supply of wage laborers (and therefore
increase its price). Thus, like his outlook on grain, Turgot’s views align with an approach that
supports the full commodification of goods and labor, where goods and labor are largely subject
to the organizing mechanisms of the market and not social institutions.
Additionally, while frequently arguing against government or guild restrictions that
workers face when employing their labor, Turgot does not seem troubled, as other republicans
are, by the relationship of economic dependency that exists between wage earners and their
employers.136 This is evident in his letter to Madame de Graffigny, a fiction writer, where, after
asserting that people are not born equal in regards to their conditions (i.e. abilities), Turgt states
the following:
One cannot labor at the soil without having utensils and the means of sustenance until the
harvest. Those who have not had the intelligence or the opportunity to acquire these
means have not the right to deprive of them him who has earned and won them by his
work. If the idle and the ignorant robbed the laborious and the skillful, all work would be
discouraged, misery would become general. It is more just and more useful for all that
those who are deficient in mind or in good fortune should lend their strength to others
who can employ them, who can, in advance, give them wages, and thus guarantee them a
share of the future products. Their subsistence then is assured, but so is their dependence.
It is not unjust that he who has invented a productive work, and who has supplied to his
co-operators the sustenance and the instruments necessary to execute it, who has made
with them, in that, only a free contract, should reserve for himself the better part, and, for
value of subsistence goods, the amount of work available and the number of workers, but which
can never be settled by anything other than competition and freedom.” Turgot, “Observations on
the Paper by Graslin,” 153-54. It should be noted that Turgot is therefore claiming that free
competition would benefit both workers and employers, insofar as it would prevent a monopoly
from forming that would increase or decrease wages at one or the other’s expense.
136
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the price of his advances, should have less hard work and more leisure. This leisure
enables him to reflect more, and still further to increase his mental resources. What he
can save from the portion, equitably greater, which he will have of the products, increases
his capital and his power to undertake new enterprises. Thus inequality will arise, and
will increase, even among the most capable and most moral peoples.... It is not an evil, it
is a blessing for mankind.137
Turgot’s comments here suggest that the unequal relationship between workers and employers is
a relationship based in nature. He states that the former is subject to the latter and dependent on
them, because the worker is naturally less intelligent or skillful than the employer. He claims,
moreover, that those with better talents are more deserving of leisure than those less fortunate.
These comments seem difficult to square with an interpretation of Turgot as an egalitarian
thinker.
On this outlook, then, Turgot departs from the agrarian republican view. While both
Turgot and agrarian republicans identify wage labor with dependency, the latter seek to
redistribute property as a means of increasing opportunities for self-employment. That is,
agrarian republicans support the decommodification of labor. This approach is not possible for
Turgot, given his understanding of economies of scale and identification of wage labor with
productivity. Alternatively, it is possible that Turgot understood wage laborers to be free, insofar
as they “voluntarily” enter into relations with their employers through the employment contract.
To recall, Turgot claims that “the right of labor” is a “property of all men.”138 In this way, if
Turgot falls within the tradition of republicanism, his outlook aligns with laissez-faire
republicanism (to be discussed in the concluding chapter) and not the anti-wage labor outlook of
agrarian republicanism.
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Conclusion
As the preceding sections demonstrate, Turgot’s defense of liberalization was informed
by normative arguments that addressed the beneficial effects of liberal reform for all members of
society. In particular, Turgot sought to show how an expansion of the grain market and the
removal of impediments to employment would improve the economic welfare and independence
of the laboring class. Turgot’s support for government intervention, demonstrated in his efforts
to combat the subsistence crisis in Limoges, also evince his commitment to these aims.
While some scholars may conclude from these facts that Turgot’s economic outlook was
more egalitarian than most contemporary free market outlooks, a comparison between Turgot
and the critics of liberal reform puts such an interpretation into question. From the perspective of
the opponents of reform, liberalization eliminated forms of public oversight and control over
local economies. In doing so, it gave the owners and sellers of grain significant power over
consumers in terms of dictating the price of grain and its availability to particular markets. The
consolidation of land for the creation of large capitalist farms, moreover, forced small peasants
into dependency on landowners and wage labor for accessing their means of subsistence. From
the perspective of the critics, the proprietarian ideology of the liberal reformers encouraged new
forms of economic harms and inequalities. This was only worsened by the proposal to increase
the voting power of the landowning class.
These criticisms of economic liberalization should not be dismissed as antiquated. To do
so would overlook contemporary struggles that assert the right to governance over local food
systems, i.e. the idea of “food sovereignty.” From this perspective, the increasing control of large
multinational corporations over the production, sale, and trade of agricultural goods is viewed as
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detrimental to local economies and small agrarian communities. While critics of free markets in
the eighteenth century may not have explicitly addressed the ecological aspect of these
contemporary movements, they did place an importance on local community control over food
systems. For these reasons, it is with the critics of reform that a closer analogy can be drawn to
the idea of economic democracy discussed in the introduction. To continue to explore these
themes, the next chapter turns to a key figure in the revisionist accounts of eighteenth century
economic thought, Adam Smith. The economic framework of the Physiocrats will be useful in
interpreting Smith’s outlook, insofar as many of these same ideas were also taken up by Smith in
his critique of feudal and mercantile economic policies.
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CHAPTER TWO
Smith’s System of Natural Liberty

The Physiocrats’ attempt to introduce liberal reform in France was influenced by the so-called
success of the new agrarian model that emerged in England. While both England and France
experienced political and economic turmoil in the feudal period, tensions between peasants and
landlords unfolded in different trajectories in each country. In England, the peasantry was able to
establish a greater political claim to land, which, as will be elaborated on in the next chapter,
allowed them to expand agricultural production to a degree that French peasants, with less
political rights under absolutism, failed to achieve. This did not prevent the Physiocrats from
developing an economic model that they believed, if instituted, would allow France to achieve
the same course of economic development as England. The economic contributions of the
Physiocrats, in turn, were important in the intellectual development of a (now) better-known
figure associated with the free market economy—Adam Smith. This chapter examines Smith’s
attempt to analyze and defend the economic principles and mechanisms associated with the new
model of agrarian capitalism in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776). Smith, of course, did not explicitly refer to this model as a “capitalist” economy, but
rather, as a system of “natural” or “perfect” liberty. Liberty here refers to the liberalization of
markets and the grounding of the economy in natural law. Similar to the “proprietarian” outlook
found in Turgot, Smith, as it will be argued, also claimed that liberalization was an extension of
the natural rights that subjects possess in their property.
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Smith was born in Kirkaldy, Scotland in 1723.1 Upon unifying with England in 1707,
Scotland experienced a period of agricultural and industrial expansion throughout the eighteenth
century. These developments informed the intellectual debates and concerns that unified Scottish
Enlightenment thought. In addition to Smith, other representative figures of this tradition include
Francis Hutcheson (Smith’s teacher), Lord Kames, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson. The
ongoing debate concerning Scotland’s union with England, led many of these thinkers to theorize
about the economic and ethical effects of commercial development.2 Often these discussions
were informed by a conception of historical progress that followed a linear transgression from
savage or rude societies, to civilized or commercial ones. As was the case with the Physiocrats,
agriculture was also an important topic of interest for the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers.
Through their participation in intellectual circles and clubs, like the “Select Society,” Smith and
others often met with wealthy landowners, “agricultural improvers,” and farmers to discuss
economic and political matters.3
As recent scholarship has emphasized, however, Smith’s contribution to this debate was
not strictly economic. Scholars have recently contested the longstanding view that Smith’s
economic thought stood in contradiction to the rest of his philosophical work (i.e. the “Das
Adam Smith Problem”). The late discovery of Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence, recorded by
students in 1762-63, and growing research on Smith has led scholars to suggest that his
1
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economic outlook was intended to form part of a larger philosophical system that included his
moral and political thought.4 From this perspective, Smith’s economic outlook cannot be severed
from his moral and jurisprudential thought. Some scholars, as will be considered in the
concluding chapter, even suggest that Smith’s economic approach was an “embedded” one,
insofar as he believed that markets required the oversight of social and moral institutions to
prevent corruption and economic inequality.
In line with this scholarship, this chapter reconstructs Smith’s economic and politicalethical defense of the market economy. In particular, it reconstructs Smith’s criticisms of
regulatory policies, including wage regulations, the guild system, a policy of provision in grain,
and mercantile restrictions in foreign trade. While Smith criticizes these practices on economic
grounds, claiming that they hinder economic growth, he also claims that they violate norms of
justice and individual liberty. Liberty, moreover, is defined in two ways in the Wealth of Nations.
On the first definition, Smith draws from the tradition of natural law to defend economic liberties
as natural rights. These liberties include the ability to take up employment in the location of
one’s choosing, the freedom to seek employment in a particular trade, the ability to freely
employ or hire laborers, and the freedom to invest capital into an industry of one’s choosing. On
the second definition, Smith employs a republican conception of freedom to claim that market
economies emancipate people from relations of economic dependency. Smith’s focus here is
how markets undo interpersonal relations of domination within the economic sphere.
This chapter provides thus an overview of the various ways that Smith employs the
values of freedom and economic welfare to defend liberal reforms against feudal and mercantile
practices. The following chapter will compare Smith to other eighteenth century economic
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outlooks to address the extent that he was successful in defending these claims. For, as I will
suggest in the concluding chapter, while many contemporary scholars claim that egalitarian
values informed Smith’s economic outlook, they overlook how critics of the market opposed
liberal reform on the basis of these very same values.

Labor, Poverty, and Grain
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith’s proposal for an economic model of natural liberty
constituted a critical response to the regulatory policies that had been in place in England from
(roughly) the beginning of the sixteenth century. It was also in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries that the first “free trade” debates originated. Early calls for free trade did not
immediately address concerns related to the importation of foreign goods, as they would by the
late eighteenth century.5 Instead, they criticized the existence of royal patents and monopolies on
the grounds that such privileges hindered citizens from participating in local and foreign trade.
As a result, in 1604 a bill for free trade was proposed to the House of Commons, but not passed,
in response to growing animosities against the privileges of chartered companies.6 In the period
leading up to the English Civil War, the Levellers also actively promoted free trade. As one
example of this, in a debate arising over the exclusive privileges of the Levant Company in 1652,
the Leveller, William Walwyn, himself a member of the Merchant Adventurers guild, put forth
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an argument in defense of free trade to the Committee for Trade and Foreign Affairs.7 From the
Levellers’ perspective, monopolistic practices were abuses of royal power and prevented citizens
from becoming economically independent while also raising the costs of goods for the general
public.
As will be discussed, the identification of monopoly as an abuse of power was what
fueled Smith’s ethical and economic complaints against the mercantile regime in Europe. De
Roover locates the intellectual origins of these views in the writings of the scholastic Doctors.
The scholastics viewed commerce as a practice that was subject to the constraints of
commutative justice and the “the principle of absolute equality.”8 From this perspective, the
scholastics developed a theory of “just price,” which De Roover defines as the price determined
by “the free valuation of buyers and sellers.”9 The scholastics condemned monopolies on the
grounds that they sold goods above their just price and violated the principle of equality
embodied by commutative justice. Smith’s critique of monopoly, as will be discussed shortly,
adopts a similar line of reasoning. While not using the language of just price, Smith accuses
monopolies of creating artificial scarcities and selling goods above their “natural” price.10 Smith
accused various practices of this injustice and supported free competition on the basis that it was
the only means to ensure a fair equality of opportunity in trade and industry. This section
provides some historical background on the specific policies that Smith objected to on both
economic and normative grounds.
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The earlier acts of economic reform that Smith addresses his criticisms to include the
Statute of Artificers (1563), the English Poor Laws, and the Act of Edward VI (1551/1552). The
Statute of Artificers regulated various aspects of industry and employment policies, with the two
most important of its clauses relating to the regulation of wages and terms of apprenticeship in
various trades. The Poor Laws were a series of laws related to unemployment and poverty, and
the Act of Edward VI pertained to regulations in the provision of corn (i.e. grain), specifically
the prohibition on forestalling, regrating, and engrossing. On this latter point, much of Smith’s
discussion follows the Physiocratic proposal for liberalizing the grain trade. I will consider each
of these policies in turn, before then discussing Smith’s objection to them.
The Statute of Artificers was an extension of two late medieval English labor laws: The
Ordinance of Labourers (1349) and The Statute of Labourers (1351). In response to the
population crisis following the Black Death, both statutes instituted regulatory measures on
labor, including a placement of ceilings on wages. Later reforms, the acts of 1514 and 1515
under Henry VII, reinstated the regulation of wages, but under new rates that were increasingly
protested due to inflation in the mid-century.11 Anxieties over employment and unviable wage
ceilings eventually led to the institution of the Statute of Artificers.12 The 1563 statute did not fix
wage rates, but left the amount to be determined by local officials, ordering a yearly adjustment
of wages in relation to the “plenty or scarcity” of food (§11).13
Although by the eighteenth century wage regulations had fallen out of practice, exceptions
were made in specific industries. Smith focuses in particular on a statute issued by George III in
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the aftermath of a London tailors’ strike in 1720 (7 Geo. I, stat. 1, c. 13).14 The statute prohibited
master tailors from raising wages or reducing the hours of work for laborers. It also set the terms
of punishment against violators of the act, including a two-month prison sentence for employers
and striking workers.15 The act was the first in a series of “combination” acts in the eighteenth
century that aimed (often through the regulation of wages) to prevent “conspiring” workers from
demanding higher pay (the most notable being the Combination Act of 1800). The combination
acts were repealed in 1824/1825, through the lobbying of Francis Place, a laissez-faire proponent
who also advocated for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.
In addition to addressing wage rates, the Statute of Artificers also established
requirements for entry into trades, including the requirement of a seven-year apprenticeship term
(§19).16 In many respects, the statute nationalized existing guild practices that historically
mandated labor regulations and entry into the trades. Apprenticeships typically entailed the
training of laborers in a trade or craft, but also training in other skills, including “religious
doctrine, personal morality, literacy, numeracy and account-keeping, needlework, knitting,
sewing, ‘housewifery,’” and other forms of “household management capabilities.”17 Apprentices
also often took up residence with the master and were given food and goods in exchange for their
help.18 Despite resistance to the removal of the statute in 1813, over 300,000 signatures were
raised to maintain the clause, the 1563 statute was repealed in 1814.19
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The English Poor Laws instituted national policies that addressed employment and
poverty. Early acts addressing poverty in the Tudor period focused mainly on the punishment of
vagrancy.20 For example, an act in 1531, Concerning Punishment of Beggars and Vagabonds,
calls for “vagabonds to be whipped” and “returned to place of birth or dwelling for three years,”
(although it also allows the “impotent” to beg if they have the proper license).21 Several other
laws were passed with less effectiveness until the enactment of the Vagrancy Act of 1598, which
simplified existing procedures of punishment for vagrancy, and the Act for the Relief of the Poor
of 1598 (updated in 1601).22 The Poor Relief law of 1598 strengthened the enforcement of
existing poor law policies by making parishes directly responsible for carrying out relief.23 Parish
responsibilities under the acts included setting the poor and children to work, providing relief for
those who were not able to work, and enrolling children of the poor as apprentices. The parish
was also responsible for taxing its members to generate funds for relief. Aside from these tasks
the parish often supplied relief in other forms. This included providing medical services, food,
clothing, rent, and even money to cover funeral expenses or subsidize wages.24
An addition made to the Poor Laws after restoration was the Settlement Act of 1662 (Act
for the Better Relief of the Poor of this Kingdom). Because the place of one’s “settlement”
conferred parish support, there was a growing concern about the ability of newcomers to
establish settlement and obtain relief from local parishes. The act was intended thus to define the
terms of settlement and tighten qualifications for relief. The act permitted a newcomer to attain
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settlement through either renting a home at a price above £10 a year, paying parish rates, taking
up an apprenticeship (or working for a year as a servant), owning property, or serving a parish
office.25 While the act was sometimes accused of restricting labor mobility, as will be argued by
Smith, contemporary historians debate its actual effectiveness. It hindered mostly women or men
with families, not individual laborers, and its main effect was to deter people from claiming
relief out of fear of being returned to their original parish (not thus, to prevent them from
migrating).26 According to some historians, the effects of the settlement laws were positive. As
one author summarizes, “[it] acted as a useful cushion, allowing parishes to control mobility but
not preventing it, giving the poor local attachments but allowing them some opportunity to
establish themselves elsewhere.”27
Of equal importance in dealing with the issue of poverty during the Tudor and early
Stuart period was the regulation of grain. Much like the customary practice of provision in
France, between 1580 and 1630 local authorities and justices of peace in England strictly
regulated the sale of grain at local markets. Their responsibilities were codified in the
Elizabethan Book of Orders, which provided guidelines for action in times of scarcity.28 When
prices were high, local authorities were ordered to inspect the farmer’s stock of grain and adjust
the price accordingly. They were also empowered to carry out existing laws on forestalling,
regrating, and engrossing, which were prohibited by an earlier act (The Act of Edward VI
1551/1552). E.P. Thompson offers a detailed account of the common market practices during
this period:
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In this model, marketing should be, so far as possible, direct, from the farmer to the
consumer. The farmers should bring their corn in bulk to the local pitching market; they
should not sell it while standing in the field, nor should they withhold it in the hope of
rising prices. The markets should be controlled; no sales should be made before stated
times, when a bell would ring; the poor should have the opportunity to buy grain, flour,
or meal first, in small parcels, with duly-supervised weights and measures. At a certain
hour, when their needs were satisfied, a second bell would ring, and larger dealers (duly
licensed) might make their purchases. Dealers were hedged around with many
restrictions, inscribed upon the musty parchments of the laws against forestalling,
regrating and engrossing, codified in the reign of Edward VI. They must not buy (and
farmers must not sell) by sample. They must not buy standing crops, nor might they
purchase to sell again (within three months) in the same market at a profit, or in
neighbouring markets, and so on. Indeed, for most of the eighteenth century the
middleman remained legally suspect, and his operations were, in theory, severely
restricted.29
By the mid seventeenth century, these practices soon fell out of favor. Farmers increasingly sold
their grain in sample to merchants therefore cutting out direct sales at the market, and by 1772
the prohibition on forestalling was entirely lifted.
Thompson notes that, despite these changes, the Tudor era policies informed popular
uprisings and food riots throughout the eighteenth century. In moments of scarcity, the poor took
up various forms of direct action, including blockades, the ransacking of goods in transport, and
more commonly, crowds seizing and “setting of the price” of grain at local markets. Thompson
characterizes these forms of dissent as informed by a “moral economy of the poor” that
reasserted the rights and privileges protected under the paternal regime in the Tudor period.30
Governments also resorted to the old customs. In 1795, chief justice Lord Kenyon upheld the
prohibition on forestalling, using common law as his grounding, despite the 1772 statute.31
Thompson summarizes, “In years of good harvests and moderate prices, the authorities lapsed
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into forgetfulness. But if prices rose and the poor become turbulent, it was revived, at least for
symbolic effect.”32
In sum, while the policies of the Tudor and early Stuart periods are often characterized as
“paternalistic,” owing to the significant oversight of the government in domestic industry and
trade, commentators sometimes point to the positive effects of these policies, which acted as a
form of “social welfare” for the laboring poor.33 As one historian comments, “The most
characteristic feature of the economic policy of the Stuarts and the Tudors was the continual
endeavor to aid the classes of society which suffered from the new capitalist development.”34
The author refers to a new class of landless poor that was an outgrowth of a series of land
enclosures beginning in the second half of the fifteenth century.35 During this period, the efforts
to consolidate land and create profitable, large-scale farms drastically altered existing property
ownership. As David McNally notes, “By the end of the seventeenth century, English landlords
controlled as much as 70-75 per cent of cultivable land, thus leaving owner-occupiers with some
25-30 per cent of cultivable land.”36 The change of property ownership negatively affected the
laboring poor. Speaking to the harms of the enclosures, Polanyi referred to the enclosures as “a
revolution of the rich against the poor” that “disrupted” society: “wasting its towns, decimating
its population, turning its overburdened soil into dust, harassing its people and turning them from
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decent husbandmen into a mob of beggars and thieves.”37 The violence of the enclosures attests
to the importance of land accessibility for peasants and wage earners throughout the period.
When wage earners, or the poor, still had access to land, either in the form of communal land
(i.e. the commons) or their own farms, they could easily supplement their income with the goods
they produced off their land. Under the new system, however, the poor were left with little of
their own to fall back on in times of scarcity or unemployment.
It was, moreover, precisely because access to the land secured “independence” to the
laboring poor, that it was viewed as a threat by advocates of enclosure to the rise of
industrialization and the growing demand for labor.38 The dire situation that this caused the
laboring poor continued well beyond the Tudor period. As McNally discusses, “by the late
eighteenth century, between one quarter and one half of village populations relied upon poor
relief,” noting that “it is especially significant that we find a strong correlation between the
extent of enclosure and per capita poor relief.”39 Smith’s response to the enclosures will be
considered in more detail in the next chapter. What follows is a reconstruction of his response to
the feudal and customary practices described thus far.

Smith’s Response: Labor, Poverty, and Grain
Smith introduces his criticism of the Statute of Artificers in his discussion concerning the
privileges of corporations (i.e. guilds). These privileges included the ability of corporations to
limit the length of the term and number of apprenticeships available in particular trades. He
locates the primary effect of these privileges as the restraint of competition in certain
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employments.40 The statute’s effect, in setting a mandatory apprenticeship term to seven years,
was the same according to Smith. In short, the statute nationalized the longstanding policies of
the guilds.
Smith voices several practical complaints against the statute. He states, for instance, that
because it pertains only to trades established before 1563, when the act was established, certain
oddities exist such that a wheel-wright could make coaches, since coach making was not subject
to the statute, but a coach maker could not make wheels (they must instead purchase them from a
master wheel-wright).41 Smith also contends that apprenticeships do not protect the quality of
work being produced—as it was commonly claimed in defense of the institution—nor do they
encourage industriousness in workers.42 He claims, “In the inferior employments, the sweets of
labour consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They who are soonest in a condition to
enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest…to acquire the early habit of industry.”43 Because, he
continues, apprentices receive no reward for their labor, they develop “an aversion to labour,”
and “generally turn out very idle and worthless.”44 Smith also considers the duration of the
apprenticeship as unnecessary, given that “in the common trades” most could develop “the
dexterity of hand” in a shorter duration of time and “without much practice and experience.”45
Smith criticizes the statute equally in regard to its economic effects. In general, Smith
views the statute and the practices of corporations as being beneficial to artificers and traders, but
not to the broader public. This is because, in restricting the number of people employed in a
particular industry, the regulations “under-stock” the market with laborers (and the goods and
40
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services they provide).46 While the under-stocking of goods and services produces high profits
and wages for tradesmen, who can charge a higher price on account of the scarcity of
goods/services, it comes at the expense of consumers purchasing those commodities. Thus,
Smith contends, if employment was opened up to free competition the “profits of the masters as
well as the wages of the workmen” would be reduced, but “the public would be a gainer, the
work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to market.”47
Smith’s critique of the statute is consistent with his criticism of monopolies in general.
Monopolies occur when manufacturers or merchants conspire to raise the price of a particular
good (or create an artificial scarcity) in order to increase their profits.48, Smith thinks such
practices would not be possible under a system of free competition. On his account, high profits
in a free market will always attract new capital and labor. Overtime, it will also cause profits and
market prices to decrease due to the increase in supply of the good and the efforts of producers to
undersell their competition.49 The view that the statute and guild privileges create monopolies in
various trades is also reflected in Smith’s discussion of the corporation’s ability to “combine”
and “conspire” “against the public” in order “to raise prices.”50
Aside from burdening the public with high market prices, Smith also views the statute as
harmful because it prevents people from having control over their labor. Smith writes:
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies
in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty
46
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both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him. As it hinders
the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders the others from employing
whom they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted
to the discretion of the employers whose interest it so much concerns. The affected
anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as
impertinent as it is oppressive.51
In order to criticize the statute on non-economic grounds and in particular its apprenticeship
clause, Smith invokes an argument similar to the one put forward in the seventeenth century by
Locke. On this outlook, labor is viewed as a type of property that individuals have exclusive
entitlement rights to and can therefore alienate (i.e. sell) to whomever they see fit.52 As Locke
states in The Second Treatise, “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his.”53 For Smith, then, the problem with the statute, as well as the privileges of the corporations,
is that both obstruct and regulate the free employment of labor. Without the proper
apprenticeship qualification or permission from a corporation a skilled worker may not be able to
move from one employment to another or take up the same employment in a different area. Such
policies block, in other words, what Smith believes to be protected by natural law, which is the
freedom to employ one’s labor or hire someone’s labor in accordance with one’s own individual
judgment.
Smith condemns the settlement laws for violating individual rights in the same way.
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Where the statute restricts the mobility of artificers and manufacturers, Smith contends that the
settlement laws restrict all “common” laborers.54 To recall, while the settlement laws laid
restrictions on entry into a new parish, they did not entirely prohibit it. Smith contends, however,
that the qualifications made it essentially impossible for a common laborer to obtain settlement
in a new parish. It was highly unrealistic that one who “lives by labour” alone could afford any
of the requirements of the law, i.e. the ability to pay parish rates, be elected as a parish member,
obtain an apprenticeship or service, afford payment for housing, etc.55 Smith concludes that such
policies are “an evident violation of natural liberty and justice,” adding that “There is scarce a
poor man in England of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who has not in some part of his
life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements.56 Thus, according
to Smith, the settlement laws, like the statute, restrict the “free circulation of labour,” and violate
the freedom of a person to choose “what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often
as he thought proper.”57 These restraints on freedom, Smith contends, also produce economic
inequalities between those employed in the same trade in different towns. Because people cannot
move freely from town to town, some places will have larger populations with low wages, while
others, smaller populations and high wages.58 If the freedom of labor were permitted, such
inequalities between towns would no longer exist and labor could flow to places of high demand,
equalizing the wages of workers within the same trades.
Smith also comments on the regulation of wages. While controls on wages had fallen out
of practice in the eighteenth century, the combination acts set restrictions on wages in certain
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industries. In particular, Smith addresses an act by George III, which set limits to the pay and
duration of work for London tailors. The act was sanctioned after a tailors’ strike in 1720, and
was a clear attempt to deter workers from “combining” to demand higher pay. Smith comments
on the act as follows:
Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their
workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in
favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise
when in favour of the masters. Thus the law which obliges the masters in several different
trades to pay their workmen in money and not in goods, is quite just and equitable. It
imposes no real hardship on the masters. It only obliges them to pay that value in money,
which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods. This law is in
favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour of the masters. When
masters combine together in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they commonly
enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more than a certain wage under a
certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary combination of the same kind,
not to accept of a certain wage under a certain penalty, the law would punish them very
severely; and if it dealt impartially, it would treat the masters in the same manner. But the
8th of George III. enforces by law that very regulation which masters sometimes attempt
to establish by such combinations. The complaint of the workmen, that it puts the ablest
and most industrious upon the same footing with an ordinary workman, seems perfectly
well founded.59
Smith views the act as supporting the tendency of employers to “combine” against their workers
to keep wages low. However, while Smith objects to the act and therefore to the regulation of
wages, he does not suggest that legislation has the right to prevent the combinations of laborers
or employers. He states, “it is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings by any law…[that]
would be consistent with liberty and justice.”60 He comments, however, that the law also “ought
to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”61 Legislation
should not promote such activity amongst employers, but neither, thinks Smith, should it prevent
it.
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Smith does not appear, then, to directly promote the combination of laborers. He points
out the hypocrisy of the legislation in permitting one form of combination (that of the employers)
and not another (that of the laborers), but nowhere seems to promote the latter. In other words, it
seems unlikely that Smith would favor labor unions. Smith also describes worker combinations
as resorting to “shocking violence and outrage.”62 He writes, “they are desperate, and act with
folly and extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an
immediate compliance with their demands.”63 The workers “seldom derive any advantage from
the violence of those tumultuous combinations, which…generally end in nothing, but the
punishment or ruin of the ring-leaders.”64 Moreover, Smith’s recognition that the masters have
significant bargaining power over their employers, given their ability to hold out longer during a
dispute over wages (since the masters possess more wealth), does not seem to deter Smith’s more
general disdain for combinations.65
In accord with his critical stance towards the regulation of labor and poverty, Smith also
views the regulation of grain as a hindrance to economic liberty. As already mentioned, while the
regulation of grain was largely on the decline throughout the eighteenth century, it remained the
de facto policy in periods of scarcity and received widespread support from many of Smith’s
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contemporaries, including liberal economists.66 Externally, moreover, imports and exports
continued to be regulated through tariffs and bounties (respectively), instituting a policy of grain
protection that remained in effect until the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, a common criticism against the liberalization of
grain was that it permitted middlemen and traders to overcharge the public by purchasing large
quantities of grain for resale. The Scottish mercantilist, Sir James Steuart, who is believed to be
the indirect target of many of Smith’s criticisms, summarizes the popular sentiment of the time:
The forestalling of markets is made a crime, because it diminishes the competition which
ought to take place between different people, who have the same merchandize to offer to
sale. The forestaller buys all up, with an intention to sell with more profit, as he has by
that means taken other competitors out of the way, and appears with a single interest on
one side of the contract, in the face of many competitors on the other. This person is
punished by the state, because he has prevented the price of the merchandize from
becoming justly proportioned to the real value; he has robbed the public, and enriched
himself; and in the punishment, he makes restitution.67
Steuart suggests thus that forestalling is, in effect, a type of monopoly that requires the most
stringent form of government regulation in order to be avoided.68 Unlike Smith, Steuart did not
believe free competition to be a remedy for monopolies, but rather the cause of them.69
Far from viewing the inland trader as a threat to the public, Smith’s response is to show
how the trader, in regulating the demand of grain in relation to its supply, performs a public
good. If and when traders do raise prices, he argues, it is not because they purposefully
overcharge their customers, but rather because the level of supply for the season demands it of

66

Some supporters of free trade, like Galiani and Diderot, retracted their support following the
harvest failures in France.
67
Quoted in Gary M. Anderson and Robert D. Tollison, “Sir James Steuart as the Apotheosis of
Mercantilism and His Relation to Adam Smith” Southern Economic Journal 51, No. 2 (October
1984): 459.
68
Steuart also argues for the institution of government controlled public granaries as a solution
to grain scarcities.
69
Ibid., 459.
85

them. To raise their prices above this level risks the possibility of being left with a surplus of
grain that can be lost to “natural causes,” or sold at a depressed price at the start of the next
season.70 Conversely, if traders keep their prices too low in periods of scarcity, then the grain
will be bought up before the end of the season and both the trader and the people will suffer. The
merchant will lose out on profits, and the people will be subject to famine. In this way—invoking
the “invisible hand” of the market— the trader, “without intending the interest of the people,”
provides for consumers like a “prudent master of a vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew.
When he foresees that provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance.”71
Smith views all attempts to regulate grain and prohibitions on engrossing and forestalling
as therefore hindering the best “palliative” for a dearth.72 He contends, that whenever the
government decreases the price of grain during times of scarcity it either hinders merchants from
bringing the grain to the market or, if they do bring it to the market, it encourages people to buy
up the grain before the end of the season.73 It prevents, in other words, the necessary mechanism
of high prices (regulated by the traders) during periods of scarcity.
Aside from worsening situations of scarcity, Smith accuses the regulations of infringing
on the liberties of those employed in the trade. Smith demonstrates how the prohibition on
forestalling had the effect of forcing farmers to split their capital and labor between two
employments: the production and the sale of grain. They were, in other words, forced to be both
a farmer and a merchant since they were prohibited or restricted from selling their grain directly
in wholesale to the dealers.74 Smith concludes that in addition to decreasing the productivity of
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grain production (since the farmer had less capital to invest in the production of grain), these
policies were “evident violations of natural liberty, and therefore unjust.”75 He continues, “the
law ought always to trust people with the care of their own interest, as in their local situations
they must generally be able to judge better of it than the legislator can do.76 Much as in the case
with the statute and the settlement laws, Smith condemns the regulations for preventing a
“freedom” of trade (in the sense of employment) for the farmer, who is forced to carry on two
trades instead of one. The regulations also interfered with the individual judgment of those
employed in the trade. In the case of the merchants Smith writes:
When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be done for the people is to divide the
inconveniencies of it as equally as possible through all the different months, and weeks,
and days of the year. The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as
exactly as he can: and no other person can have either the same interest, or the same
knowledge, or the same abilities to do it so exactly as he, this most important operation of
commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him: or, in other words, the corn trade, so far at
least as concerns the supply of the home market, ought to be left perfectly free.77
On Smith’s account, as much as the regulations hindered the mobility of labor, it also hindered
the liberties of individuals to act (as economic agents) in accordance with their own judgment.
In many ways thus, in addition for arguing against the economic shortcomings of these
feudal and customary practices, Smith often employed a concept of justice to support his claims.
In a rough sense, this idea of freedom aligns with a negative conception of freedom, which
emphasizes the importance of non-interference. In the case of employing one’s labor or capital,
any attempt on part of the government to impose their will on economic agents is held to be in
violation of liberty and property (a claim that was also advanced by Turgot in his defense of
grain merchants and traders).
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Foreign and Colonial Trade
While economic reform in the Stuart and Tudor periods regulated production and
distribution at the domestic level, by the eighteenth century, due to the growing importance and
expansion of international trade, economic reform and debate turned outward. The prevailing
foreign trade policy at the time, promoted under what Smith calls the “mercantile system,”
entailed a protectionist stance toward imports.78 This approach to trade was an outgrowth of a
variety of seventeenth and eighteenth century concerns, including the issue of unemployment
and the mercantile obsession with bullion (money in the form of gold and silver). In regard to the
latter point, because the amount of money was believed to be in short supply, mercantilists
viewed other countries as competitors in the race toward the accumulation of gold and silver.
This supported the drive to colonize (to maintain direct access to foreign gold and silver
reserves), but also to out-produce foreign competitors in manufactured goods. The latter
approach was often defended on the grounds of a “balance of trade” theory, which argued that in
order to keep the stock of money high in a particular country, exports, especially in
manufactured goods, should outweigh imports to ensure that money coming in would
overbalance money going out. Restrictions on imports were also believed to protect existing
industries and the laborers they employed from being undersold by foreign competitors, what
today would be referred to as an “infant industry” argument.
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Although balance of trade theories were popular throughout the early seventeenth
century, most notably in the work of Thomas Mun, who Smith references, the emergence of
protective tariffs came somewhat later.79 Import duties existed in England prior to the
seventeenth century, but they were primarily directed toward generating revenues and not
explicitly intended to ward off foreign competitors.80 One exception was an early prohibition on
the importation of woolen cloth in 1337 under Edward III.81 In general, however, prior to 1688,
most duties on imports remained at a flat 5 per cent rate and were equally applied to exports (not
then directed toward the promotion of domestic industry).82 This changed in 1690, when under
pressure from competition with the East India Company (and the growing expense of war), a
protective tariff of 20 per cent on Indian and Chinese textiles was introduced, followed by
prohibition in 1701.83 The reforms of 1722 under British Prime Minister Walpole further
solidified the new protectionist approach to trade. Under these reforms, export duties on
manufactures were eliminated and imports duties raised, with an exception for the importation of
raw goods to encourage production. Subsidies (bounties) for certain goods were also instituted,
as were regulatory measures to set quality control standards.84
England’s protectionist policies also extended to its colonies. Initially, in the case of the
American colonies, trade was conducted through companies that were granted exclusive royal
patents, like the Plymouth and London Companies formed in 1606. For a brief period in the early
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seventeenth century, trade was open to other foreign traders, including the Dutch, until 1625
when England forbid the exportation of tobacco on foreign ships.85 These restrictions were, in
practice, only loosely observed until the Navigation Acts, a series of laws established in 16511663 (with two further acts in 1673 and 1696). Under these Acts, colonists were forced to import
goods from England (on English ships) and were no longer permitted to export goods to foreign
countries other than England (some exceptions were granted).
By the eighteenth century, while trade with the American Colonies was open to all
British subjects, in other parts of the world it was still under the control of exclusive companies.
Regulated and joint-stock companies were the two main types of chartered companies. The
regulated companies of England that Smith discusses include the Hamburgh Company, Russia
Company, Eastland Company, Turkey Company, and the African Company. The joint-stock
companies include the Royal African Company, South Sea Company, Hudson Bay Company,
and the British East India Company. Members of the regulated companies traded independently
with their own capital and, much like guilds, entrance required a fee and approval by the
company. In joint-stock companies, membership required the purchasing of a share. In both
cases, while the companies were privately owned, a patent was necessary from the government
to operate their trade in certain areas.

Smith’s Response: Foreign and Colonial Trade
Smith disagrees with many aspects of the mercantile system. His main dispute, at the
theoretical level, hinges on the mercantile conception of wealth. As already discussed, the
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mercantilists equated wealth to the total sum of bullion in any one country. Consequently, it was
believed that the best means to increase wealth was through foreign trade, specifically by
maintaining a positive balance of trade or through the acquisition of colonies. It was also held
that profits were obtained through the “buying cheap and selling dear” of goods, i.e. what is
known as the “profit upon alienation” theory.
Smith rejects both the importance of money (as a measure of wealth) and the mercantilist
conception of profit. Wealthier nations, Smith contends, are nations that possess larger annual
stocks of goods, not bullion; money “circulates” and “distributes” goods, but it is the goods
themselves that make up the total “revenue” of a nation (revenue here meaning wealth).86 This is
why, as outlined in books one and two, Smith attributes increases in wealth to increases in
productivity (where more goods are produced per unit of labor). Smith attributes the main causes
of productivity to a developed division of labor and the employment of productive labor, i.e.
labor that “adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed.”87 Based on this
conception of wealth, Smith claims that foreign trade contributes less to a nation’s wealth than
agriculture and manufacturing, which employ a greater sum of productive labor.88 For Smith,
moreover, profit is the revenue that remains after the cost of the initial capital used to produce a
good is replenished (upon the sale of the good).89 Thus profits can be obtained from the
production of domestic goods irrespective of a nation’s involvement in foreign trade.
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While Smith favors domestic industry, especially agriculture, over foreign trade, he does
not view foreign trade as altogether unimportant.90 In this way, Smith departs from the
Physiocratic view that viewed agriculture as the only productive form of industry. Smith believes
that if nations sufficiently develop their domestic industries, foreign trade can serve a useful
function in the production of wealth. Smith, however, does not agree with the mercantilist, who
believes that foreign trade increases wealth because it increases bullion. Rather, he writes:
It [foreign trade] carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for
which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for
which there is a demand. It gives a value to their superfluities, by exchanging them for
something else, which may satisfy a part of their wants, and increase their enjoyments.
By means of it, the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour
in any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the highest
perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part of the produce of their
labour may exceed the home consumption, it encourages them to improve its productive
powers, and to augment its annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real
revenue and wealth of the society.91
Trade is important thus, but not because it generates so much profit through the act of exchange
alone. Rather, trade contributes to national wealth because it provides a larger market for
domestic industries and thereby enhances its productivity (the true measure of wealth). As an
example of this, Smith discusses how the discovery of America expanded the European market
and increased its productive powers.92 As stated in book one, chapter three, the “extent of the
market” contributes significantly to the development of the division of labor: without a greater
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demand for goods, industries will not be able to expand their productions beyond the immediate
needs of the domestic market.93
In addition to his criticisms of the theoretical conception of wealth and its relation to
foreign trade, Smith also criticizes the trade policies adopted under the mercantile system. At the
time, protectionist policies had placed restrictions on foreign imports in an attempt to protect
domestic industries from foreign competitors. In regard to its economic effects, Smith contends
that the import restrictions divert capital into less productive industries and therefore decrease
the total annual revenue of the country.
Smith’s reasoning is as follows. If a government, for example, were to impose import
restrictions on silk, it would result in more capital flowing into the production of silk, than if no
protective measures were in place (and foreign silk is cheaper than domestic silk). In turn, given
Smith’s assumption that there is a fixed amount of labor and capital within the country, import
restrictions would direct capital away from other (non-silk) industries. So, for instance, less
capital would be invested in the production of wool. Assuming, however, that the silk industry is
less profitable than the industries from which labor and capital are diverted (i.e. the wool
industry), these policies would cut into the countries total revenue. It would be better to import
silk (for cheaper) from abroad and invest capital in industries in which that particular country has
an “advantage.”94 Buying silk, in other words, frees up more capital to invest in industries in
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which greater profits can accrue. Restrictions thus divert part of the nation’s capital and labor
away from advantageous (i.e. profitable) industries into less advantageous ones.95
Aside from being economically unwise, Smith contends that import restrictions also
interfere with the judgment of individuals:
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the
produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his
local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The
statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to
employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no
council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of
a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it...To give
the monopoly of the home-market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular
art of manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought
to employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases, be either a useless or a hurtful
regulation.96
In making certain industries appear more profitable than they actually are, or would be without
restrictions in place, the government encourages people to invest their capital and labor into
them. Governments essentially thus, according to Smith, make choices for people as to where it
is best for them to invest instead of leaving this choice up to individuals themselves.
Smith also criticizes the restrictions on trade that the European nations subject their
colonists to. In general terms, Smith views the creation of colonies and colonial trade as
economically advantageous for the colonies and colonizing countries alike. He even suggests it
(potentially) has advantages for the natives of the country, commenting on how in “savage and
barbarous nations,” the colonizing country introduces agriculture and industry, as well as a
system of government and juridical stability.97
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The example of the Northern American colonies is of particular interest to Smith. He
attributes their rapid economic development to the abundance of land (protected by restraints on
engrossing and primogeniture), the relative dependency and distance from Europe, the moderate
taxes, and the less oppressive monopoly to which it was subject.98 Unlike other colonies, Smith
comments on how the American Colonies were no longer subject to the exclusive trade of
companies, and were also permitted by the Navigation Acts to export some goods (nonenumerated goods) to other European countries.99 For these reasons, despite the negative effects
of the monopoly, the colonists were able to make significant progress in agriculture. Smith
emphasizes too, the beneficial effects of trade with the colonies for the European nations, both
because of the increase of “enjoyments” made available to Europeans, as well as the
encouragement of European industries through the expansion of a new foreign market.100
In making trade with the colonies exclusive, however, Smith argues that European
nations negate the beneficial effects of trade. Much of his commentary addresses the negative
economic effects for England. He contends that although England maintains an advantage over
other European countries by excluding them from access to colonial goods, its advantage is only
relative. For example, while England may pay less than France for tobacco from Maryland or
Virginia due to its monopoly, under a system of free trade, the cost of tobacco would become
even cheaper. Without its monopoly, England may lose its “relative” advantage over France, but
it would obtain an “absolute” advantage due to the lower prices afforded to it within a system of
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free trade.101 Other disadvantages include the “revulsion” of capital from British industries into
the colonial trade.102 Seeing how profits in the colonial trade were initially high, Smith explains
how capital shifted from other British industries into the new trade. This in turn, caused a
decrease of competition in the older industries and, as consequent, a rise in profits.103 The effect
of this, however, is to cause the decay of older industries and (due to high profits) British goods
to be undersold by foreign competitors.104 It also forces capital into a less productive industry
(foreign trade) and leaves less capital available for the productive industries, i.e. agriculture and
manufacturing.105
In general, Smith views Britain’s dependency on trade with the colonies as an unnatural
and risky form of economic development. He argues that in investing its capital into one “great
channel” instead of “a great number of small channels” England is less “healthful.”106 Smith
continues:
Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital
parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many dangerous
disorders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more properly proportioned. A
small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its
natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and
commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring the most
dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic.107
For these reasons, Smith recommends, as one option, a “moderate and gradual relaxation” of the
monopoly (much like his recommendation for removing import restrictions).108 Where to permit
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trade with other nations “all at once” would have disastrous effects on the industries dependent
on it.109 Interestingly, he comments how it will be up to the “wisdom” of statesmen and
legislatures to determine how the system of perfect liberty ought to be implemented in these
cases.110 The best option for England, Smith concludes, would be to grant the colonies political
emancipation. If it were to go through with such a plan:
Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expence of the
peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce
as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of
the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present
enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother
country, which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, would quickly
revive…the same sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other,
might revive between Great Britain and her colonies, which used to subsist between those
of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they descended.111
While acknowledging that no nation would ever voluntarily give up their colonial dominions, he
suggests that it would be the best solution to end the growing expenses of the colonies (given the
failure of the colonies to generate much revenue for the kingdom).
Smith comments on how the economic liberties of the colonists are also compromised
under monopoly. Although permitted to sell raw goods to the British (and in certain cases other
Europeans), the colonists were prohibited from the exportation of manufactured goods. As Smith
comments: “[Britain] will not suffer colonists to work in those more refined manufactures even
for their own consumption; but insists upon their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers
all goods of this kind.”112 The prohibition was consistent with British foreign trade policy that
encouraged the exportation of manufactured goods and prohibited foreign imports (except raw
goods that were needed for manufacturing). Smith concludes that Britain turned the colonies into
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a nation of “customers” to meet the demands of “a nation whose government is influenced by
shopkeepers.”113 He also condemns the policy as a violation of justice: “To prohibit a great
people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their own produce, or from
employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves,
is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind.114 Smith, however, does not view
the restrictions placed on the American colonies as economically “hurtful.”115 Because land was
“so cheap” and labor “so dear” in the colonies, he states that it is better for the colonists to import
cheap European manufactures and focus on agricultural production.116 In line with Smith’s views
on the natural progression of economic development, he argues that the American colonies are
not yet in the phase of development where the production of manufactures for foreign trade
would be economically fruitful. As such, Smith says of the prohibitions, that they are “only
impertinent badges of slavery” put in place by “the groundless jealously of the merchants and
manufacturers of the mother country;” that only in a “more advanced state” might such
restrictions “be really oppressive and insupportable.”117 Thus, for the time being, Smith saw the
prohibitions as unjust, but as otherwise not economically harmful.
Lastly, Smith faults the exclusive trading companies for committing a variety of
oppressive acts in their trade with overseas countries. The consequences for European subjects
include the usual constraints imposed by monopolies, including the exclusion from participation
in a trade (without meeting the entry requirements of the regulated or joint-stock companies) and
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the subjection to monopoly prices.118 Trading companies also carry negative economic effects
for European countries in general. Whether in the case of a rich or poor country, they lead to a
“derangement of the natural distribution of stock.”119 For rich countries, exclusive companies
prevent more stock from entering into the trade than if the trade were open to all subjects
(thereby experiencing the loss of capital investment in a profitable trade). Where in poor
countries they cause more stock to enter into the trade than without the existence of the
companies. As a result, the country loses capital to an industry “which must be more or less
unsuitable to their present circumstances”—i.e. not all countries were well suited for
participating in foreign trade.120
Smith also details the destructive effects of the companies on native populations and local
forms of land cultivation. He comments on how in Africa and East India, exclusive companies
have not been successful in the creation of colonies, unlike in the case of the Americas, where
colonies are “numerous and thriving.”121 Smith contributes some of this to the denser populations
of Africa and East India, as well as the fact that the natives are not “weak and defenceless as the
miserable and helpless Americans.”122 But aside from these differences, Smith notes that it is
largely the “genius” of the companies, and the “unfavorable” conditions they create, that
ultimately prevents the development of thriving colonies.123 Smith lists several examples of the
destructive tendencies of trading companies that have created these conditions. In the instance of
the Dutch East India Company, this includes the burning of surplus spices, the “extirpat[ion]” of
clove and nutmeg trees, and “the arts of oppression,” which have reduced the population of
118
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Moluccas.124 In the case of the British East India Company, Smith cites examples of the
“destructive” practices surrounding the production of poppies (including the plowing of “rich
fields” of rice and grain) for the opium trade in Bengal.125 He also comments that it seems likely
that the British will soon adopt the practice of the Dutch, who restrict production (often through
destruction) in order to meet the needs of the company and to prohibit natives from selling some
of the surplus goods themselves. It is worth noting that while Smith describes a system where the
economic liberties of the natives are (on his own definition of economic liberty) clearly violated,
he does not explicitly refer to how these practices violate the “sacred rights” of justice, or the
right of natural liberty. Instead he speaks only of the “oppressive” and “destructive” measures
perpetuated by the companies.
Smith attributes these destructive acts to the failure of the companies to act as sovereigns
of a country ought to act, commenting that the companies fail even to consider themselves as
sovereigns.126 The proper goal of a sovereign is always to increase the revenue of a country,
which comes from increases in the annual produce of the land. Instead, Smith contends, the
companies rule as merchants. They care not for increasing the productivity of the land, through
the freedom of trade and the extension of the market, rather they seek to cut off competition and
reduce the total surplus (creating thus an artificial scarcity of goods). As Smith summarizes:
“trade, or buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principle business, and by a
strange absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of the
merchant.”127
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As merchants, they also lack authority within the country and therefore rely on
“despotical” forms of governance, where they “command obedience” through military means.128
Smith also comments on the destructive tendencies of the company servants who establish
monopolies within the country through private trades. In the end, Smith blames not the
individuals, but the “system of government.”129 He writes it is “the situation in which they [the
servants of the East India company] are placed, that I mean to censure; not the character of those
who have acted in it. They acted as their situation naturally directed.”130 He concludes that the
companies are “nuisances” and “always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they
are established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under their
government.”131 In the final book of the Wealth of Nations, moreover, Smith goes into the details
of the economic failures of joint-stock companies, which he attributes to the mismanagement of
the directors.132
In sum, Smith accuses the mercantile system for its injustices along with its economic
failures. He contends that the injustice of the mercantile system is founded on the restraints it
sets against individuals in their pursuit of commercial gain. Specifically, protectionism (which
encourages a monopoly of domestic goods), the monopoly over the colonial trade, and the
exclusive trade of companies with foreign countries, all hinder the ability of people to freely
partake in a global system of competitive exchange. The mercantile system also directs the flow
of capital and labor into less profitable industries and restricts the choice of individual agents as
to where it may be best to invest their capital. In a more general sense, Smith notes how the
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system is founded on the corrupt influence of those who benefit from it the most—i.e. the
merchants, manufacturers, and traders, who are afforded the high profits that accrue under
monopolies. Smith writes of this group that they act as a “formidable” force and “intimidate” the
legislature into support of such policies.133 This comes all at the expense of the people, not only
in restricting their economic opportunities, but also in subjecting them to higher market prices.
For these reasons Smith defends the freedom of trade, viewing it as the best possible means to
secure a more prosperous and liberal system of trade for the “general good” of society at large.134

Markets and Economic Independence
From the preceding sections, it is clear that Smith viewed liberalization in labor markets,
the grain trade, and domestic and foreign trade as an extension of justice, insofar as it protected
citizen’s economic liberties and property.135 Smith, however, also ascribed another important
value to markets. In the third book of the Wealth of Nations, Smith discusses how the
introduction of commerce freed subjects from feudal relations of dependency and dissolved the
arbitrary authority of feudal lords. Smith’s account is intended to be a historical one, but his
commentary also addresses how modern market relations offer individuals greater forms of
independence and freedom. This section provides an overview of this discussion to help clarify
Smith’s understanding of the connection between market economies and independence.
Importantly, it will be revealed that through this identification Smith departed from traditional
republican association of markets (especially in labor) with domination.
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In book three, Smith compares what he calls the “natural progress of opulence” to the
historical development of European commercial societies. Because “subsistence” comes “prior to
conveniency and luxury,” Smith states that in the natural course of development the “cultivation
and improvement of the country” precedes the development of the town.136 Towns, moreover,
Smith contends, are generally dependent on the surplus produced in the country, both for their
subsistence and for their manufactures. As such, they “can therefore increase only with the
increase of this surplus produce.”137
While the natural course of opulence requires an initial stage of agricultural development,
Smith contends that in the history of European nations the reverse was true. Towns developed
prior to the country. Smith attributes this to the discouragement of agriculture in the feudal
period and the unique history of feudal towns. In the case of the former, during the feudal period,
land was both scarce (due to entails and primogeniture), but also under-cultivated. Smith reasons
that this was because the lords were too preoccupied with war to improve their land, and that the
tenants of the land, who did not possess full property rights, lacked incentive to produce anything
above what was necessary for their own subsistence.138
Development in the cities, conversely, was encouraged due to the interest of the king in
securing power over the lords.139 People within the cities were granted certain liberties on the
part of the king (unlike the occupiers of the land under a lord) and therefore were incentivized to
develop and extend commercial production. As Smith summarizes, only when people “are secure
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of enjoying the fruits of their industry” will they “naturally exert it to better their condition and
to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniences and elegancies of life.”140
Despite the “unnatural” progression of opulence in Europe, Smith shows how the
development of towns eventually led to the development of agriculture in the countryside. Smith
attributes this to three things. First, the commercial growth of towns expanded the market for
goods produced in the country and therefore encouraged the development of agriculture; second,
wealthy merchants from the towns began to purchase land in the country and use capital to
improve them for profit; and third, the commerce of the towns brought about political stability in
the region.141 On this third point, Smith writes:
Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with
them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who
had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile
dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the
most important of all their effects. Mr. Hume is the only writer who, so far as I know, has
hitherto taken notice of it.142
The claim that Smith attributes to Hume is found in Hume’s essay “Of Refinement in the Arts.”
Here Hume writes, “progress in the arts [the arts of industry] is rather favourable to liberty, and
has a natural tendency to preserve, if not produce a free government.”143 According to Hume,
developments in commerce positively affect the art of government by contributing to the rise of
the “middling rank of men.”144 He contends that wealthy farmers, merchants, and traders “are the
best and firmest basis of public liberty,” because they, unlike the poor peasants, “submit not to
140
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slavery,” and unlike the barons (or lords), do not seek to “submit to the tyranny of their
sovereign.”145 The middling ranks instead, “covet equal laws, which may secure their property
and preserve them from monarchical as well as aristocratical tyranny.”146 Smith’s account of
how commerce introduces political stability diverges from that of Hume’s. Smith attributes the
introduction of order and government (and with it the liberty and security of people) not to the
intentions of any one group or individual, but rather to the unintended effects of individuals in
pursuit of their own self-interest.147
Smith’s narrative is as follows. In the feudal era, the authority of the lords and barons far
exceeded that of the kings. The lords were “the judges in peace, and the leaders in war, of all
who dwelt upon their estates;” “they could maintain order and execute the law within their
respective demesnes,” and “the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that of
making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights possessed allodially by
the great proprietors of land.”148 These powers, which were granted to the lords, were founded in
the social relations that existed between lords and their subjects. With nothing to trade their
revenue for, the lords spent their wealth on the maintenance of their retainers and the tenants
who occupied their land. In return for the “rustic hospitality” of the lords, the subjects, lacking
any means with which to repay the lords, offered them their obedience in exchange.149 Feudal
relations were constituted thus by relations of dependency that bred servility amongst those
beneath the lord.
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With the rise of commerce and trade in the towns, however, the wealthy proprietors of
land were afforded an opportunity to exchange their revenue for luxury goods. They used this
opportunity to spend their fortunes on themselves instead of the maintenance of their subjects. In
doing so, however, the relations of dependency upon which their authority was based, were
destroyed:
All for ourselves, and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have
been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a
method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no disposition
to share them with any other persons. For a pair of diamond buckles perhaps, or for
something as frivolous and useless, they exchanged the maintenance, or what is the same
thing, the price of the maintenance of a thousand men for a year, and with it the whole
weight and authority which it could give them…For the gratification of the most childish,
the meanest and the most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power
and authority.150
To purchase new luxuries for themselves, the lords soon dismissed their retainers. They also
removed the peasants from the land, leaving a few to remain, but only in exchange for a high rent
(thus instituting long-term commercial leases).151 In effect, those who were once dependent on
the lord were soon granted their independence; room was made for the institution of “a regular
government,” and the disturbances of feudal wars came to an end.152 As the lords lost power, the
state was able to unify its political power, and institute more stable relations and a regime of
political rights within the kingdom.153
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In Smith’s description of the development of commercial society, he also provides an
account of how market relations emancipate producers from the arbitrary authority of the lords
(or other forms of servile labor). Smith’s description here, is one that continues to find resonance
in contemporary discussions about the value of markets. Smith reasons that a wealthy person can
potentially support more workmen in a market society, than if they had directly provided for
people who were their subordinates (as was done on the feudal model). This is because in paying
for “precious production[s],” the wealthy proprietor supports the revenue of the workmen and
their employers (in wages and profit). Importantly, however, although a wealthy person
“maintains” the members of society by being the source of their income, they do so
“indirectly.”154 It is because of this latter fact that, according Smith, economic relations in
commercial societies are not coercive. As Smith describes it:
By paying that price he [a wealthy person] indirectly pays all those wages and profits,
and thus indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their
employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion to that of
each, to very few perhaps a tenth, to many not a hundredth, and to some not a thousandth,
nor even a ten thousandth part of their whole annual maintenance. Though he contributes,
therefore, to the maintenance of them all, they are all more or less independent of him,
because generally they can all be maintained without him… Each tradesman or artificer
derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand
different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not
absolutely dependent upon any one of them.155
Smith argues that unlike in feudal societies, in market societies people do not depend on any
particular individual for their maintenance. Therefore, they owe no particular person political
allegiance or service. As a worker or an employer, they depend only on the wages or profit they
receive in exchange for the products they produce. As Smith notes, that money is derived from
multiple individuals (i.e. multiple consumers) and therefore the worker or employer isn’t
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beholden to any single person for their survival. That is, if one particular seller, consumer, or
employer tries to coerce one into buying, selling, or employing, subjects are free to seek out
others to accomplish their economic aims.
Smith’s suggestion that relationships within the sphere of the market are freedom
enhancing is also supported by an earlier comparison in the Wealth of Nations. It occurs before
the famous passage where Smith declares “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own selfinterest.”156 While many point to this passage as evidence of Smith’s psychological egoism,
some scholars suggest that this passage can also be read as a commentary on the egalitarian
nature of market relationships.157 This is evident in his comparison between the servile behavior
of a dog that “fawns” to “gain the favour of those whose service it requires” with the behavior of
people in a “civilized” country, who appeal to each other’s “self-interest.”158
As will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, Smith’s belief that the market
emancipates wage earners departs from a traditional republican view. On this latter view, wage
labor was viewed as a form of dependency. The reasoning being that, insofar as wage earners
rely on their employer for their subsistence, they remain vulnerable to their abuse. For many
republican thinkers the ownership of property, other than one’s labor, was necessary to secure
subjects from forms of domination. Smith’s contribution here is unique. He does not reject the
republican understanding of freedom, but claims that ownership of property in one’s person, in
the form of labor, is sufficient to secure economic independence. What is particularly troubling
about this view, however, is that Smith is also sensitive to the forms of oppression and inequality
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that workers face in relation to their employers. Some scholars suggest that, for this reason,
Smith supported an economic model that entailed self-employment and decreased the
commodification of labor—i.e. that he favored a “society of equals.”159 The next chapter will
consider this possibility.

Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of some of the key arguments that Smith advances in
the Wealth of Nations in his polemic with feudal and mercantile practices. It should be noted,
however, that Smith’s attack on feudal and mercantile regulations did not prevent him from
supporting various forms of regulation or wealth redistribution. Smith’s support for progressive
taxation and the public funding of social institutions like education has led scholars to associate
Smith with contemporary theories that favor a liberal welfare state. Some of the exceptions to
intervention that Smith granted will be considered in more detail in a comparison with Kant, who
is also associated with this view.
As argued in the introduction, however, the focus of this dissertation is less on
establishing whether or not pro-market thinkers favored intervention, given that intervention is
consistent with support for a market economy. Rather, it interrogates the extent to which the
same values that pro-market thinkers accused the state of violating were employed in the
development of their alternative economic models. This chapter demonstrates the importance of
justice and liberty in Smith’s criticism of state-led practices, which he believed hindered the
economic and republican freedoms of all members of society. The next chapter considers how
Smith’s claims were compatible with his response to the growing inequality in the distribution of
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land and the concomitant proletarianization of the laboring poor, both of which were outcomes
of the transition to a new model of agrarian capitalism.
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CHAPTER THREE
Smith and the Society of Equals

The previous chapter demonstrated how Smith’s economic arguments were largely informed by
ethical claims about the nature of market economies. This centered on his belief that free markets
protected the economic freedom and welfare of society and replaced feudal relations of servitude
with non-coercive forms of economic interdependency. Like Turgot, then, Smith’s defense of
liberal reform did not neglect concerns about the laboring poor. Smith’s critique of the
mercantile system challenged the abuse of the state in permitting and encouraging monopolies
that stymied equal opportunities for economic agents. This has led many scholars to argue that
the caricature of Smith as a dogmatic proponent of laissez-faire is a faulty one. Some have gone
so far as to claim that Smith was “egalitarian” in his economic outlook and even an anti-capitalist
thinker.
This chapter considers more closely the plausibility of these interpretations by locating
Smith’s outlook in the context of other eighteenth century debates. In particular, it examines
Smith’s reaction to the controversial practice of enclosure and engrossing, which was strongly
condemned by his contemporaries throughout the period. Critics claimed that these practices
were harmful for society because they created a monopoly in land. Unlike his contemporaries,
however, Smith did not favor reforms that would prevent the consolidation of land by a
landowning class. In other words, while some thinkers in the eighteenth century promoted the
ideal of a free society of equals, Smith was not one of them. Conversely, I argue that Smith’s
outlook was likely on the side of the improvers in the debate over the enclosures. In the
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conclusion of the dissertation, I return to contemporary interpretations to demonstrate how his
response to the enclosure movement challenges the claim that Smith was a radical, egalitarian
economic thinker.

Enclosure, Engrossing, and Agrarian Capitalism
The English transition to an agrarian capitalist economy has its origins in the peasant
uprisings against feudal lords in the fourteenth century. Throughout Europe, an ongoing
subsistence crisis led to increased forms of exploitation of the peasant class.1 English peasants
were unique, insofar as they were successful in winning concessions from the lords, including
secure tenures and longer leases. As McNally notes, the securing of leases occurred during a
period in which rents were relatively stable and food prices were on the rise.2 As a result of these
factors, there soon emerged a wealthy class of peasants, or yeomen farmers, who were able to
secure a profit above their cost of production.3 With this surplus they invested in the
improvement of the land and increased their productivity.4 According to one historian, the
yeomen “were responsible for much of the productivity growth in the early modern period.”5
The yeomen class consisted of owner-occupiers and family farmers who were either
freeholders or leaseholders (including copyholders) with relatively secure tenant or property
rights.6 The practice of enclosure and engrossing developed with the rise of yeomanry farming.
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Prior to it, agriculture operated on an “open-field system” where people produced on divided
strips of land. On this system, after food was harvested from the land, it was converted into
common land (i.e. the “commons”) so that people could use it to graze their animals on or for
other subsistence-based reasons. The enclosures refer to the process of privatizing land that was
held in common.7 Often occurring in tandem with enclosure was the process of “engrossing,” or
the consolidation of smaller pieces of land for the creation of large farms.
According to McNally, the landlords were the ultimate beneficiaries of engrossing and
enclosure. Allen too, makes a distinction between the yeomanry model—an earlier model of
small scale, owner-occupier farming— and landlordism, which ultimately replaced yeomanry
farming. The transition from the yeoman model to landlordism (or agrarian capitalism) occurred
through an aggressive move on the part of the landlords to engross and enclose land. As McNally
describes:
From the late sixteenth century onwards, sections of the gentry took advantage of the
weakened status of the village community to launch a sustained offensive against the
rights of the small tenants...They attempted to break the grip of copyhold agreements and
to turn them into forms of leasehold renewable only at the will of the lord. They drove up
rents every year or every few years ("rack-renting"). They attempted to supplement
income by increasing fines and enforcing obsolete obligations. And, most important, they
undertook to enclose and reorganize lands—a path which tended to raise the productivity
of the land by 50 percent on average. Contrary to older views which saw the eighteenth
century as the great age of enclosure, modern research suggests that by 1700 threequarters of all enclosure had already taken place. As a result of this multifaceted
offensive, rents doubled during the half century from 1590 to 1640.8
Enclosure and engrossing dramatically changed agricultural production and property distribution.
As noted in the previous chapter, by the start of the eighteenth century “English landlords
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controlled as much as 70-75 per cent of cultivable land, thus leaving owner-occupiers with some
25-30 per cent of cultivable land.”9 Presumably thus, while some wealthy yeomen became
capitalist farmers, the majority was pushed into the new class of the rural proletariat, along with
small proprietors.10
Once land was consolidated, it was then leased out to wealthy tenants (i.e. capitalist
farmers), who invested in production and labor (wage laborers) to produce goods for the market.
The new model was not directed toward family subsistence, but rather toward profit. With
landlords rapidly raising rents, farmers were compelled to increase their productivity and
incorporate themselves into a new capitalist market logic.11 With less access to the commons,
which historically enabled the poor to supplement their incomes, workers were also forced to sell
their labor to purchase goods on the market. As McNally notes, in the nineteenth century, Marx
described this process as “primitive accumulation.”12 According to Marx, “freeing” the peasants
from the land (or the “means of production”), essentially forced them into their new role as wage
earners (i.e. the proletariat), given that the only thing they could exchange in order to purchase
their means of subsistence was their labor power.13
Enclosure and engrossing continued into the eighteenth century. The change in land
transfers from peasants to large landowners between 1690-1750 was particularly significant.14
During this period too, the gentry increasingly came to rely on parliamentary support for the
9
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further consolidation of land. While in the Tudor period the monarchy instituted anti-enclosure
measures to protect tenants (due to concerns over depopulation), in the eighteenth century over
6.5 million acres of common land was enclosed through a series of parliamentary acts.15
In response to these changes, there were significant periods of resistance and calls for
reform. Allen documents three common reforms advocated by anti-enclosure proponents in the
seventeenth century: “the prevention or reversal of enclosures,” “the enfranchisement of
copyholds,” and “an ‘agrarian law’ to set an upper limit to the property that any individual could
own.”16 Many of these reforms were advanced by a radical sect of revolutionaries, including the
Levellers, in the upheaval leading to the English Civil War. As Allen notes, Leveller Richard
Overton (1599-1664) advocated turning enclosed fields into commons again for the “use and
benefit of the poor,” and John Lilburne (1614-1657), also a Leveller, supported the abolition of
“servile tenures.”17 James Harrington (1611-1677) (who was not a Leveller) adopted the third
idea of reform in his book Oceana (1656). Although the idea of agrarian reform circulated
amongst radicals during this period, the intellectual tradition that Harrington drew from was
republicanism, as demonstrated in his referencing of Machiavelli’s text Discourses on Livy
(1517). As it will be seen below, Roman influences were also common in the eighteenth century
debate over the parliamentary enclosures.
Importantly, the outlook promoted by seventeenth century radicals differed from the antiabsolutism adopted by the landowning class during the period of the English Civil War. As
McNally notes, while the gentry class was also opposed to absolutism, radical egalitarian
reforms threatened their holdings in property and therefore their incomes (in the form of rent).
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For this reason, although favoring a limitation on the monarchy’s power, the landowning class
eventually supported its restoration.18 As noted by Allen, none of the reforms advocated by the
radicals were instituted. In particular, the enfranchisement of copyholds and leaseholds did not
prevail until 1922 with the Law of Property Act.19 Resolutions passed during this period were,
alternatively, to the benefit of the landowners, not small proprietors.20
The idea of implementing an agrarian law continued into the late seventeenth and
eighteenth century. Better known writers who adopted this outlook include John Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon (authors of Cato’s Letters 1720-1723), the Scottish philosopher (and Smith’s
teacher) Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), the Scottish writer Andrew Fletcher (1655-1716),
Richard Price (1723-1791), and Stephen Addington (1729-1796).21 As Allen notes, for these
thinkers, the application of republican ideas to the English context “was subversive,” believing
that, “the rise of the great estate and the destruction of the yeomanry produced authoritarianism
and subservience.”22 Because some of these thinkers employed the idea of a republican agrarian
law, contemporary scholars sometimes refer them to as “agrarian republicans.”

Richard Price and the Owner-Occupier Model
Price’s criticism of enclosure and engrossing was particularly trenchant. Price was a
British nonconformist minister who wrote on a range of topics including economics, morality,
theology, and politics. Although active in various intellectual circles at the time, Price became
18
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known to the wider public when he published a series of texts defending the American Colonists
in their struggle for independence. These texts included Observations on the Nature of Civil
Liberty (1776) and Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty, and the
War with America (1777). Both pamphlets were later republished in one volume entitled Two
Tracts (1778).
In these texts, Price argues that the American colonists lacked political freedom under
British rule. Price, like Rousseau (whose idea of the social contract will be considered in more
detail in the conclusion), held that political authority originates in the collective will and
agreement of the people.23 Price claims that just as personal freedom requires that one “be guided
by one’s own will,” and that to be guided by another’s will “is the characteristic of servitude,” a
country’s political freedom also requires it to be “guided by its own will.”24 He concludes from
this, that if one country attempts to rule over another, as the British did to the American
colonists, they violate the country’s political freedom and subject them to condition of
“slavery.”25 Central to Price’s understanding of liberty thus was the concept of self-governance.
He states, “There is one general idea that runs through them all [his accounts of liberty]; I mean
the idea of self-direction, or self-government.”26 The importance placed on self-governance also
carried over into his critique of the enclosures. For Price, the problem with engrossing and
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enclosing was that it forced self-sufficient producers into new relations of market dependency
and therefore into accepting the authority and governance of the landowners and employers.
Price became interested in the effects of the enclosures as an outcome of his research on
mortality rates in urban and rural areas in Observations on Reversionary Payments (1773).27
While in earlier editions of this text Price identified depopulation with luxury in urban areas, he
later came to view engrossing and enclosure in rural areas as a major barrier to population
growth. As this text is rather obscure, it will help to provide a brief overview of the postscript,
where he offers an analysis of the negative effects of the parliamentary enclosures on the
laboring poor.
Price begins the text by comparing “savage” and “civilized” states and notes that in the
latter there are different “degrees” or “stages” from “simple” to “luxurious.”28 It is the former, or
“simple” stage of a civilized state, to which he attributes greater happiness for mankind. Here,
“agriculture supplies plenty of the means of subsistence; the blessing of a natural and simple life
are enjoyed; property is equally divided; the wants of men are few, and soon satisfied; and
families are easily provided for.”29 Conversely, in civilized states, “property is engrossed, and
the natural equality of men subverted;” he continues, “artificial necessaries without number are
created; great towns propagate contagion and licentiousness; luxury and vice prevail; and,
together with them, disease, poverty, venality, and oppression.”30 In such conditions, he adds,
“all liberty, virtue, and happiness must be lost, and complete ruin follow.”31
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England is cited as an example of a civilized society in this later “luxurious” stage.
Among the ills of advanced civilization, a chief concern for Price was the problem of
depopulation. As one of its causes, he lists the “the accumulation of property” and continues the
postscript explaining the harms of this phenomenon. To quote at length:
Let a tract of ground be supposed in the hand of a multitude of little proprietors and
tenants, who maintain themselves and families by the produce of the ground they occupy,
by sheep kept on a common, by poultry, hogs, etc.; and who, therefore, have little
occasion to purchase any of the means of subsistence. If this land gets into the hands of a
few great farmers, the consequence must be, that the little farmers will be converted into
a body of men who earn their subsistence by working for others, and who will be under a
necessity of going to market for all they want.32
In this passage, Price articulates the concern that the enclosures deprived people of land and of
the possibility to be self-sufficient, or at least not entirely dependent on a wage. Price continues
to note that as subsistence becomes more difficult, children become economic “burdens,” and
people leave to find employment in urban areas, which results in a decline of population.33 He
also predicts that there will be an increase in labor, “because there will be more compulsion to
it,” more corn grown (as bread becomes a staple), parishes overrun with poor, and increases in
manufactures in towns as workers are removed from agricultural production.34
The importance of land for ensuring self-sufficiency among the poor is also emphasized
in his commentary on the price of grain. He claims that in the past, when grain prices were high,
it did not cause “alarm” amongst the poor.35 This was because people “could live more upon
other food which was then cheap; and because also being more generally occupiers of land, they
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were less under a necessity of purchasing bread.”36 However, he continues, when the poor are
forced off the land, high prices have a greater impact on their livelihood since their main source
of subsistence is grain purchased on the market.37 Because of this, when prices are high the poor
“are rendered incapable of maintaining themselves.”38 Price was concerned thus that if people
were primarily dependent on the market for meeting their subsistence needs, market failure or
disruptions could be potentially catastrophic. Conversely, with greater independence from the
market comes greater security, especially for the poor. Price’s comments also make an
interesting contribution to the grain debate. On his account, the solution to a subsistence crisis is
giving people access to the land, whereas for Turgot and Smith the solution is faith in the market
economy, or, in Turgot’s case, the introduction of government led employment programs.
As a solution to the engrossing of land, Price speaks favorably of an agrarian law. He
mentions, for instance, historical precedents, including the Roman laws of Licinius that limited
the acreage of land that one could hold.39 Price also quotes Francis Bacon on his approbation of
anti-enclosure Tudor era policies, which sought to prevent the “servile condition” of people and
“keep the plough in the hands of the owners and not hirelings.”40 Bacon in particular refers to the
Tillage Act under Henry VII, which established “that all houses of husbandry, with 20 acres of
ground to them, should be kept up forever.”41 As Thompson notes, Bacon was active in
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politically opposing the enclosures and understood Tudor era policies as being favorable to the
development of a yeomanry class.42
Price favorably mentions several other Tudor era statutes that sought to make land
available for the poor and prevent further enclosure. He concludes the postscript noting that
“modern policy,” unlike the Tudor era reforms, is “more favorable to the higher classes of
people; and the consequence of it may in time prove, that the whole kingdom will consist of only
gentry and beggars, or of grandees and slaves.”43 Price’s reference to modern policy refers to the
parliamentary acts. He writes: “How astonishing is it that our parliament, instead of applying any
remedy to these evils, should chose to promote them, by passing every year, bills almost without
number, for new enclosures?”44 He notes too, that when more people are self-employed the
wages of labor increase, but this has not been the case in England where the price of labor is high
but increases in the price of food make it such that it remains low.45 In sum, he writes, “Upon the
whole, the circumstances of the lower ranks of men are altered in almost every respect for the
worse. From little occupiers of land, they are reduced to the state of day laborers and
hirelings.”46
That Price favors the yeomen and small owner-occupier model of agriculture over the
emerging capitalist model is also evident in his commentary on the American colonies. In the
postscript, he notes that America is an example of a “simple” earlier state of civilization where
“everyone occupies land for himself” and is in a state of great happiness.47 The idea of an owneroccupier, yeomanry model is taken up again in his later text, Observations on the Importance of
42
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the American Revolution and Means of Making it a Benefit to the World (1785). In the section
“Of an Unequal Distribution of Property,” Price describes the inhabitants of Connecticut as
follows:
an independent and hardy yeomanry, all nearly on a level, trained to arms, instructed in
their rights, cloathed in homespun, of simple manners, strangers to luxury, drawing
plenty from the ground, and that plenty, gathered easily by the hand of industry and
giving rise to early marriages, a numerous progeny, length of days, and a rapid
increase—the rich and poor, the haughty grandee and the creeping sycophant, equally
unknown—protected by laws which (being their own will) cannot oppress, and by an
equal government which, wanting lucrative places, cannot create corrupt canvassings and
ambitious intrigue.48
Price warns, however, that such a state of affairs may not continue. He states that the government
could soon “degenerate into an instrument in the hands of the few to oppress and plunder the
many.”49 As a palliative to corruption, Price again invokes the idea of an agrarian law. He
mentions “Plato, Sir Thomas More, and Mr. Wallace” as “some great men” who developed the
idea of “community of goods” and the abolition of property.50 Ideas that, if put into action,
would make it “impossible for any one member of a state to think of enslaving the rest, or to
consider himself having any interest distinct from that of his fellow-citizens.”51 Price states that
he is not able to give the best alternative to inequality, but that “there is an equality in society
which is essential to liberty,” and that every state ought to seek to maintain it.52 As further
recommendations, he argues against “hereditary honors and titles of nobility,” the practice of
primogeniture, and also, in an interesting departure with Smith, foreign trade.53
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The historical record also supports the concerns raised by Price in his discussion of the
enclosure movement. As Allen notes, at the end of the eighteenth century:
The open fields were enclosed, and the small peasant holdings were amalgamated into
large farms let to tenants who cultivated them with wage labor. By the nineteenth
century, a unique rural society had emerged in England. This new society was
characterized by exceptional inequality. English property ownership was unusually
concentrated. Rents had risen, while wages stagnated. By the nineteenth century, the
landlord’s mansion was lavish, the farmer’s house modest, the laborer’s cottage a hovel.54
The anti-enclosure movement failed thus to halt the development of agrarian capitalism. The
enclosure movement also found ideological support from eighteenth century pro-enclosure
proponents, i.e. the “improvers.” A common defense put forward by such thinkers centered on
the idea that inequality in property was necessary for agricultural and economic growth. Allen
refers to this idea, which continues to inform contemporary scholarship on the period, as a
“trade-off between growth and equity.”55 This view is not far from the contemporary free market
outlook, often used to argue against progressive taxation, that economic inequality is necessary
for economic growth.56 It is also reproduced in contemporary discussions on global development,
where it is believed that small peasant farming should be replaced with large-scale farms to
“modernize” their economy.57
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Allen’s historical research upends this assumption. While this debate is beyond the scope
of this dissertation, I’ll mention two points that Allen raises. First, Allen demonstrates how
yeomanry farming, not later forms of capitalist farming, that contributed to England’s high
productivity gains. Because the former model entailed greater equality of land distribution, his
research challenges the view that inequality (or large-scale farming) is necessary for economic
growth. Second, Allen argues that the material effects of the “radical programme,” advanced by
thinkers like Price, would be of a greater advantage to the laboring poor than the landowner
model was. To support this claim, Allen analyzes the economic data from 1800 (in the midlands
region of England) and claims that if farms had been limited to 40-acres of land and
independently owned, the rural unemployment problem would be “eliminated” and farm incomes
increased (without affecting output).58 In particular, because rent and the cost of labor would be
eliminated, he concludes that, “the recreation of peasant proprietorship would have increased the
total incomes of rural agricultural families by between 67 per cent and 100 per cent.”59 Allen
also considers how the yeomanry model was better for the laboring poor on the grounds of its
more positive psychological effects. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
however, the landowner model was fully established in England. While republican ideas
continued to effect policies in the American colonies, in England such policies failed to come to
fruition.60
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Smith on the Society of Equals
In his description of economic progress, Smith speaks favorably of the yeomanry class
and small proprietors. Smith, like Price, was also critical of the policy of primogeniture. His
critique of the latter appears in the third book, where Smith describes how the development of
commerce in Europe took an “unnatural” path of progression because the towns developed prior
to agriculture in the country. Smith includes among the restrictions that slowed agricultural
growth in Europe the policies of primogeniture and entail, which prevented the breaking up of
land by hindering division upon succession. Smith’s criticism here was that such policies left
large tracts of land “uncultivated” and incapable of “improvement.”61 While Price also viewed
primogeniture as a threat to the equal distribution of land, his main concern was the engrossing
and enclosing of land, by the landowning class, for agricultural “improvement.”62 To get clear on
Smith’s position here it is necessary to consider in more detail his commentary on these themes.
Another barrier to agricultural development that Smith identifies relates to his discussion
of yeomanry farmers. He claims that in addition to primogeniture and entail, agricultural
progress in the feudal period was slowed because of the insecure position of those who
“occupied the land.”63 Smith’s reasoning is that when producers lack property rights and cannot
keep the surplus produce they generate there, is little incentive for them to work. This is
especially evident in the example of slavery, where, for the slave, “work he does beyond what is
sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and
61
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not by any interest of his own.”64 Thus, it is only with the development of lease holding farmers
that the motivation to produce over and above one’s subsistence emerged. Here, farmers “find it
for their interest to lay out part of their capital in the further improvement of the farm; because
they may sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of the lease.”65
Smith notes that, despite the slow development of protected leases in England, the
yeomen were able to achieve secure property rights and the protection of long-term leases. Smith
concludes that farmers who have secure leases are “altogether independent” from the proprietor,
noting that proprietors cannot ask more from their leaseholder “beyond what is either expressly
stipulated in the lease.”66 He goes so far as to claim that even a tenant at will “is not altogether
dependent upon the landlord” and (presumably, unlike a slave) “will expose neither his life nor
his fortune in the service of the proprietor.”67 Because of their security in land, Smith claims that
the yeomen “have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all their
boasted regulations of commerce taken together.”68
Smith also speaks favorably of small proprietors and independent owner-occupiers. For,
as discussed above, and as also noted by Smith, yeoman, insofar as they were still leaseholders,
were not the same as proprietors of the land. Smith notes, interestingly, that when a farmer,
instead of a proprietor, cultivates land the improvement comes about more slowly. This is
because a portion of the produce is absorbed by rent, which cannot be invested into the “further
improvement of the land.”69 His favorable view of small proprietors also appears in the
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comparison he makes between England and the American colonies. Consider, for instance, these
two passages from the third book:
From artificer he becomes planter, and neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence
which that country affords to artificers, can bribe him rather to work for other people than
for himself. He feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers, from whom he
derives his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and derives his
necessary subsistence from the labor of his own family, is really a master, and
independent of all the world.”70
A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of his little territory, who views it all
with the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who
upon that account takes pleasure not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of
all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most successful.71
In linking property ownership to independence, Smith aligns with the republican outlook that
views material independence and self-sufficiency as a form of economic freedom. Some
scholars, including Elizabeth Anderson, have concluded thus that Smith’s critique of monopoly
also applied to the monopolization of land. Specifically, she refers to his conception of the free
market as a form of “commercial republicanism,” which supports free markets “because stategranted monopolies and privileges, and property rules such as entail and primogeniture,
concentrate the means of production in a few hands and thereby force the rest into
dependency.”72
Despite, however, Smith’s appraisal of the independent farmer and owner-occupier, there
are important distinctions between Smith and Price that challenge Anderson’s interpretation.73
Smith is curiously silent, for instance, about the immense changes in land ownership that
occurred during the period. Unlike Price, he does not discuss the accumulation of land by the
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gentry and the concomitant increase in their political and parliamentary power—the latter of
which was attested by numerous parliamentary acts of enclosure. Alternatively, Smith describes
the yeomanry as “independent” and claims that the transition to commerce led to a decline in the
political power of proprietors. In his narrative in the third book, he writes how with the
development of commerce, “the great proprietors were no longer capable of interrupting the
regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of the countries.”74 He continues, “A
regular government was established in the country as well as in the city, nobody having
sufficient power to disturb its operations in the one, any more than in the other.”75
Smith is, moreover, aware of the history of enclosure and engrossing. In his account of
the development of commerce, he writes: “Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land,
notwithstanding the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for cultivating
it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and improvement in those times.”76 Enclosure is
also described in relation to methods of agricultural improvement.77 Smith’s description here,
however, is neutral. If Smith was opposed to the monopolization of land, as Anderson suggests,
it is perplexing that he is silent about the parliamentary enclosures, especially given that it was a
topic his contemporaries continued to debate.
Smith’s economic explanations also assume the landowner model, not the yeoman model
of owner-occupiers. This is evident, for instance, in his comments on the topic of land rent in
book one of the Wealth of Nations. Here, Smith reiterates what he has already described in the
preceding chapters, which is that the “whole annual produce” of a country divides into three
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parts: the rent of land, the wages of labor, and the profits of stock.78 He adds to this observation
that these forms of revenue map on to “the three great, original and constituent orders of every
civilized society.”79 There are “those who live by rent,” (i.e. proprietors), “those who live by
wages,” (i.e. workers), and “those who live by profit” (i.e. merchants and manufacturers).80
Importantly, Smith characterizes the proprietor class, or the class that lives by rent, as a class
whose revenue “costs them neither labor nor care.”81 This class is not, therefore, associated with
a class of small proprietors or self-employed farmers.
Throughout the book, Smith assumes this triadic arrangement, or landowner model of
agriculture. On this model, and as it was also practiced at the time, proprietors rent land out to
farmers, who then employ workers to cultivate the land and produce a surplus sufficient to cover
both the costs of production and rent. As another example of this, Smith writes that investment in
agriculture is the most profitable way to employ stock because a farmer’s “laboring servants”
(along with his “laboring cattle”) are able to generate a value over and above the capital invested
by the tenant farmer, i.e. rent for the landlord. He adds, “of all the ways in which a capital can be
employed, it [agriculture] is by far the most advantageous to the society.”82 Smith’s analysis of
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agriculture development, much like that of the Physiocrats Quesnay and Turgot, is clearly based
on the agrarian capitalist model.
It might be claimed that Smith is being purely descriptive in his economic analysis.
Smith’s language, however, is often normative. For example, his description of the “constituent
orders of every civilized society” as the group that makes up the “revenue” from which “every
other order is ultimately derived,” ascribes an important function to the class of proprietors,
merchants, and manufactures.83 Smith, like Turgot, also claims that the interest of the proprietors
“is strictly and inseparably connected with the general interest of the society.”84 The interests of
those who live by wages are also tied to the general interest of society, but Smith describes them
as “incapable” of “comprehending” society’s interest.85 Their “education” and “habits” “render
him [the worker] unfit to judge even though he was fully informed;” moreover, in “public
deliberations…his voice is little heard and less regarded,” except in the case that it is supported
(albeit, instrumentally) by his employers.86 Although Smith speaks here of wage earners, and not
capitalist farmers (in fact it is unclear where tenant farmers can be located within these three
orders), his description of proprietors as those who do not labor, certainly presumes that
“civilized societies” are those based on agrarian capitalist economies.87
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There are other passages that also suggest that Smith, despite his positive assessment of
independent farmers, was opposed to the owner-occupier model. Perhaps the most conflicting
piece of textual evidence is found in his explicit critique of an agrarian law. In his Lectures on
Jurisprudence, Smith writes:
For tho an agrarian law would render all on an equality, which has indeed something very
agreeable in it, yet a people who are all on an equality will necessarily be very poor and
unable to defend themselves in any pressing occasion…So that in the present state of
things a man of a great fortune is rather of advantage than disadvantage to the state,
providing that there is a gradual descent of fortunes betwixt these great ones and others of
the least and lowest fortune.88
Here, Smith identifies inequality in property ownership with favorable conditions for economic
growth.89 His claim, moreover, that those who possess great fortunes are of an advantage to the
state, insofar as their wealth descends down to those of “the least and lowest fortune,” is a claim
that reappears in the Wealth of Nations.90 In the opening pages of the book, he claims that while
modern commercial societies are vastly unequal in comparison to primitive societies, the
“workman” of the “poorest” and “lowest” order is, nevertheless, significantly better provided
for.91 This idea is also expressed in an early draft of the Wealth of Nations where Smith claims
that the division of labor “can alone account for that superior opulence which takes place in
civilized societies, and which, notwithstanding the inequality of property, extends itself to the
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lowest member of the community.”92 Smith, then, did not identify an unequal distribution of
property as the cause of impoverishment for the poor, as did Price. Alternatively, he set out to
show how such inequalities would be compensated for by increases in productivity and the
trickling down of wealth to the least advantaged members of society.
Together, this suggests that Smith was likely on the side of the “improvers” in the debate
over the enclosures in the eighteenth century. As Thompson notes, improvers, including Hume,
directly refuted the republican critique of enclosure and the call for a more equal distribution of
property.93 For instance, in his essay Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations (1752), Hume
disputes the republican claim that modern commercial societies were less populous than ancient
republics (a view held by Montesquieu).94 To dispute this, Hume argues that the republican
dependency on slavery was itself a cause of depopulation. Smith’s critical mention of “party
pamphlets,” which purported how “the wealth of the nation was fast declining, that the country
was depopulated, agriculture neglected,” may also be a reference to contemporary concerns
about depopulation and decline in tillage as a result of enclosure.95 Hume also held that the best
way to encourage agricultural production was through the growth of industry and trade. A
similar outlook is attested by Smith in his belief that demand from industrial growth and
manufactures in the city helps increase agricultural output. This appears at odds with Price’s
understanding of the self-sufficient yeomanry who rely on “homespun” clothing.96
In his discussion of justice in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751),
Hume also directly criticizes the idea, which he attributes to the Levellers, that property should
92
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be equally distributed.97 Smith, as seen above, repeats this sentiment in reasoning that while
equality in property appears “agreeable” enough, it would prevent the large growth of fortunes,
and consequently, lead to growing impoverishment for the laboring poor.98 Thompson notes that
other proponents of enclosure, including Sir James Steuart, supported this view. Although
sometimes a target of Smith’s criticisms, Steuart also viewed the removal of small proprietors as
beneficial to the state, given that (echoing Smith) wealth would trickle down to the poor.99
Steuart and other improvers also held that the consolidation of land would lead to the creation of
new industrial laborers in the towns, which would then increase the demand and production of
agricultural output.100 Thompson concludes of Hume and Steuart that their “contribution to the
enclosure debate was to deny the economic value of the classical republican economy of
independent smallholders.”101
Other arguments that were used to challenge Price’s call for an agrarian reform included
the claim that the exportation of surplus corn was essential for a nation’s wealth.102 It was also
argued that permitting enclosure “was more compatible with individual liberty” and that the
older open field system, “with its requirement of universal agreement among all proprietors as to
the mode of cultivation, was an impediment which obstructed the natural course of production,
and prevented the improvement of the land” (improvers here, apparently overlooked the role of
the parliament in permitting such acts).103 In short, improvers applied anti-interventionist
arguments to defend the use of property for enclosure or engrossing. Thompson concludes that
97
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while Price and other opponents of enclosure invoked “moral and political reasons” for their
opposition, improvers, of which many were Scottish thinkers, focused “on the economic
potential of a modern system of large-scale commercial farming, liberated from the low
productivity constraints of small-holding.”104
In sum, although Smith held the independent owner-occupier—who is “a master, and
independent of all the world”—in high regard, his esteem for the yeomanry did not translate into
support for an agrarian ideal of a society of equals. Alternatively, in the debate between growth
and equity, Smith’s economic analysis pushed him in favor of the former. This is not to suggest
that Smith was altogether opposed to the value of equality, but rather that his interpretation of it
differed from that of Price’s. On Price’s outlook the laboring poor ought to be compensated for
their loss of property and/or access to the commons with actual property, whereas for Smith
compensation takes the monetary form of a wage. As further evidence of this view, in his
Lectures on Jurisprudence, Smith claims that the greatest source of security within the nation
comes from elimination of “dependency,” the opposite of “freedom and independence.”105 He
continues:
Commerce is one great preventative of this custom [having servants and dependents].
The manufactures give the poorer sort better wages than any master can afford; besides, it
gives the rich an opportunity of spending their fortunes with fewer servants, which they
never fail of embracing.106
While both Price and Smith may have believed that those without property should not be left to
suffer, for Price the compensation the poor receive in the form of a wage embedded them in
relations of dependency and unfreedom. As attested by the passage above, Smith alternatively
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describes wage labor as a practice that enables people to overcome servile relations. To
understand why Smith did not follow Price on this point requires some further examination.

Republican Freedom and Wage Labor
It may be asked, given Smith’s expressed concern for the laboring poor, why it was that
Smith did not promote Price’s conception of a society of equals? Above, I have argued for the
possibility that Smith’s economic explanation rested on the assumption, circulated by
“improvers” during this period, that the small owner-occupier model was not favorable to
economic growth. However, it is also important to consider other normative views that may have
influenced Smith on this point. In particular, an important difference between Smith and Price
relates to Smith’s characterization of wage labor as a form of economic independence. In
claiming that workers were free, Smith was less concerned with the fact that the monopolization
of land encouraged the proletarianization of the rural poor.
Smith’s account of economic independence marks a departure from other eighteenth
century republican outlooks. As discussed in the introductory chapter, classical and agrarian
republicans identified wage labor with republican unfreedom. On this outlook, it was believed
that if a person was dependent on another for their subsistence, as a wage earner is on their
employer, they could become subject to the arbitrary power of their provider. This outlook
clearly informs Price’s criticism of engrossing and enclosure. For, on his account, removing
people from the land forced them into greater dependency on the market for meeting their
subsistence needs, and therefore into dependency on employers for earning a wage. For this
reason, Price and others understood inequalities in property as a threat to independence and
freedom.
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In claiming that wage labor emancipates people from relations of dependency, Smith
clearly departs from the classical and agrarian republican view. As discussed in the previous
chapter, Smith believed that the introduction of commerce dissolved feudal relations of
servitude. To recall, in a key passage from the Wealth of Nations, Smith argues that workers
achieve independence in market economies, because, unlike in feudal societies, producers are not
dependent on any single person for their subsistence.107 His comments here correspond to the
contemporary view that workers are not dominated by their employers since they possess the
right to exit—i.e. the ability to leave their employers and seek employment elsewhere.108
While Smith does not describe wage labor as a form of servitude, as did other
republicans, it is important to note that he did comment on the oppressive conditions that
workers faced. He notes, for instance, that in disputes over wages with their masters, workers
were disadvantaged because they lacked the necessary stock (or capital) to withhold their
labor.109 He comments that “a landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant” could live
“a year or two” on the stocks they have saved up, unlike laborers who, for the most part, “could
not subsist a week” without employment.110 Smith concludes from this, that while workers are
necessary for masters, this “necessity is not so immediate” for the master as it is for the
workman.111 In being dependent on their employer to provide them with a wage, employers also
obtain an “advantage” in disputes over wages and are able to “force” workers into “compliance
with their terms.”112 Smith comments, moreover, that the law tended to favor employers insofar
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as it only prohibited the “combination” of workers and not the combination of masters.113 Smith,
in the final book of the Wealth of Nations, also discusses the negative effects of the division of
labor for the laboring poor. He claims that in subjecting workers to a type of labor that entails
repetitive and simple “operations,” they are prevented from developing their “understanding.”114
As a result of this, he claims that workers become “stupid,” “ignorant,” and incapable of
developing their social, intellectual, and martial virtues.115
In these passages, then, Smith acknowledges the unequal relations between workers and
their employers, as well as the demeaning and oppressive conditions that unskilled workers may
be subject to. Smith does not conclude from this, however, that workers were therefore unfree.
One possible explanation for this is that Smith held a proto-contractarian view of wage labor. On
this outlook, because people possess property in their person, they are free to alienate it, like any
other piece of property, through a contractual exchange. Although subject to the authority of
their employer, insofar as they “freely” contracted out their labor, it cannot be said that their
employers dominate them.
This outlook has its roots in the tradition of natural law, which was influential on Smith’s
thinking, especially as it pertained to his jurisprudential and moral thought.116 Hugo Grotius, the
natural law theorist Smith favorably addresses in his discussion of jurisprudence, is typically
cited as a formative figure in the theorization of rights in terms of subjective possession.117 For
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Grotius all rights entail a relationship of ownership, where to have a right to something is to have
dominium over it. Grotius even goes so far as to claim that because persons have a right to
liberty, and thus have dominium over their liberty, they are free to alienate it through voluntary
submission into slavery or despotism.118
Not all natural law theorists are in agreement with Grotius. On Locke’s view, for
instance, while rights are also viewed in terms of possession, the right to one’s liberty is
something that cannot be alienated since this would be to “forfeit” one’s “preservation” and
“life.”119 Since no one has “power” over their own life (only God does), he contends in The
Second Treatise, no one can voluntarily give away their liberty, and thus their life, to another
person.120 Locke does, however, permit a modified version of voluntary slavery in the form of
servitude, where a master and slave enter into a contract of “limited power on the one side and
obedience on the other.”121 He also gives the example of a time when men sold themselves into
“drudgery,” a form of servitude distinct from slavery, where the masters do not possess absolute
power over the life and death of their servants. Thus, in Locke, while absolute liberty is
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inalienable (and slavery/absolutism objectionable) other rights remain alienable, including the
right to alienate one’s labor.122
Smith’s views fall more in line with Locke than with Grotius.123 Like Locke, Smith sets
limits on what rights can be alienated. He writes that because in voluntary slave contracts “the
person and all he hath” is transferred to the master “from the moment the bargain begins,” such
contracts are “illusory.”124 In agreement with Locke, however, Smith believes that people are
still free to alienate their labor, and, in fact, that such an act is tantamount with one’s liberty.
Smith’s adoption of this view is evident, for instance, in his criticisms of feudal and mercantile
policies. In his critique of the guild system he employs a Lockean argument to claim that
regulatory policies violated the right of workers to employ their labor as a form of “property”
where they see fit. He writes (to quote at length again):
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of all
other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man lies
in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain
violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty
both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him.125
On this outlook, independence and freedom are not tied to the ownership of property, but rather
to ownership of property in the person. As further evidence of this, in his Lectures of
Jurisprudence Smith identifies “commercial right,” or the “the right one has to the free use of his
122
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person,” with a natural right of liberty.126 Smith’s account of natural liberty is also similar to the
definition of liberty offered by Francis Hutcheson, his professor at the University of Glasgow
(and Chair of Moral Philosophy). Hutcheson too lists a person’s right over their “industry” and
“labour” as a right secured by natural liberty.127
Smith’s understanding of economic independence anticipates the outlook of “laissezfaire republicans” in the nineteenth century. As Alex Gourevitch describes it, this variant of
republicanism is characterized by its re-framing of wage labor as free labor.128 According to
laissez-faire republicans, while workers may be subject to the authority of their employer, they
are still free since they “voluntarily” contract out their labor. Laissez-faire republicans strongly
opposed, moreover, the analogy made by republican radicals (i.e. labor republicans) in the
nineteenth century between wage labor and slavery—i.e. “wage slavery.”129 The former group
claimed that it was enough for workers to own their own labor to be independent and free from
civil forms of domination. This discourse was most visible in state and federal United States
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Supreme Court decisions in the nineteenth century that ruled against protective labor regulations
on the grounds that they violated the freedom of contract.130 In rejecting the connection between
property ownership and independence, Smith offers an early example of the laissez-faire
republican view.131 The question, however, concerning where Smith falls in the typology of the
republican tradition will be further developed in the conclusion.

Conclusion
In many ways, the enclosure debate in the eighteenth century can be understood as a
debate over the meaning and significance of economic equality and independence. It was also a
debate over how the newly emerging ownership society was to be organized. While Smith and
Price both invoked the laboring poor in their economic discussions, they held very different
views in regard to the type of reforms needed to improve the position of the least advantaged on
the basis of these values. I have argued that, although Smith praises the independent farmer, the
republican owner-occupier ideal was not the economic model he theorized and supported in the
Wealth of Nations. Unlike other thinkers during the period, Smith fails to extend his critique of
monopoly to the growing consolidation of land by the proprietor class. Two reasons I’ve
conjectured for why Smith took this route include (1) his belief about the necessity of inequality
(and large farms) for economic growth, and (2) his ethical judgment about the status of wage
labor. This latter point will be considered in more detail in the next chapter on Kant. For Kant,
like Smith, also rejects the classical republican association of wage labor with unfreedom.
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These observations prove especially important in determining whether or not Smith
should be classified as a “capitalist” thinker. Smith’s criticisms of profit seeking merchants and
manufacturers does not necessary translate into a critique of the capitalism of his day. To do so
would require that he adopt the criticisms found in thinkers like Price, who attacked the
monopolization of land by the gentry and the proletarianization of the rural poor through
engrossing and enclosure.132 Interestingly, however, scholars on Smith have not paid sufficient
attention to his views in relation to these important eighteenth century political and economic
transformations. I hope to have shown why such an examination remains important in better
situating Smith in his own historical moment and for scholars who rescue aspects of Smith’s
economic and moral or political thought for their own normative projects.

132

Allen makes the interesting point that early critics presented a different critique of enclosure
than criticisms of primitive accumulation in Marx. For Marx, although he was critical of such
processes, “he thought that those changes were progressive and desirable.” On this point then,
Marx is in agreement with the “improvers” in the eighteenth century. Conversely, Allen seeks to
support the early critics of enclosure by refuting the belief that large farming and enclosure was
necessary for economic growth. For both economic and ethical reasons then, Allen argues in
defense of the small-owner occupier model. Allen, Enclosure and the Yeoman, 10. For more on
how Marxist theory departs from contemporary struggles of the global poor (especially global
environmental movements) see: Omar Dahbour, “Marx and Political Ecology,” Radical
Ecological Democracy, December 21, 2018, https://www.radicalecologicaldemocracy.org/
redweb-anniversary-series-marx-and-political-ecology.
142

CHAPTER FOUR
Kant’s Republican Defense of the Market Economy

In the previous chapters, it was demonstrated that the values Turgot and Smith attached to the
free market economy faced serious scrutiny by critics of liberal reform in the eighteenth century.
In contrasting their views to their contemporaries, concerns were raised about how their ethical
defense of a market economy overlooked the deleterious effects of economic liberalization on
the poor. This was exemplified in their inattention to the power that economic agents (i.e. grain
merchants and traders, landlords, and employers) amassed through liberal reform. What is most
troubling is that Smith and Turgot appear to adopt republican values in their defense of
liberalization. This raises the question, how did pro-market thinkers overlook (or account for) the
abuse of republican freedoms in the economic realm, in particular in the oppressive relationship
that occurred between workers and employers? This chapter considers these themes in
relationship to Kant’s economic thought. Kant is helpful in this discussion because he provides a
philosophical explanation of republican freedom, which is lacking in Smith and Turgot. Kant
thus might offer a stronger justification for the pro-free market, republican outlook of the
eighteenth century.
To consider the extent to which Kant is successful in his republican defense of the free
market, this chapter examines his discussion of hereditary privilege, commerce, wage labor, and
state intervention (in the form of wealth redistribution and protectionism). Before doing so,
however, it should be noted that many scholars would dispute the characterization of Kant as a
free market thinker. Because Kant’s comments on the topic are limited, there are conflicting
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interpretations in the literature. On one interpretation, Kant is said to subscribe to the liberal
economic outlook of his contemporaries, including Smith, whose work Kant was familiar with.1
According to a second interpretation, however, it is argued that because Kant was amenable to
wealth redistribution and state intervention in trade, he departed from the “radical” free market
positions of his contemporaries.2 In contemporary terms, these two views might cast Kant’s
outlook as aligning either with an anti-interventionist libertarian outlook or a liberal welfareoriented approach to the state and free markets.
The problem with these contemporary interpretations, however, is that support for
intervention is not incommensurable with support for a free market economy (as my introductory
chapter demonstrates). Thus, it is possible that Kant’s favorable views on state intervention did
not entirely set him apart from thinkers like Smith and Turgot. In order to clarify, then, what
Kant’s views on the market were and how they fit in with the normative foundations of his
republican thought, it will require a more detailed examination of his commentary on the topic.

Republican Freedom and Hereditary Privilege
This section introduces Kant’s republican conception of freedom and examines his
application of it to the discussion of hereditary privilege. This feudal custom relates to economic
concerns because it was viewed as a barrier to upward mobility in the eighteenth century. In
Germany, moreover, although the process of state building was underway during this period, the
authorities of the old estate society continued to hold significant political power. The feudal
custom and practice of hereditary privilege had not yet been abolished.
1
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As Reidar Maliks details, three political positions dominated the eighteenth century
German political landscape: the traditionalist defense of the old Reich, enlightened absolutism,
and liberalism (backed by the emerging bourgeoisie).3 It was with the first group that the custom
of hereditary privilege found its ideological support. As Maliks summarizes, traditionalists,
including Justus Möser and Johann Gottfried Herder, defended the practice on the grounds that
freedom was a privilege not a universal right. From the perspective of these thinkers, “social
conventions and membership of traditional estates, guilds, and towns (characteristic of the late
feudal old Reich) determine a person’s legal status, not natural rights.”4 In response to this view,
Kant contends that hereditary privilege violates the innate right of freedom and the equality of
opportunity granted to all through this fundamental right.
Kant introduces the idea of equality of opportunity in his discussion of the three
principles of public right.5 In his discussion of equality, the second principle of right, Kant
permits that certain inequalities remain consistent with right, including disparities in wealth, but
excluding hereditary privilege. He writes:
Every member of a commonwealth must be allowed to attain any level of rank within it
(that can belong to a subject) which his talent, his industry, and his luck can take him;
and his fellow subjects may not stand in his way by means of a hereditary prerogative
(privileges [reserved] for a certain rank), so as to keep him and his descendants forever
beneath the rank.6
Further on, Kant claims that because “birth is not a deed of the one who is born,” they “cannot
incur by it… any other subjection to coercive laws than merely that which is common to him
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along with all others.”7 In claiming that none can by birth or descendance obtain a “superior”
status of rank, Kant contests the traditionalist outlook that viewed rights as privileges.
Kant is careful, however, to emphasize that equality in rights is consistent with economic
inequality. Kant assumes here that as long as people are equal before the law, other forms of
inequalities that exist within the private sphere of the market or household are permissible.8
After asserting one cannot bequeath one’s rank, he writes (reiterating his point in the passage
quoted above):
He may bequeath anything else, whatever is a thing (not pertaining to personality) and
can be acquired as property and also alienated by him, and so in a series of generations
produce a considerable inequality of financial circumstances among the members of a
commonwealth (of hireling and hirer, landowners and agricultural laborers, and so forth);
but he may not prevent their being authorized to rise themselves to like circumstances if
their talent, their industry, and their luck make this possible for them.9
This point will be returned to below. It is interesting to note here, however, that for Kant, the
accumulation of wealth is associated with the existence of unequal social relationships, i.e. that
between workers and employers. To understand how Kant views these inequalities to be
consistent with right requires a closer examination of his understanding of freedom.
Kant’s criticism of hereditary privilege relates to his conception of “innate equality,”
which is entailed in his conception of freedom.10 In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant
defines equality as “independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind
them; hence a human being’s quality of being his own master (sui iuris).”11 Hereditary privilege
violates this principle because it creates an intermediary power between subjects and the king,
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which can “coercively prevent others from attaining by their own merit the higher levels of
subordination.”12 In other words, those with less privilege are asymmetrically bound by those
with greater privilege in regard to rank and economic status. In addition to claiming that people
are not responsible for the family they are born into, Kant also claims that no subject would
willingly consent to such a situation. He writes, “Since we cannot admit that any human being
would throw away his freedom, it is impossible for the general will of the people to assent to
such a groundless prerogative.”13 Kant concludes that the sovereign ought to gradually phase out
positions of nobility and let the “natural division into sovereign and people” replace that of “the
division into sovereign, nobility and commoners.”14
The emphasis Kant places on independence and the idea of being one’s “own master,”
brings his account of freedom in line with the tradition of republican thought. As discussed in the
introduction, there is significant historiographical debate over how to define this tradition. Here,
I follow Philip Pettit’s classification of republicanism as a body of political thought that
promotes the three following ideals: (1) civil freedom (where freedom is defined as nondomination), (2) an “empire of law,” or “constitutional constraints associated broadly with the
mixed constitution,” and (3) a “contestatory citizenry,” i.e. a citizenry with “virtue to track and,
if necessary, contest public policies and initiatives.”15 On his account, moreover, the second two
ideals are instrumental to the first. In other words, constitutional law, a division of power, and
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civic virtue are valued not as ends in themselves, but as ends to the means of securing republican
freedom.16
Republican thought originated in classical Rome, was revived in the Renaissance period,
and informed political discourse throughout the periods of the English civil war, and the French
and American Revolutions. Republican ideas also circulated in Germany during the period of the
French Revolution.17 Kant’s critique of hereditary privilege, for instance, accords with the
criticism of the French nobility put forward by Rousseau and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès whose
ideas influenced the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789).18 Other German
intellectuals also (initially) received the news of the French Revolution favorably and viewed it
as confirming their growing support for political freedom, i.e. the idea that citizens have the right
to participate in government and hold the government accountable for its actions.19 However,
because many Germans favored a form of republicanism that was compatible with constitutional
monarchy, the radical turn towards popular sovereignty and the experience of the reign of terror
caused many to withdraw their support.”20
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While thinkers within the tradition of republicanism diverge in important ways, they
unite in their conceptualization of freedom as nondomination.21 This idea of freedom is rooted in
Roman law and the legal category of sui juris, which refers to the status of a free, independent
person or a person who is not under the power (potestas) of another.22 From the republican
perspective, then, to be unfree is to be subject to the arbitrary power of another person, i.e. to be
dominated. As Pettit explains:
Such a relationship means, at the limit, that the dominating party can interfere on an
arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated: can interfere, in particular, on the basis
of an interest or an opinion that need not be shared by the person affected. The
dominating party can practice interference, then, at will and with impunity: they do not
have to seek anyone’s leave and they do not have to incur any scrutiny or penalty.23
Importantly, on the republican outlook domination is distinct from interference: there can be
domination without interference (a “non-interfering master”) and interference without
domination (a “non-mastering interferer”).24 An example of the former case would be a master
who does not interfere with the choices of their slave. In this instance, while the slave is free to
choose, it is a freedom that is dependent on the goodwill of the master. Because the master still
possesses the power to interfere, the slave remains unfree even though in possession of certain
negative freedoms (freedoms from interference). Domination refers not to a specific act of
interference, then, but “the capacity to interfere arbitrarily” in one’s choices.25
Kant’s account of freedom is in accord with this view insofar as it characterizes freedom
as the possession of a certain status (sui juris) that protects an individual from interference and
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not freedom from interference as such. This may not be initially apparent. In the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant claims that external freedom requires “independence from being constrained by
another’s choice.”26 One is externally free, then, when their choices are not constrained by the
choices of others, where choice is defined as the ability “to do or to refrain from doing as one
pleases…joined with one’s consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one’s
action.”27
The emphasis on choice might lead one to believe that Kant is strictly concerned with
freedom as a form of non-interference. This is not Kant’s view, however. He makes this clear,
for instance, in claiming that the type of freedom protected under the doctrine of right is not
“lawless” freedom—or the natural freedom people possess in a state of nature—but lawful
freedom.28 The type of freedom protected under the doctrine of right concerns not the ability to
do whatever one wishes: it does not concern the “end” each subject seeks out, i.e. the “matter” of
one’s choice.29 Rather, it concerns what Kant refers to as the “form” of one’s choice.30 Form,
alternatively, relates to “the way choices are reciprocally related.”31

26

Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 393.
Ibid., 374-74.
28
Ibid., 459.
29
Ibid., 387. As Arthur Ripstein points out, it is difficult to conceive how an equal system of
negative freedom could be established. Any attempt to protect one person’s negative freedom,
will necessarily entail hindering another person’s negative freedom. Arthur Ripstein, Force and
Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009),
33.
30
Kant, “Metaphysics of Morals,” 387.
31
Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 68. Ripstein distinguishes this in terms of one’s capacity to
choose, as opposed to the particular choices one makes. On this account, a person can fail to
achieve their purposes, but still possess their freedom if their means to set and pursue self-chosen
ends remain within their control and not another’s. In sum: “You are independent if you are the
one who decides what ends you will use your means to pursue, as opposed to having someone
else decide for you.” Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 33-34.
27

150

According to Kant, for the form of one’s choice to be free it must be independent from
the constraint of other private wills.32 This is possible only under a system of equal laws, where
all possess the legal status of being one’s “own master.”33 Kant’s account of external freedom
refers, then, to the position and juridical status of the chooser as opposed to the particular choices
made available to them. As Maliks summarizes, “Lawful freedom is choice-making that is
compatible with the equal freedom of others. It means that a person is legally independent from
the arbitrary wishes of another and lives under law.”34 The emphasis Kant places on being one’s
own master (sui iuris), i.e. being free from the subjection to another’s private will (as opposed to
non-interference), puts his account of freedom in line thus with the republican commitment to
nondomination.35
Kant’s political outlook also expresses the traditional republican commitment to a
separation of power. Kant supports a division of power under a republican constitution, where
the role of the executive is limited to executing the law, not creating it.36 The creation of law is
the responsibility of legislators who construct laws on the basis of a hypothetical contract, i.e.
where a law is just if it is in accord with the principle of right and people can, in theory, consent
to it.37 Through this division of power and the establishment of constitutional law, citizens are
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protected from the arbitrary abuses of rulers (who are also subject to the rule of law) and other
members within society.38 For Kant, then, the type of freedom secured under the doctrine of right
refers to an interpersonal form of freedom, where people are protected from the arbitrary
authority of a ruler as well as other subjects.
In this section, I have suggested that Kant’s political account of freedom was influenced
by republicanism. The question that remains is whether or not Kant understood a market
economy to be compatible with republican freedom. In the passages discussed above, Kant
introduces the possibility that free labor markets and economic inequality do not in conflict with
republican freedom. He states that civil equality is “quite consistent with the greatest inequality
in terms of the quantity and degree of their [individuals’] possessions, whether in physical or
mental superiority over others or in external goods.”39 This departs thus from the principle held
by classical or agrarian republicans that material equality in physical property is important for
political and civil freedom and that wage labor is a form of domination. This problem in Kant
will be explored below. Next, however, it will help to consider Kant’s remarks on the concept of
commerce more broadly. Unlike other republican thinkers who adopted a classical republican
view of commerce, Kant holds a favorable view of it and attributes to it an important role in his
political theory.

Virtue, Commerce, and Doux Commerce
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, in the eighteenth century there was little
consensus about the positive effects of liberal reform. Concerns were often raised about the
38
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worsening economic and political conditions of the laboring poor. In this period, there also
circulated complaints about the negative effects of commerce on virtue. In particular, it was
believed that commerce thwarted one’s capacity to put the public good before one’s own private
interest. This idea was often expressed by republican thinkers who held that a virtuous citizen
was a subject who submitted their private interest or will to the collective interest of the
community, i.e. the general will.40 On this view, then, commerce, insofar as it was associated
with avarice and self-interest, was viewed as a threat to the political order. As an example of this
outlook, in Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), Rousseau comments on how people
who were once “free and independent” have become “slave[s]” to their “fellowmen” in seeking
to satisfy growing needs, claiming, moreover, that the desire to earn more money leads people to
“harm” one another and use them as means to the ends of making a profit.41
This eighteenth century outlook was a continuation of ancient and Christian views that
identified commerce and the pursuit of wealth with vice and corruption. These historical
arguments took many forms. In a general sense, the belief was rooted in the characterization of
the economic realm as a “realm of necessity.”42 As MacGilvray explains, on this outlook,
“acquisition and consumption of material goods is obligatory for all people—there can be no
particular honor or dignity in that—and so freedom is associated…with the activities that one is
able to engage in once these material needs have been satisfied.”43 The characterization of the
pursuit of material gain as an inferior activity is exemplified in Aquinas, who, restating Aristotle
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on this point, claims that wealth is not a man’s “supreme good” because “wealth is not sought
except for the sake of something else.”44 The concern was that if wealth was treated as an
ultimate good instead of an instrumental good, it would deter people from the pursuit of virtue,
i.e. ends that are good in themselves.
For this reason, as MacGilvray notes, involvement in the productive realm was associated
with negative character traits, including being “self-regarding, calculating, and even
duplicitous.”45 Classical republicans, like Cicero, also adopted this view. Cicero, for example,
claims that because of the temptation of trade and commerce in maritime cities, there is a greater
risk of people abandoning their civic duties, including the cultivation of military skill.46 Classical
republican thinkers, as noted in the introduction, were also led to exclude wage earners and
dependents on the grounds that they were incapable of political participation.47
These ancient and republican understandings of commercial life reemerged in the
eighteenth century. In particular, a debate was spurred by a controversial text, The Fable of the
Bees (1714) by Bernard Mandeville. In this satirical text, Mandeville compared two communities
of bees: one that sought out virtue and the other that pursued vice. He concludes that because the
former bee society destroyed its economy and the other, by promoting industry, contributed to its
economic growth, that “private vices” promote the “public good.”48 In this, Mandeville inverts
the republican argument that commercial behavior necessarily leads to corruption and decline.
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Mandeville’s argument elicited a variety of responses, including retorts by several
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Francis Hutcheson and Andrew Fletcher, who both
incorporated aspects of the agrarian republican view, were more favorable to the classical view
that commerce can have a deleterious effect on society, whereas Hume attributed to commerce a
more positive function. Smith’s treatment incorporated both perspectives. That is, he recognized
the negative effects of commerce on virtue, but ultimately attributed (in Mandeville fashion) the
pursuit of wealth to positive economic outcomes.49
Kant does allude to this anti-commercial view in his text Critique of Judgment (1790).
Here he associates commerce with “self-interest, cowardice, and weakness.”50 However, in other
respects, Kant appears to side with the position of Mandeville and Smith. For instance, in an
early text, he introduces the idea of unsociability, which appears to distance him from the
concerns expressed by critics of commerce in the eighteenth century. He writes:
Without those characteristics of unsociability—which are in themselves quite unworthy
of being loved and from which arises the resistance that every man must necessarily
encounter in pursuing his self-seeking pretensions—man would live as an Arcadian
shepherd, in perfect concord, contentment, and mutual love, and all talents would lie
eternally dormant in their seed; men docile as the sheep they tend would hardly invest
their existence with any worth greater than that of cattle; and as the purpose behind man’s
creation, his rational nature, there would remain a void.51
Kant’s outlook here is suggestive of the view that the pursuit of self-interest, despite its
“unsocial” qualities, generates positive societal effects. While Kant is not directly addressing
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self-interest within the sphere of the market, it seems possible, given his outlook, that he would
be immune to the concerns expressed by classical and radical republicans about civic virtue.
Kant’s identification of commerce with peace also provides further evidence that Kant
rejected the republican concern about commerce. This appears in his discussion of cosmopolitan
right, which includes the right to “seek commerce” as a general right of hospitality.52 Kant’s
justification for commercial right is grounded in his assumption that commerce fosters relations
of peace and civility. For example, in Toward Perpetual Peace Kant claims that the “spirit of
commerce …cannot coexist with war,” and that states are “compelled…to promote honorable
peace” due to “the power of money.”53 In accord with this sentiment, he also states that through
relations of “trade” people enter into “understanding, community, and peaceable relations with
one another, even with the most distant.”54
Kant’s comments here accord with what historians now refer to as the “doux-commerce”
thesis, or the idea that commerce tends to “soften” or “polish” manners.55 For example, in The
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu writes: “it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are
gentle (doux) mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle
mores.”56 The characterization of commerce as a “moralizing” or “civilizing agent” was a
common theme in eighteenth century discussions about the effects of commerce on civil society.
Hume (who also favored free trade), for example, argues that the growth of industry leads to
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developments in liberal arts: where “the same age, which produces great philosophers and
politicians, renowned generals and poets, usually abounds with skillful weavers, and shipcarpenters.”57
Laurence Dickey suggests that Hume, and others, found support for the doux-commerce
thesis in the stoic concept of Oikeiosis (or “sociability” within Natural Law theory): “a doctrine
that holds that as human beings have more contact with each other they begin to exhibit a
willingness to negotiate and co-operate with each other in common endeavors.”58 In line with
this view, it was argued that because commerce brings people into greater forms of interaction
with each other, people cultivate “other-regarding disposition[s]” and a growing sense of
humanity and “cosmopolitan fellowship.”59 Demonstrating this perspective, Montesquieu (who
clearly influences Kant) claims, “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace,” and the
“spirit of commerce unites nations.”60 From the doux-commerce outlook thus the positive effects
of commerce extend beyond private life into the public and international sphere.61
From these passages, it appears that Kant understood commerce to promote positive
virtues. This sets Kant apart from other eighteenth century thinkers who were skeptical about the
societal effects of markets and brings his outlook closer line with pro-market thinkers like Hume
and Smith. These observations do not yet demonstrate, however, Kant’s understanding of how
the economy ought to be organized, given that “commerce” can occur in different institutional
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frameworks, nor does it make the connection between freedom and a market economy. It is to
these latter points that we now turn.

Kant on Wage labor
An important claim advanced by Turgot and Smith is that a market economy liberates
producers from relations of servitude and protects their individual freedom. To recall, Smith
expresses this view in the third book of the Wealth of Nations, where he contends that “the most
important” effect of introducing commerce and manufactures in Europe was that it brought about
“liberty and security” for individuals.62 Smith attributes this to the independent or impersonal
nature of market relations. He states that in contrast to feudal relations, where “tenants and
retainers” are dependent on a single lord for their subsistence, in market societies “tradesman[s]
or artificer[s]” derive their subsistence not from any one particular person, but potentially “a
hundred or a thousand different customers,” and therefore are “not absolutely dependent upon
any one of them.”63 For Smith, then, in market societies, sellers of goods and the wage-laborers
they employ are not subject to the forms of “servile dependency” that characterized feudal
relations of production.64
That Smith adheres to this view, I suggest, also relates to his adoption of a contractual
understanding of labor. Both Turgot and Smith refer to labor as a type of property and therefore
something that can be voluntarily alienated without violating the liberty of the person. On this
outlook, the alienation of labor becomes an act that is expressive of freedom. This view departs
from agrarian republicanism, which describes freedom not in terms of one’s ability to own and
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alienate one’s labor, but rather as a form of self-governance over labor and the ownership over
property in land. On the agrarian republican outlook, if a person owns land or has free access to
it, they will not be compelled to work under the direction of an employer. Thus, access to land is
viewed as a necessary means to securing republican freedom and preventing servitude in the
form of wage labor.
Kant, I argue, adopts a view similar to that of Turgot and Smith in terms of identifying
wage labor with freedom. Kant’s description of producers as free, however, is not entirely
straightforward. On the one hand, Kant, like Smith, characterizes craftsmen, merchants, artisans,
and leasehold farmers (as opposed to tenant farmers) as independents, i.e. as subjects who
possess the quality of “being one’s own master (sui iuris).”65 For Kant, to be one’s own master it
is necessary to own “some property,” but this property can include “any art, craft, fine art, or
science,” insofar as one can be supported by it, presumably through the sale of it in exchange for
goods or money.66 For this reason, Kant includes “craftsmen” along with landowners as an
example of subjects who are entitled to a vote.67
On the other hand, however, and in contrast to Smith, Kant appears to identify wage
earners as “passive” not “active citizens.”68 Passive citizens are dependent citizens and therefore
are disenfranchised citizens; they possess civil freedom but lack political freedom. Kant defines a
“dependent” as “anyone whose preservation in existence (his being fed and protected) depends
not on his management of his own business but on arrangements made by another.”69 Examples
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Kant provides here include a woodcutter for hire, a private tutor, and a tenant farmer.70 Much
like Smith’s description of servants beholden to feudal lords, Kant says of these subjects that
they are “underlings of the commonwealth because they have to be under the direction or
protection of other individuals, and so do not possess civil independence.”71
Kant’s characterization of wage laborers as dependents (i.e. passive citizens) might imply
that he did not ultimately view wage earners as free in the republican sense of the term. If this
were correct, his outlook would fall closer in line with the classical republican view. The
important thing to note in response to this concern is that Kant does not identify dependency with
an absence of civil freedom, but rather with an absence of political freedom. Thus, in his
discussion of active and passive citizenship requirements, he concludes of passive citizens: “This
dependence upon the will of others and this inequality is, however, in no way opposed to their
freedom and equality as human beings, who together make up a people.”72 Kant reasons,
moreover, that because positions of higher rank and active citizenship status are open to other
members of society, such inequalities remain consistent with right, where “anyone can work his
way up from this passive condition to an active one.”73
To recall, for Kant, people are free when they are free from forms of arbitrary authority.
This, however, is secured through the establishment of a republican constitutional order, not
through participatory forms of democracy. Thus, if one lacks political freedom, i.e. the right to
vote, they still remain in possession of their status as a free person in possession of the same
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rights as other citizens (albeit not the right to vote). Kant, moreover, has pragmatic reasons for
excluding dependents from the right to vote. Kant’s worry is that if dependents are enfranchised,
they will vote under the direction of their master. Kant was not alone in holding this view.74
Under the influence of the Abbé Sieyès, who feared that universal franchise would empower the
aristocracy, the distinction between active and passive citizenship was enacted into law at the
start of the French revolution.75
Despite, however, Kant’s assurance that wage laborers remain equal under civil law
(even if they are disenfranchised), his description of them as dependents still raises some
concern. For instance, Kant writes:
Thus the welfare of one is very much dependent upon the will of another (that of the poor
on the rich); thus one must obey (as a child its elders or a wife her husband) and the other
directs; thus one serves (a day laborer) and the other pays him, and so forth.76
Kant’s comments here are consistent with his remark, quoted above, that dependents remain
under their superior’s “direction.”77 His claim that dependents are under an obligation to “obey”
and “serve” private persons, moreover, appears to contradict his view that they possess equal
civil freedoms. For, as discussed earlier, Kant is opposed to the existence of intermediary powers
between citizens and the state. Maliks describes the problem as follows:
The remaining puzzle, which still lacks a satisfactory answer, is why Kant was prepared
to accept that women and mere workers could be completely subservient in private
relations. As contemporary Kantians have argued, it is difficult to see how their
dependent position is compatible with their innate right to freedom as independence,
since it renders them very much dependent on the arbitrary choices of a paterfamilias or
an employer. That such private relations of dependence are sometimes chosen by the

74

Although, see Maliks for an overview of Kant’s “radical” critics, who argue in favor of
extending the franchise. Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context, 95-101.
75
Ibid., 84.
76
Kant, “On the Common Saying,” 292.
77
Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 458.
161

dependent person does not solve the problem, since, as Bergk rightly pointed out, giving
up one’s natural right to independence is to make oneself into a mere thing.78
Maliks therefore suggests that Kant does not provide a satisfactory answer as to why private
forms of subjection are consistent with civil freedom. Presumably, Kant’s claim that higher
positions of rank remain open to dependents does not detract from the fact that people within
these positions are still subject to forms of domination.
It seems possible, however, that Kant understood his account of contractual rights to
refute these concerns. Contract rights are private acquired rights that grant individuals exclusive
entitlements to acts performed by other persons. Specifically, Kant defines a contract as a
“possession of another’s choice, in the sense of my capacity to determine it by my own choice to
a certain deed in accordance with laws of freedom.”79 Kant permits, then, the possibility that
one’s choice can be subject to another’s control without it violating their freedom. Through a
contract, Kant writes, “something is added to my external belongings; I have become enriched by
acquiring an active obligation on the freedom and the means of the other.”80
The possibility that one can come to acquire another’s choice without violating their
independence is attributed to the consensual nature of the act. For Kant, contracts are the result
of a “united will.”81 That is, one can only come to acquire a right to the deeds of others if it is the
result of a mutual agreement and never through a unilateral acquisition.82 Ripstein summarizes
the view as follows:
If I consent to your use of my person (or powers) or property, I have decided how they
will be used, and so your use of them is an exercise of my freedom. If I consent to your
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doing something that injures me or damages my property, the injury or damage results
from the exercise of my choice.83
Thus, through contracts, acts that would otherwise be coercive become expressive of freedom.
Granting another the use of your powers or the right to set ends for you become permissible in
this context.
This is equally true in the case of employment contracts. Kant explicitly makes reference
to the employment contract in his discussion of contracts to let and hire (locatio operae).84 These
contracts entail “granting another the use of my powers for a specified price.”85 Importantly, for
Kant, the employment contract is unlike a slave contract, for which Kant, in agreement with
Smith and Rousseau, rejects.86 Bergk’s criticism in the quoted passage above (by Maliks)
therefore overlooks the fact that Kant does not permit contracts that entail the complete
alienation of one’s freedom (i.e. voluntary slave contracts), and that Kant therefore would oppose
an employment contract based on these terms. For Kant, to renounce one’s freedom is to
renounce all obligations and make any contract null.
Conversely, employment contracts (ideally) grant others the use of your powers, but
within certain limits, and through mutual agreement. Kant is especially clear on this point,
writing:
Now it might seem that someone could put himself under obligation to another person, by
a contract to let and hire (location conductio), to perform services (in return for wages,
board or protection) that are permissible in terms of their quality but indeterminate in
terms of their quantity, and that he thereby becomes just a subject (subiectus), not a
bondsman (servus). But this is only a deceptive appearance. For if the master is
authorized to use the powers of his subject as he pleases, he can also exhaust them until
his subject dies or is driven to despair (as with the Negroes on the Sugar Islands); his
subject will in fact have given himself away, as property, to his master, which is
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impossible. – Someone can therefore hire himself out only for work that is determined as
to its kind and its amount, either as a day laborer or as a subject living on his master’s
property (MM, 6: 330).
Kant suggests, then, that workers may be subordinate to their employers, but not subordinate in
the sense that would entail a real loss of freedom. To ensure this, Kant contends that contracts
must specify the quality and quantity of work in order to limit the scope of the employer’s
authority. Workers must serve their employer, but in doing so they are following through with
the terms of an agreement they negotiated and consented to.
In characterizing contractual relations as free relations, Kant’s commentary can be
interpreted as responding to classical concerns about wage labor. For, although Kant
characterizes wage laborers as servile, passive citizens, he views them as free citizens (in the
republican sense of the term), nonetheless. As I suggest in the case of Smith, Kant’s
identification of wage labor with free labor brings his views, moreover, closer in line with
“laissez-faire republicanism” in the nineteenth century.87 On this outlook, and in contrast with
the radical and classical republican view, ownership of property in the person (i.e. labor power)
is viewed as sufficient grounds for economic independence and therefore freedom.
An important question that remains, however, is whether or not Kant is successful in
making this argument. There are, on the one hand, reasons to be skeptical here. One reason being
that Kant and other defenders of the right of contract overlook structural forms of coercion that
put workers and employers on unequal footing. Workers, insofar as they lack access to land,
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resources, and wealth, are forced to become wage earners, and possess, moreover, significantly
less bargaining power in disputes over working conditions and wages. To say workers “freely”
enter into employment contracts therefore overlooks the structural conditions that coerce workers
into accepting non-ideal conditions and pay. This was, moreover, why Price and other antienclosure critics opposed the removal of small proprietors from the land.
Secondly, the role of consent in contract theory (as described above by Ripstein) also
raises concerns. While one may consent to the use of their person to their employer, it is not clear
that the act of consent therefore legitimates what might otherwise appear as an act of domination.
In line with this view, Carole Pateman argues that the idea of the contract, or contracting out
one’s labor, is a fiction that masks relations of subordination.88 In sum, a defense of Kant’s views
would have to respond to criticisms of contractarianism and make a case for its compatibility
with republican values. This problem, I would add, remains true for contemporary republican
thinkers who also maintain that free market practices (including wage labor) are compatible with
a republican commitment to nondomination. 89
On the other hand, however, (and in response to these concerns) Kant may have assumed,
like Smith, that competitive market conditions enhance republican freedoms because workers are
free to leave their employers in the case of abuse. This refers to the idea of a “right of exit.” The
problem with this response is that although workers are not subject to any single employer in a
free labor market, they are still subject to employers as a class, insofar as they are forced to sell
88

Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
Some contemporary republican thinkers view the free market and capitalism to be compatible
with republicanism (albeit under certain conditions). For example, although Anderson, in Private
Government, is critical of workplace domination, she does not argue against free markets or
capitalism. In another example, Robert Taylor argues, “the proper republican attitude toward
competitive markets is celebratory rather than acquiescent.” Robert Taylor, Exit Left: Markets
and Mobility in Republican Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7.

89

165

their labor to access their means of subsistence. Alternatively, Kant may have believed that a
state welfare system, which Kant appears amenable to, could protect workers from domination in
private labor markets. The next section further elaborates Kant’s views on this topic to better
assess this possibility.

Intervention: Wealth Redistribution and Protectionism
As noted in the introduction, several scholars have objected to the characterization of
Kant as a free market thinker. Many would dispute, for instance, F.A. Hayek’s claim that Kant’s
political philosophy provides grounds for rejecting a model of welfare state liberalism. Hayek
associates Kant’s political philosophy with his own neoliberal outlook, claiming, for instance,
that both defend a “negative” conception of justice, which is opposed to an anti-liberal “social
justice” theory.90 While most contemporary Kant scholars oppose this interpretation, some
continue to identify aspects of Kant’s economic views with the free market position of his
contemporaries, including Smith. This section will consider two views Kant held that complicate
the pro-free market interpretation. One relates to his support for wealth redistribution by the state
and the other his support for protectionist policies in foreign trade.
Hayek’s claim is presumably rooted in Kant’s criticism of paternalism and his
identification of the just state with freedom. According to Kant, the positive laws of a just state
have their basis in the a priori principle of right. Right refers to “the sum of the conditions under
which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal
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law of freedom.”91 In this way, right and therefore the basis of the state is grounded in a concept
of freedom, where freedom is defined as “independence from being constrained by another’s
choice.”92
Because the basis of the state is external freedom, Kant rejects the possibility that the
state has a duty to secure the individual well-being or happiness of its subjects. Kant writes that
“the concept of an external right” is grounded in the idea of “freedom in the external relation of
people to one another,” and that, moreover, it “has nothing at all to do with the end that all of
them naturally have (their aim of happiness) and with the means for attaining it.”93 The following
quote from On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use in
Practice emphasizes this point:
No one can coerce me to be happy in his way (as he thinks of the welfare of other human
beings); instead, each may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him,
provided he does not infringe upon that freedom of others to strive for a like end which
can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a possible universal law
(i.e., does no infringe upon this right of another). A government established on the
principle of benevolence toward the people like that of a father toward his children—that
is, a paternalistic government (imperium paternale), in which the subjects, like minor
children who cannot distinguish between what is truly useful or harmful to them, are
constrained to behave only passively, so as to wait only upon the judgment of the head of
state as to how they should be happy and, as for his also willing their happiness, only
upon his kindness—is the greatest despotism thinkable (a constitution that abrogates all
the freedom of the subjects, who in that case have no rights at all).94
Kant’s comments here accord with his claim in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
that the “proper end of nature” does not relate to preservation, welfare, or happiness, but rather to
the creation of a “good will,” which is also a free will.95 Kant reasons, moreover, that happiness
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cannot be universalized into law: “the highly conflicting but always changing illusion in which
someone places his happiness… make any fixed principle impossible.”96 Freedom thus, in the
moral and political realm, is the proper end for rational beings.
Kant suggests therefore that directing people in their pursuit of happiness or welfare is an
infringement on the freedom of individuals to choose their own ends. This outlook is not far
from Smith’s insistence that the state should limit its involvement in the economic activity of its
citizens. There is also some textual evidence that Kant was concerned about the negative
economic effects of intervention. Fleischacker, for instance, interprets an early passage from Idea
for a Universal History as suggestive of this view.97 In the passage, Kant suggests that
constraints on political or civil freedoms hinder “trade” and can weaken a nation’s international
standing.98 Kant also contends that hindering subjects in their pursuit of “well-being” “hampers
the liveliness of enterprise generally.”99
As further evidence of this interpretation, Fleischacker also points to Kant’s
characterization of sumptuary laws, i.e. laws that prohibited the importation of luxury goods, as
paternalistic. In his lectures on anthropology, Kant states: “If the regent makes the subjects
immature, they are indignant. Denmark therefore did not do well when it introduced the order
governing dress. Smith, in the book on national character, says just this.”100 Kant’s comments
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here are not very surprising given his familiarity with Smith’s writing. Kant read Smith’s Theory
of Moral Sentiments in the 1770s and is believed to have read The Wealth of Nations, although
perhaps not in its entirety, quickly after the release of the German translation in 1776.101
A closer examination of the economic views of Kant’s adversaries also lends support for
the view that Kant was in agreement with Smith’s economic outlook. As Maliks details, Kant’s
criticism of paternalism can be read as a response to enlightened absolutism, which was a
dominant political outlook of the period. According to this school of thought, represented by
thinkers like Christian Wolff, the role of the state is to “promote human perfection.”102
Importantly, in order to achieve perfection, the state was held responsible for the welfare of its
subjects. On Wolff’s view, as Maliks summarizes, “monarchs could intervene in the economy to
encourage growth in rural areas and towns, build infrastructure, subsidize the arts, promote
public health, and supervise public morals.”103
Other thinkers associated with this school of thought include Johann Heinrich Gottlob
von Justi and Joseph von Sonnenfels, who both produced important texts in the area of
cameralist thought.104 Cameralists believed that the strength of the sovereign (and the state) was
tied to wealth, which was derived through the revenue of the sovereign’s subjects. As Keith
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Tribe summarizes: “The political power of a ruler was therefore directly linked to the economic
welfare of that ruler’s subjects: the (political) happiness of a ruler rested upon the (economic)
happiness of his subjects.”105 Unlike the Smithian view, however, it was believed that economic
prosperity was the outcome of proper government oversight and management—i.e. not the
invisible hand of the market. Justi and Sonnenfels’ writings offered thus various instructions
related to forms of economic regulation.106
Interestingly, Tribe notes that although cameralist thought had little influence outside of
Germany during its period of activity, one notable exception is found in the economic thought of
Sir James Steuart. Steuart drafted parts of his Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy
during his stay in Germany and is thought to have been one of Smith’s targets in his attack on
mercantilist thought.107 To the extent that Kant also criticizes these views, it seems plausible that
he sides with the liberal economic outlook. Maliks draws a similar conclusion and categorizes
Kant’s political thought as aligning with the outlook of the emerging Prussian bourgeoisie,
contending that Kant “supplied Germany’s growing middle classes with a metaphysical
foundation for their liberal aspirations.”108
As mentioned, however, there are some problems with this interpretation. The first being,
that Kant, despite his warnings about paternalism, claims that the state is responsible for the
welfare of the poor. He writes:
To the supreme commander there belongs indirectly, that is, insofar as he has taken over
the duty of the people, the right to impose taxes on the people for its own preservation,
105
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such as taxes to support organizations providing for the poor, foundling homes and
church organizations, usually called charitable or pious institutions. The general will of
the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself perpetually; and for
this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in order to maintain
those members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state
the government is therefore authorized to constrain the wealthy to provide the means of
sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural
needs. The wealthy have acquired an obligation to the commonwealth, since they owe
their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and care, which they need in order
to live; on this obligation the state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to
maintaining their fellow citizens.109
Given Kant’s warnings about paternalism, his reasoning is not entirely developed here. However,
he suggests that economic welfare is a necessary component for the “preservation” of the just
state, i.e. a state in which the external freedoms of all are secured.110
Kant’s comments also do not explicitly state the extent to which the poor should be
supported and therefore the extent to which the property rights of the wealthy are to be limited. It
is clear, however, that he believes the state has a duty to ensure the welfare of the poor. He
reiterates this claim, in a separate discussion on foundations (state-established institutions that
exist “for the benefit of certain members”).111 Here, he promotes the existence of institutions for
the “poor, invalids, and the sick.”112 Interestingly, he notes that it may be more consistent with
freedom to support the poor and sick “with certain sums of money” so they can board where they
choose, adding that when boarded in “splendid institutions, serviced by expensive personnel”
their freedom is limited.113
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Some scholars conclude from these passages that, according to Kant, freedom entails
some basic assurance that subsistence needs are met. On this view, poverty relief is a duty of the
state because it is tied to freedom. For example, Allen Wood writes:
If we wonder how the state’s concern with the physical survival of its members can be
reconciled with its fundamental task of protecting their external freedom, then we should
reflect on the obvious fact that physical survival is a necessary condition for any human
being to exercise free agency.114
This position contrasts with twentieth century libertarian or neo-liberal outlooks that insist on the
separation of wealth and freedom. From this perspective, one can be poor but still free, insofar as
they remain free from the coercion of others.115 Wood’s comment suggests, however, that Kant
adopts a more robust conception of freedom (compared to a negative conception), which
emphasizes the importance of providing people with material goods so they are enabled to freely
act on and develop their capacities. Wood concludes, moreover, that for these reasons, Kant
should not be associated with a libertarian outlook.
In line with this interpretation, Pauline Kleingeld argues that Kant’s support for an
interventionist state distinguishes his economic outlook from “radical” free trade proponents in
the eighteenth century, including Smith.116 Kleingeld concludes as much not only from Kant’s
remarks on wealth redistribution, but also on the basis of his commentary on free trade. In
disagreement with Fleishacker’s interpretation of Kant, she points to a footnote where Kant
appears to support protectionist policies in foreign trade. The footnote occurs in a passage where
Kant claims that laws aimed at protecting the prosperity and welfare of citizens can be justified
insofar as they are needed to secure a “rightful condition.”117 Kant claims that such laws bring
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“strength” and “stability” “internally and against external enemies,” so that people can “exist as a
commonwealth.”118 Kant includes as an example of such legislation, prohibitions on trade:
Certain restrictions on imports are included among these laws, so that the means of
acquiring livelihood will promote the subjects’ interests and not the advantage of
foreigners or encouragement of others’ industry, since a state, without the prosperity of
the people, would not possess enough strength to resist foreign enemies or to maintain
itself as a commonwealth.119
Kant claims, in other words, that the state is not prohibited from improving the welfare of its
subjects, including through the protection of domestic industry, if such measures can be deemed
necessary for the securing of external freedoms and not happiness. Kant’s remark therefore goes
against Smith’s argument that import restrictions are economically harmful for the nation.
Kant also appears to support protectionist policies in his discussion of colonialism. In
Toward Perpetual Peace (1795), Kant claims that China and Japan “wisely” place restrictions on
trade with other countries.120 Kant’s praise of these protectionist policies is the outcome of his
critical observation of “civilized” and “commercial” states who visit foreign countries “under the
pretext…to set up trading posts,” but engage in acts of “oppression” which lead to the
“incitement” of “wars, famine, rebellions, treachery.”121 For these reasons too, Kant establishes a
limiting condition for cosmopolitan right. On this limiting condition, “the right to visit” does
“not extend beyond the conditions which make it possible to seek commerce with the old
inhabitants.”122 As Kant puts it in the Metaphysics of Morals, cosmopolitan right does not permit
the “right to make a settlement on the land of another nation.”123 Some scholars, including Peter
Niesen, conclude from this that Kant is critical of colonialism not only as the “imposition of
118
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political order,” but also as the imposition of “a particular economic order by outside forces.”124
He writes, “Kant’s opposition to colonialism is fueled by doubts about the universal introduction
of a proto-capitalist private law system [that] would entail open borders for economic interaction
on a global scale.125 In other words, Niesen assumes that Kant’s critical stance on colonialism
translates into a criticism of free trade and capitalism.
Kleingeld and Niesen assume, then, that Kant’s economic thought is categorically distinct
from an eighteenth century pro-free market outlook. They overlook, however, how in making
exceptions to the principle of non-intervention, Kant did not depart from other eighteenth century
free market advocates. On the topic of free trade, Smith, for instance, does not oppose all
prohibitions on imported goods. Of the four exceptions to free trade that Smith permits the one
that is most similar to Kant’s passage (quoted above) is his support for the British Navigation
Acts.126 Smith contends that the Acts, like other trade restrictions, are economically harmful.
However, because the shipping industry is tied to Britain’s military defense, Smith views them as
necessary. He writes: “As defense, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act
of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.”127 Here
interestingly, Smith, like Kant (as well as other mercantilists of the period), puts national security
at the center of his policy prescription. Smith also includes as an exception to free trade the
removal of restrictions on manufactured goods that are widely produced in the home country.
Smith comments: “humanity may in this case require that the freedom of trade should be restored
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only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection.”128 To do
otherwise and remove prohibitions immediately might “deprive all at once many thousands of
our people of their ordinary employment and means of subsistence.”129 Smith ultimately thinks
that such a possibility is unlikely, given the ability of people to take up employment elsewhere,
but his comments point to his amenability to government oversight for the sake of the nation’s
economic welfare.
As recent scholarship emphasizes, moreover, Smith was also not opposed to wealth
redistribution.130 Smith includes in the final book of The Wealth of Nations several examples of
public goods that the state may be responsible for paying, including public education. Smith’s
comments on education follow his description of how the division of labor hinders the
intellectual capacities of workers. From this he concludes, “For a very small expence the public
can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people,
the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.”131 Smith also favors
progressive taxation.132 This includes his suggestion to tax luxury vehicles at a higher rate for
tolls in order that “the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute in a very easy
manner to the relief of the poor.”133 In response to house rent taxes falling “heaviest upon the
rich,” he writes, “in this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very
unreasonable.”134 And that, moreover, “It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute
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to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that
proportion.”135
Lastly, Kant’s comments on Japan and China do not necessarily support the view that he
was entirely opposed to free trade. After all, on Kant’s account, both countries do not completely
cut off trade; they only restrict it, allowing, “access, but not entry” in China and access to the
Dutch, though not with the “natives” in Japan.136 What is completely cut off, however, is the
possibility of contact with the “natives” and “entry” beyond, presumably, the nation’s ports or
commercial centers.137 It is possible to interpret his comments here as a praise of Japan and
China’s ability to steer off European attempts at political conquest. In other words, that Kant
favorably views the regulation of trade in these countries, not as ends in themselves, but rather as
means to the ends of warding off political annexation.
It is, moreover, anachronistic to interpret Kant’s critical remarks on colonialism as an
implicit critique of free trade and therefore capitalism.138 As Dickey discusses, free trade ideas in
the eighteenth century were often combined with anti-imperialist politics. Dickey examines how
in tying commerce to universal benevolence, the doux-commerce thesis informed criticisms
against British policy in the American colonies during the eighteenth century.139 Benjamin
Franklin, for instance, under the influence of David Hume’s “Jealousy of Trade” (1760) essay,
criticized the regulatory policies of England as “selfish” and put forward suggestions for England
to adopt a laissez-faire approach in the colonies.140 As discussed in a previous chapter, Smith
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also employed the argument for free trade in his defense of American independence. According
to Smith, moreover, the injustice of European colonialism was not the imposition of economic
order through free trade policies, but instead the imposition of economic order through monopoly
(often in the form of joint-stock companies) and regulation—i.e. through mercantile policies141.
It seems equally anachronistic to interpret Kant’s reference to “commercial” countries, which are
responsible for colonial violence, as meaning “capitalist” countries. Likely, such a term was
alternatively associated with the mercantile policies that dominated European political and
economic practices during this period.

Conclusion
In sum, while Kant’s support for wealth redistribution and state intervention conflicts
with some contemporary forms of free market fundamentalism, it was not entirely at odds with
an eighteenth century free market outlook, which was equally amenable to state intervention,
welfare support, and anti-imperialism. In his comments on hereditary privilege, commerce, wage
labor, and intervention, Kant thus shares much in common with Turgot and Smith. This is not to
overlook some anomalies. The footnote supporting import restrictions does raise questions
concerning the extent to which Kant fully understood or adopted all aspects of Smith’s economic
views on foreign trade.
Kant also appears sympathetic to small landowners. Kant, like Smith, was opposed to
entails, but goes further in suggesting that the consolidation of land is inconsistent with right. For
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instance, in his explanation for why votes should be allocated according to property ownership
and not the size of one’s property, as was supported by Turgot, Kant comments as an aside:
Without even raising the question, how it could with right have come about that someone
received as his own more land than he could himself make use of with his own hands (for
acquisition by military seizure is not first acquisition), and how it came about that many
human beings who could otherwise have acquired a lasting status of possession were
thereby reduced merely to serving him in order to be able to live?142
Here Kant appears sympathetic to the agrarian republican outlook. Much like Smith, however,
Kant does not suggest anything like an agrarian reform to limit the appropriation of land
(domestically). Alternatively, his comment in the same text that one may rightfully bequeath
wealth and contribute therefore to “considerable inequality of financial circumstances among the
members of a commonwealth” conflicts with this sentiment.143 What may be concluded from
this, is that while there is significant evidence that Kant sided with many aspects of the
eighteenth century pro-market outlook, he was also an inconsistent or undecided economic
thinker—which would account for the several inconsistencies in his texts. On balance, however,
like Turgot and Smith, it is not evident that Kant supported the more radical reforms of agrarian
republicans who favored an egalitarian property scheme within the emerging ownership society.
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CONCLUSION
Economics Beyond Turgot, Smith, and Kant

While Turgot, Smith, and Kant did not use the word “capitalism,” their economic thought
responded to developments associated with the transition to a capitalist economy in the
eighteenth century. This included the liberalization of domestic and foreign trade, the enclosing
and engrossing of land, and the proletarianization of the laboring poor. As discussed in the
introduction, capitalism is one possible institutional form that a market economy can take. What
defines a capitalist economy is a property regime that endorses private over social or public
forms of ownership. For this reason, capitalism is associated with a “proprietarian” ideology.1
Economies that favor egalitarian distributions of wealth generally oppose this logic because they
seek to limit the sacrosanctity of private property. As discussed throughout this dissertation,
many of these thinkers made exceptions to non-intervention and set some limitations on property
rights. Several contemporary scholars conclude from this that eighteenth century pro-market
thinkers should not be read as apologists of capitalism, but rather as critics.
This concluding chapter introduces some of these interpretations as they are applied to
Smith’s economic outlook.2 After providing an overview of these interpretations, I draw from the
previous chapters to challenge their conclusions. I suggest that, on balance, these thinkers did not
adopt the progressive economic reforms that were advanced by other eighteenth century thinkers.
As such, the identification of early pro-market thought as anti-capitalist proves unsubstantiated.
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In particular, I challenge Elizabeth Anderson’s interpretation of Smith as a “commercial
republican” thinker who was opposed to laissez-faire capitalism. I suggest that there is a closer
analogy between Turgot, Smith, and Kant with the emergence of “laissez-faire republicanism” in
the nineteenth century. I conclude by offering some suggestions for how the economic ideals of
agrarian and labor republicanism provide a more egalitarian normative framework for rethinking
contemporary economic practices.

Smith the Anti-Laissez-Faire Thinker
Scholars who interpret Smith as a critic of capitalism often point to his amenability to
state intervention as evidence to support this claim. They claim that because Smith sought to
limit the autonomy of the market, his approach to the economy was a socially embedded one.
Interestingly, this assessment is in accord with Polanyi’s commentary on eighteenth century
political economy. On Polanyi’s account, prior to the 1820s economic liberalism existed only as
a “spasmodic tendency” that had not yet developed into a full-blown economic theory and
practice.3 Polanyi comments, for instance, that to “credit François Quesnay with having
envisaged such a state of affairs [i.e. laissez-faire] would be little short of fantastic.”4 He claims
that Quesnay (and the Physiocrats), while supporting free trade in grain, otherwise demanded
“the regulation of industry and agriculture by a supposedly all-powerful and omniscient
government;” and that the “idea of a self-regulating system of markets had never as much as
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entered his mind.”5 While Polanyi, moreover, is critical of Smith’s thesis of the “economic man”
(i.e. the so-called natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange”), he views the association
of Smith with laissez-faire as equally misguided.6 He writes that, “wealth was to him merely an
aspect of the life of the community, to the purposes of which it remained subordinate.”7 On
Polanyi’s view, then, eighteenth century thinkers assumed the importance of a socially embedded
market economy. They did not, conversely, advocate fully subjecting economic activity to
market mechanisms outside the control of societal regulations and norms.
Contemporary scholars writing on this topic are largely in agreement with Polanyi’s
assessment. They note how Smith and other early free market thinkers differ from nineteenth
century economic liberals, insofar as they promoted greater forms of state intervention in the
economic sphere. Debra Satz, for instance, is explicit in making this connection. Drawing from
Polanyi’s work, she claims that Smith and other classical economists “emphasized the social
embeddedness of markets.”8 She claims that these thinkers “saw that markets could not become
the sole institution or sole organizing principle of a liberal society without destroying that
society,” and that, moreover, “they recognized that markets required limits if a liberal society,
based on the equality and freedom of its members, is to be maintained.”9
She notes that, in general, Smith identified markets as social institutions that have both
positive and negative effects on individual freedom. In the case of the former, she points to
Smith’s observation, made in the third book of The Wealth of Nations, that markets can free
people from relations of dependency and servitude. Smith, to recall, attributes this to the
5
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independent, or impersonal, nature of market relations.10 As Satz summarizes it: “freedom of
commerce creates the possibility of multiple and optional webs of relationship with anonymous
others, thus undermining the relations of personal and direct subjection and servility that
characterized feudalism.”11 Smith characterizes this, moreover, as “the most important” effect of
introducing commerce and manufactures in Europe.12
Satz claims, however, that Smith also understood freedom to be a contingent feature of
markets. Smith was aware, in other words, that markets could also curtail the freedoms of the
laboring poor. This is evident in passages where Smith describes workers as being subordinate to
the authority of their employers, and in his discussion of the negative impact of unskilled labor
on workers’ capabilities. In response, she claims that Smith believed that a number of conditions,
both political and economic, had to be in place for the freedom of laborers to be secured. Satz
claims that Smith understood how in order to prevent employers from taking advantage of
laborers, markets had to be competitive, and workers had to be skilled.13 She also alludes to the
idea of a “right of exit”— the idea that in competitive labor markets, the threat of a worker
leaving the job incentivizes employers to comply with their demands.14
On the political end, Satz views Smith’s support for various forms of state intervention as
a means to further protect worker’s liberties. As an example of this, she points to a passage
where Smith appears to suggest that regulation is only “just and equitable” when it favors
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workers, and not their employers, in disputes over wages.15 In further support of her view that
“Smith was no simple critic of government intervention in markets,” she points to his
amenability to progressive taxation, state-funded public education, and intervention in credit
markets (i.e. favoring a limit on rates of interest).16 Satz concludes from these passages,
moreover, that:
Smith made an important contribution to economic thought with his observation that
specific types of exchanges have constitutive effects on their participants. For this reason
I doubt that Smith would accept “the market” as the essence of those practices we
conventionally label “the labor market” or endorse the view that employment regulations
should be driven entirely by efficiency criteria. Indeed his perspective—that labor
markets shape workers’ capacities and preferences—can be expanded to embrace a vision
of the role that work plays in our lives that links work to some level of material wellbeing (a minimum wage), democratic organization (union organizations, worker’s rights
on and off the job, the workplace as a site for furthering democratic capacities, perhaps
by lessening the sharp divide between manual and mental labor), and for some balance
among our different life activities (hours regulation). At the very least Smith himself
clearly recognized that the functioning of labor markets inevitably raises questions
relevant to the structure of public life, in a way that the functioning of a market in cars or
apples does not.17
Satz’s interpretation of Smith is intended to show how early free market thinkers judged the
market on normative grounds that differ from the criteria employed in contemporary economic
theory. On this latter outlook, market failure is associated not with the curtailment of freedom,
but rather with failures in allocative efficiency or in preference maximizing capabilities.18
Alternatively, on her view, because Smith is concerned with the political and moral effects that
markets have on subjects, he constructs a system that would grant greater institutional power to
the state to regulate labor markets on behalf of the workers. For these reasons, Satz views
Smith’s approach to markets as one that falls within the category of a socially embedded outlook.
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While Satz is correct to point out that Smith was favorable to certain forms of
intervention, to what extent does this prove that he was a critic of capitalism? Satz seems to
suggest as much in her claim that Smith adopts an “embedded” approach to markets and would
be in favor of workplace democracy or worker unions. Satz’s comments here appear to place
Smith in the tradition of socialist thought. This conclusion, however, seems unsupported. As
noted in chapter two, while Smith was critical of the fact that the law favored employers over
workers in disputes, he did not suggest that workers should be permitted to “combine.”19 That is,
Smith was critical of the combination of both employers and workers. This is significant,
moreover, given Smith’s claim that workers, because they possess less stock than their
employers, are at a disadvantage in bargaining over wages.20 Although Smith recognizes the
political and economic advantages that result from unequal holdings of capital, it seems unlikely
that he would be open to anything that would radically limit the profits that accrue to owners and
employers. To recall, Smith believes that without the incentive of a profit, owners of capital
would not risk their investments.21
Smith’s discussion of progressive taxation also does not extend to landowners. In book
five, he comments that, in general, “every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to
keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the
public treasury of the state.”22 On the rent of the land, while Smith permits a tax on landlords, he
insists that such taxes should not inhibit the improvement of the land. He writes:
The principle attention of the sovereign ought to be to encourage, by every means in his
power, the attention both of the landlord and of the farmer; by allowing both to pursue
their own interest in their own way, and according to their own judgment; by giving to
19
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both the most perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompence of their own
industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part of their
produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest communication both by
land and by water, through every part of his own dominions, as well as the most
unbounded freedom of exportation to the dominions of all other princes.23
His comments on progressive taxation occur thus not in his discussion of the rent of land, but
instead when he discusses taxes on housing—which is an unproductive unit, unlike the land.24 In
defending the rights of the landlords and farmers, the emphasis is not on limiting the
accumulation of property or wealth of proprietors, but rather encouraging it. It aligns thus with
the emerging proprietarian ideology of modern ownership societies, which does not seek to
radically limit the wealth of proprietors or the gentry class.
Smith’s support for intervention, then, departs from the anti-capitalist outlook of the
critics discussed in the preceding chapters. From this perspective, it was argued that a more equal
distribution of land would increase opportunities for the ownership of property and, therefore,
economic self-sufficiency. Thinkers like Price opposed the process of enclosure and engrossing
on the grounds that it led to the proletarianization of the poor. Critics of liberal reform in France
also opposed the introduction of free trade in grain because it allowed the owners of grain to
dictate the price and allocation of grain. To reiterate the point emphasized in the introduction,
when discussing alternatives to contemporary free market economies, it is not just about
intervention: “the fundamental question…is not ‘free market’ or ‘intervention,’ but rather
intervention ‘for whom’ and ‘for what.’”25 The types of reform proposed by the critics of the
grain trade and the enclosures, also sought intervention. Their proposals, if enacted, would have
radically hindered the ownership rights of an emerging class of wealthy proprietors and
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employers. Alternatively, Turgot, Smith, and Kant, as I have demonstrated in the preceding
chapters, often took the side of defending the property rights of employers, landlords, and
merchants. That is, the types of intervention they sought, were consistent with permitting forms
of inequality in wealth. This is most explicit in Kant, who claims that economic inequality is not
inconsistent with right.

Smith the Commercial Republican
Elizabeth Anderson goes further than Satz in arguing that Smith supported a more equal
distribution of property and subsequently a reduction in the commodification of labor. Anderson
suggests, then, that Smith favored a limitation on the property rights of the gentry and merchant
classes. On Anderson’s account, Smith was a “commercial republican” thinker, where
commercial republicanism:
secures widespread personal independence through a property regime that supports selfemployment. This requires free markets in consumer goods and land, because stategranted monopolies and privileges, and property rules such as entail and primogeniture,
concentrate the means of production in a few hands and thereby force the rest into
dependency.26
Anderson suggests that republican support for free markets in the eighteenth century was
understood in terms of its ability to break up monopolies in agriculture and trade. In the
mercantile state, trade was an exclusive and monopolistic practice controlled by the state and the
guilds. The presumption was that free trade would increase opportunities for self-employment. In
agriculture, Anderson emphasizes how Smith opposed primogeniture on the grounds that it
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would increase the number of yeoman farmers (which she defines as “small proprietors who
work their own land”).27
Anderson claims that there are four features of commercial republicanism (as it is
developed by Smith) that make it distinct from laissez-faire capitalism. These include: (1) A deemphasis on economies of scale, (2) the lack of joint-stock companies, or the use “of stock
markets for raising capital,” (3) small labor markets and, (4) support for “pro-labor state
regulation.”28 She claims that although Smith was “not as hostile as radical republicans to wage
labor,” he supported a society in which wage labor would be minimized through the existence of
small-scale enterprises. She comments how these enterprises, moreover, “could still support a
robust republican culture of workers’ independence, since they could be run on a collaborative
basis.”29 The upshot of Anderson’s interpretation is that she believes Smith favored the breaking
up of monopolies in trade and land and supported the decommodification of labor. Anderson
makes this point explicit in her book Private Government, where she claims, “the early promarket view did not aim to promote the commodification of labor.”30 She continues: “rather,
they hoped that with the right reforms, the emerging market order would liberate people from
servitude, including wage labor, rendering it—in Lincoln’s most optimistic vision—at most as
only a temporary stage of life.”31
In many respects, Anderson brings Smith’s commercial republican view closer in line
with the agrarian republican tradition, which supported self-employment and property
redistribution on the basis of their identification of wage labor with servitude. This is clear in
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Anderson’s characterization of Smith, along with the Levellers, Locke, Thomas Paine, and
Abraham Lincoln, as an advocate of a “free society of equals.”32 From the preceding chapters, I
hope to have shown why Anderson’s grouping together of these diverse range of thinkers faces
several shortcomings once the details of their outlooks on markets, property distribution, and
wage labor are considered in more detail. In chapter three, I demonstrate how Smith, while
critical of monopolies, did not oppose the monopolization of land that occurred in the period of
the parliamentary enclosures. Although Smith criticized primogeniture and praised yeoman
farmers, his economic thought presupposes and favors a model of agrarian capitalism that relied
on large farms and wage labor. Additionally, Smith departs from the agrarian republican outlook
in adopting a contractarian view of the employment contract that identifies wage labor with
freedom.
In sum, Turgot, Smith, and Kant were critics of “ternary” (to borrow Piketty’s term)
societies. As such, they opposed existing forms of inequality that resulted from status-based
distinctions in the feudal era. This included economic privileges such as royal monopolies (or
patents) and hereditary privileges that limited property ownership. The new proposals for an
ownership society that were intended to replace ternary societies came in a variety of forms that
were more or less egalitarian in their economic outlooks. Smith, as I’ve demonstrated, did not
follow in adopting the more progressive measures proposed by his contemporaries. Anderson has
erred thus in classifying Smith (and also Locke), as a thinker that favored a limitation on the
accumulation of property.

Laissez-Faire Republicanism
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As discussed in the introduction, on the classical and radical republican view, because
wage labor was associated with economic dependency, it was seen as a form of republican
unfreedom. From this perspective, to acquire the status of sui juris one had to be free from the
control or direction of another’s private will. Wage labor, because it entails following the orders
of a private employer or master, was viewed as a form of unfreedom on both of these accounts.
The association of wage labor with dependency, was expressed in particular by agrarian
republicans in their distinction between free labor and wage labor. To recall, this view was
articulated in Lincoln’s statement: “The prudent, penniless beginner in the world, labors for
wages awhile, saves surplus with which to buy tools or land, for himself; then labors on his own
account another while…[this] is free labor.”33 Agrarian republicans supported reforms that
would increase opportunities for land ownership and self-employment, believing that progressive
redistributive efforts were the best means to eradicate the existence of “wage slavery.”
The commercial republican interpretation of wage labor departs from the agrarian view,
insofar as it views wage labor as a form of economic independence. This is evident in Smith’s
comparison between feudal and market societies, and his claim that in the latter artisans and
tradesmen (and also the wage laborers they employ) are free from relations of servility.34
Scholars frequently cite Smith’s discussion here to emphasize the normative dimensions of his
economic outlook. What is overlooked, however, is the extent to which Smith’s departure from
the republican tradition (and its characterization of wage labor as servitude) brings his views
closer in line with traditional laissez-faire. For instance, Lisa Herzog also makes note of Smith’s
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departure from the “civic humanist” tradition and its ascription of “a special dignity and capacity
for virtue” to the possession of landed property.35 She writes:
By expanding the notion of capital, Smith turns civic humanism against itself, as it were:
commerce and exchange, seen by civic humanists as corrupting the moral bases of
society, lead to a situation in which everyone can participate, on an equal legal footing, in
the independence that the civic humanists value. Not everyone has the independence that
comes from landownership, but almost everyone has, or can acquire, human capital. This
allows people to choose freely whom to work for and with whom to enter into exchange
relationships, rather than depending on one single employer, as had been the case in
feudalism. These one-sided dependencies, with all their opportunities for personal
animosities and sadism, are replaced by the “cash-nexus,” which connects people of
equal legal standing, and by an ‘exit option’ for any particular relationship, because every
customer contributes ‘but a very small proportion’ to a person’s subsistence.36
Anderson and Satz adhere to Herzog’s charitable reading of Smith. This is puzzling, however,
insofar as this outlook is one that is characteristic of a traditional defense of laissez-faire.37 This
is especially surprising for Anderson, given her criticism of workplace domination that is
permitted by the “private government” of the workplace. Anderson is critical of how contractual
relations for most workers (who are “at-will”) are undemocratic, even if they remain free to leave
and work for another employer. Perhaps aware of this tension, Anderson erroneously claims that
Smith sought to limit the commodification of labor and develop an economy of self-employed
workers.
In the typology of republicanism, then, the distinction between “commercial
republicanism” and the development of “laissez-faire republicanism” in the nineteenth century is
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a tenuous one. On Gourevitch’s account, laissez-faire republicanism is a variant of republicanism
that is characterized by its re-framing of wage labor as free labor.38 He attributes the emergence
of this view to the rapid expansion of a permanent wage-labor force and introduction of factory
production in the nineteenth century. Because “free labor,” as agrarian republicans defined it,
became increasingly difficult to obtain, economic independence took on a new meaning. On this
outlook:
The free laborer is free in virtue of the control he exercises over his labor-power as his
own property, not as a form of inalienable control over the activity of work itself. To
freely alienate this control over one’s capacity to labor, through a labor contract, was no
violation of one’s independence because the individual had consented to give this control
over his property to another for a specified period of time and on terms to which he had
consented.39
In other words, where agrarian republicans claimed that economic independence was made
possible through owning productive property and thereby having direct control over one’s labor,
laissez-faire republicans claimed that it was enough to possess property in one’s person to be
considered economically independent. On this view, while workers labor under the private will
of an employer, they do so “voluntarily” by consenting to the terms of their employment. This
outlook can also be described as the application of proprietarian logic to labor. Because labor is
described as a type of property, employers can claim that any intervention in employment
contracts violates the worker’s property rights.
Although Gourevitch identifies laissez-faire republicanism as a nineteenth century
development, I suggest that this outlook has its origins in thinkers like Smith and Kant, who both
view wage labor as an expression of republican freedom.40 This is especially clear in Kant’s
discussion of wage labor and employment contracts. Kant, although describing wage-laborers as
38
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“dependents,” does not view them as unfree in the republican sense of the term. Alternatively,
Kant views wage laborers as lacking political freedom (as being passive not active citizens), but
not as lacking in civil freedom. For Kant, moreover, civil freedom is republican freedom. Kant
also adopts this view by incorporating the idea of contractual rights, which allows him to claim
that wage laborers are both dependent on their employers and civilly free. Gourevitch overlooks
this important distinction and mischaracterizes Kant as a pre-nineteenth century thinker who, like
Cicero, identifies wage labor with dependency and therefore represents an economic outlook
closer in line with the classical republican view.41

Labor Republicanism
To help illuminate how the ideals of the agrarian republican tradition may be of use in
contemporary approaches to markets, this section considers the idea of labor republicanism.
As already discussed, the agrarian republican tradition sought to overcome economic
dependency by equalizing property ownership and establishing greater opportunities for free
labor in agricultural production. This model came closest to being enacted in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries in America, as exemplified in the egalitarian property schemes
proposed by Lincoln, Paine, and Jefferson.42 In England, given the rapid consolidation of land, it
was too late for the agrarian reforms proposed by anti-enclosure thinkers to be enacted.
In the nineteenth century American context, as the number of wage laborers rose and
industrial employment expanded, the agrarian republican model became increasingly untenable.
41
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In response, there emerged a “labor republican” movement that adjusted the small producer ideal
of the agrarian republican tradition to the contemporary industrial setting. This labor republican
outlook was articulated in the early 1820s-30s by “workingmen’s” organizations and again (in a
more developed form) in the late nineteenth century by the Knights of Labor.43 What united this
group of thinkers was their republican critique of wage labor and adoption of the principle of
cooperative production.
The labor republican critique of “wage slavery” was directed at the laissez-faire
reformulation of wage labor as free and voluntary. On this account, wage laborers were said to
be free because they possessed control or ownership over their labor power. Laissez-faire
republicans claimed that insofar as workers were free to enter and leave employment contracts or
to alienate their labor power as they saw fit, they were not subject to the arbitrary authority of a
single employer. Any attempt to intervene in labor markets, moreover, was viewed as a violation
of the worker’s right to enter into contract with the employer of their choosing.44
In response to this argument, labor republicans claimed that although workers were not
legally bound to their employers (as in the case of chattel slavery), they were still subject to them
through “personal” and “structural” forms of economic domination.45 Gourevitch details how
labor republicans articulated this claim.46 In terms of the structural aspect of domination, it was

43

The Knights of Labor formed in 1869 as a “secret organization.” Peak membership reached
700,000 members in 1886, but the organization dissolved in the 1890s. Gourevitch, From
Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 99.
44
Gourevitch provides an overview of court cases where this logic was applied. The most
famous case being Lochner v. New York in which a maximum hours law for bakers was rejected
on the basis that it “infringed” on the liberties of the workers and their “independence of
judgment.” Ibid., 63.
45
This is Gourevitch’s terminology. Ibid., 106-16.
46
What follows is a summary of Gourevitch’s reconstruction. As he notes, the labor republican
view was never articulated as a “philosophical form of a formal treatise,” but rather was
193

argued that unequal distributions of property compelled dispossessed workers to sell their labor
to the property owning class. To recall, this view was central to Price’s criticism of the
enclosures. While workers were not legally forced to work for an employer, the fact that they
lacked “material independence” (i.e. productive assets) meant that they were economically
compelled to be dependent on a minority class of landowners.47 It was emphasized too,
moreover, that while workers were free to leave an abusive employer, they were not free to opt
out of selling their labor power altogether. In other words, while workers were not subject to a
single employer, insofar as they lacked material assets, they remained subject to employers as a
class.
It was also argued that these structural relations supported personal forms of domination
both in the making of the employment contract and in the worker’s relationship to their
employer. In this way, labor republicans offered a criticism of the contractual defense of wage
labor theorized by laissez-faire advocates. In regard to the making of the employment contract, it
was argued that because workers are dependent on their employers for their livelihood, they are
forced to accept conditions of labor that they would otherwise be opposed to (i.e. if they were
materially independent). Employers and workers, in other words, do not meet each other as
equals in setting the terms of the contract by virtue of the fact that the employers are owners of
property, while workers are not.
What made workers unfree in the eyes of labor republicans was not only the fact that
workers lacked bargaining power in setting the terms of the contract. It was also understood that
the employment contract itself was constitutive of subordination and servitude. This is because
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the labor contract entailed handing over one’s person to the private use of another. On the
classical republican outlook, this was an obvious instance of domination, insofar as the person is
subjected to an arbitrary will. On the contractual view, however, as long as one consents to the
use of their person by another, it cannot be said to be in violation of their freedom. Gourevitch
insightfully details the labor republican response to this argument:
It was a mockery of the idea of consent to say that the worker, by agreeing to sell his
labor, had thereby consented to every command of the boss, and thus followed only his
own will. The actual contract was exactly the opposite, an agreement not to control those
decisions—an agreement of subjection. In fact, to labor republicans, the whole point of
the contract was that the worker had consented to evacuate his will, to suspend its
exercise for the period of employment. Outside violating the very general terms of the
contract, the employer was at liberty to do what he liked. Here was where labor
republicans drove home their argument against the laissez-faire republicans. The basic
logic of any contract to sell property was that sale of a commodity involves giving over
ownership and control rights of that commodity to the buyer. But the special character of
the labor commodity—as a physical commodity (the body) inseparable from the seller’s
person—meant that labor contract was necessarily an agreement to give up control over
the seller’s will for the duration of the working day.48
It was unclear, in other words, how the act of consent (which, moreover, can hardly be said to be
given “freely” by the dispossessed) made it such that the worker was no longer subject to the
authority of their employer. Therefore, from the labor republican view, what appeared to be an
act of domination from one perspective was the paradigm of freedom from another.
Contemporary scholars, including Carole Pateman, have put forward similar critiques of
contract theory. Like the labor republicans, Pateman, although herself not a republican thinker,
also views contract theory as a “means of creating relationships of subordination” that are, in
turn, “presented as freedom.”49 Pateman claims that contracts, like the employment contract, are
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constitutive of social relations where obedience is exchanged for protection.50 Where, the one
“who provides protection, has the right to determine how the other party will act to fulfill their
side of the exchange.”51 This is true, for example, in the employment contract, given that, in
return for remuneration, the worker agrees “to obey the direction of an entrepreneur.”52 Pateman
concludes from this that the identification of contracts with freedom is ideological, insofar as
contractual agreements entail submission into a relation of subordination.
Pateman’s critique of contractarianism is indebted to Rousseau, who offers a similar
criticism of social contract theory. In general, social contract theorists argue that political
authority is justified if people agree to it.53 Hobbes, for example, claims that the authority of the
sovereign is legitimate because people bring the sovereign into power through a contractual
agreement (whether voluntarily or not). Rousseau’s criticism of Hobbes is that his version of the
social contract is not actually contractual in the sense of constituting a free mutual agreement,
given that it entails the exchange of freedom for protection. On Rousseau’s view, such an
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Pateman also refers to the employment contact (as well as the social contract in liberal
societies) as a “promise to obey,” which is distinct from a promise. She writes of this distinction:
“Promising…implies that individuals are capable of independent judgement and rational
deliberation, and of evaluating and changing their own actions and relationships; promises may
sometimes justifiably be broken. However, to promise to obey is to deny or to limit, to a greater
or lesser degree, individuals’ freedom and equality and their ability to exercise these capacities.
To promise to obey is to state that, in certain areas, the person making the promise is no longer
free to exercise her capacities and decide upon her own actions, and is no longer equal, but
subordinate.” Carole Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 19. While rejecting aspects of Hegel’s
version of the social contract, she remarks that she is indebted to him for her theorization of
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some, hypothetical consent is possible (i.e. tacit consent). For others, partial consent is sufficient.
Rousseau’s account is more radical in demanding full agreement by those who are ruled (albeit
excluding women). On these distinctions see Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, 1516.
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exchange cannot be described as contractual, given that the act of alienating one’s freedom is a
contradiction in terms. In this way, Rousseau viewed Hobbes’ social contract to be analogous to
slavery, which Rousseau argues is a relationship based on force, not contractual agreement.54
Rousseau’s alternative social contract theory claimed that sovereignty is an inalienable
right of the people. On this view, in order for people to remain free but still subject to civil laws,
they must live under the laws that they themselves have created. In this way, people maintain
their freedom because they are subject to a collective will, not the private will of a sovereign.
Rousseau’s solution to the problem of political authority relates to the idea of popular
sovereignty and self-governance. As Pateman describes it, Rousseau’s version of the social
contract was a “democratic” account that criticized the “liberal” account of political obligation.55
It was, moreover, a similar theory of democracy that informed the labor republican’s solution to
workplace domination.
As Gourevitch details, in response to their analysis of workplace domination, labor
republicans theorized an alternative economic arrangement of cooperative production. This
model entailed “an economy of interdependent producer and consumer cooperatives, collectively
owned and managed by workers.” 56 Labor republicans, then, went beyond the individualist
agrarian model of their predecessors (although, importantly, still employed the ideal of “self-
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As Rousseau writes: “Finally, it is a vain and contradictory convention to stipulate absolute
authority on one side and a limitless obedience on the other. Is it not clear that no commitments
are made to a person from whom one has the right to demand everything? And does this
condition alone not bring with it, without equivalent or exchange, the nullity of the act? For what
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Problem of Political Obligation, 5.
56
Gourevitch, From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth, 118.
197

governance” advocated by Price). Recognizing the cooperative nature of industrial labor, they
reinterpreted what “productive control” over one’s labor would have to entail.57 On their view,
this “could only mean equal, collective rule over their joint activity.”58 Like Rousseau’s solution
to the problem of political absolutism, labor republicans claimed that workers were free only if
they were subject to rules that they themselves created. As Gourevitch details, this did not mean
doing away with hierarchical arrangements altogether. While there was still the need for
technical expertise and management, on the self-governance model “managers would be
accountable to workers” and therefore not pose a threat to the worker’s freedom.59 Workers, in
other words, might have to comply with workplace rules, but because these rules have been
collectively decided upon, it cannot be said they are following the orders of a private arbitrary
will.
While the idea of worker cooperatives existed in the early workingmen’s movement, it
was not until the late nineteenth century, with the formation of The Knights of Labor, that these
ideas were put into action. Gourvetich details how the Knights created “500 producer
cooperatives, and thousands of consumer co-ops, employing tens of thousands of workers.”60
Importantly, moreover, the labor republican vision went beyond supporting the development of
worker collectives within an otherwise capitalist economy. Rather, they believed that the
development of worker cooperatives would eventually “replace wage-labor with cooperation
wholesale.”61 They also incorporated plans for “creating a parallel cooperative economy…[that]
would have its own public credit system and issue currency notes, based on labor time, usable in
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markets…selling only cooperative produced goods.”62 There were also ideas for a “national
cooperative fund” that would help provide capital for cooperatives, and allow them to compete
with non-cooperative businesses.63 Their economic outlook aimed thus to give workers,
consumers, and communities greater decision-making power over economic activities that
affected their livelihood and freedom. In many ways, the example of the worker cooperative
model theorized by nineteenth century labor republicans aligns with the principles of economic
democracy (discussed in the introduction).

Conclusion
In the preceding discussion, I hope to have shown how competing conceptualizations of
economic freedom and equality circulated throughout the eighteenth century. Some of these
outlooks were more explicit in addressing the economic harms associated with the development
of the new ownership society and its corresponding proprietarian ideology. While a defense of
property was also central to agrarian and labor republicans, in their emphasis on self-ownership
or collective ownership, their proposal for a new property regime sought to prevent the
consolidation of wealth and therefore political power in the hands of a minority class.
In addition to defending an agrarian reform that would limit the accumulation of
property, Price was also favorable to forms of communal property (i.e. the commons) that the
enclosures threatened to dissolve. In the case of the labor republicans, they applied the ideal of
self-governance promoted by agrarian republicans to the industrial context and supported
collective ownership and governance in the workplace. Because these thinkers identified
freedom with self-sufficiency (whether conceived as individual or collective), their defense of
62
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property aimed to prevent the growth of a laboring class dependent on a wealthy class of
proprietors. For reasons I have detailed already, in rejecting these reforms, Turgot, Smith, and
Kant did not make the same connection between equality in property ownership with freedom.
On their accounts, freedom was compatible with wage labor and inequalities in property
ownership and wealth.
The ideals and models proposed by agrarian and labor republicans continue to be relevant
for contemporary economic debate. From a global perspective, small agrarian and indigenous
communities are threatened with the same processes of primitive accumulation that English
peasants fought against since the beginning of the early modern period up until the eighteenth
century. In these communities, local governance over food and natural resources is under threat
from multinational corporations that extract resources for short-term economic gain. Resistance
to land grabbing and other forms of resource extraction mimic eighteenth century struggles
against the enclosures and the liberalization of grain. The model of collective ownership and
governance in the workplace that was expressed by labor republicans is a demand voiced in
contemporary labor struggles in industrial and post-industrialized countries. The growing
disparity in economic wealth and property ownership has also led many contemporary scholars,
like Piketty, to propose new forms of social and public ownership to curtail the consolidation of
property in the hands of an elite minority. These movements have closer intellectual roots with
some of the critical positions outlined in this dissertation, not the more modest proposals of
wealth redistribution found in the pro-market outlook of the early proponents of economic
liberalization.
Recognizing that alternative proposals for economic justice have occurred in the past, in
particular during the transitional period to a new economic and political regime, can help provide
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insight into the contemporary moment. In the eighteenth century, different paths were proposed
and debated, alternative conceptualizations of freedom and equality were theorized, and the
liberal free market economy—which has been declared as “the only alternative” since the
1980s—was only gradually (and not without resistance) implemented.64 Perhaps, now more
aware of the shortcomings of the current inegalitarian ownership model, it would behoove
scholars to revisit the egalitarian outlook that formed a formidable counter-discourse to the
liberal economic tradition. These theories may prove to be useful in the normative work of
reconstructing new approaches to economic justice. I have only sketched the philosophical
underpinnings of these alternative economic models, but I hope to have convincingly shown why
the more modest accounts of Turgot, Smith, and Kant fail to live up to the egalitarian label that
contemporary scholars commonly attach to them.

64

I refer here to the slogan used by Margaret Thatcher, “There is no alternative,” which meant
there is no alternative to a neoliberal free market system.
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